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ABSTRACT
SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION IN PRACTICE
Marcella Christine Hastings
Nadia Heninger
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic primitive for computing on private data.
MPC provides strong privacy guarantees, but practical adoption requires high-quality application
design, software development, and resource management. This dissertation aims to identify and
reduce barriers to practical deployment of MPC applications.
First, the dissertation evaluates the design, capabilities, and usability of eleven state-of-the-art
MPC software frameworks. These frameworks are essential for prototyping MPC applications, but
their qualities vary widely; the survey provides insight into their current abilities and limitations. A
comprehensive online repository augments the survey, including complete build environments, sample
programs, and additional documentation for each framework.
Second, the dissertation applies these lessons in two practical applications of MPC. The first
addresses algorithms for assessing stability in financial networks, traditionally designed in a full-
information model with a central regulator or data aggregator. This case study describes principles
to transform two such algorithms into data-oblivious versions and benchmark their execution under
MPC using three frameworks. The second aims to enable unlinkability of payments made with
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. This study uses MPC in conjunction with other privacy techniques
to achieve unlinkability in payment channels. Together, these studies illuminate the limitations of
existing software, develop guidelines for transforming non-private algorithms into versions suitable
for execution under MPC, and illustrate the current practical feasibility of MPC as a solution to a
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From the first introduction of secure multi-party computation in the 1980s, theorists have developed
robust, efficient algorithms; researchers have implemented optimized software frameworks; and newly
identified applications abound in the real world. However, connecting these threads into effective,
privacy-preserving deployments reveals a new set of challenges. This dissertation aims to identify and
solve some of these challenges to encourage wider-spread adoption of this useful, privacy-enhancing
primitive.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic tool that allows a group of mutually
distrustful parties to compute a function on their joint inputs without revealing anything beyond
the output of the computation. This umbrella encompasses a wide variety of functions; some
algorithms optimize for a specific function, like set intersection or signing. Others are capable of
computing an arbitrary function. This dissertation focuses mainly on the latter category, trading
off application-specific optimization for broad, reusable utility across many settings. However, this
theoretic expressive capability requires a great deal of practical infrastructure before it can be used
with real data. Lindell writes [Lin21]:
“MPC still requires great expertise to deploy, and additional research breakthroughs are
needed to make secure computation practical on large data sets and for complex problems,
and to make it easy to use for nonexperts.”
This dissertation explores the question of why MPC is difficult to deploy.
Although challenges to practical application exist, the academic community has successfully
1
collaborated with practitioners to develop software for MPC applications: the first software framework
implementing general-purpose secure computation was introduced in 2004 [MNPS04], and the first
known deployment was a blind auction for Danish sugar beets [BCD+09]. Recent applications
illustrate a range of motivating factors for using privacy enhancing technologies. The ZCash foundation
used MPC to compute verifiably random parameters for zk-SNARKS [BGM17, BD18]; the goal of the
computation was to compute parameters with randomness that relies on only one of the 87 participants’
honest behavior. The Boston Women’s Workforce Council computed statistics on gender and racial
wage gaps across Boston [LJDA+18], without compromising on participants’ concerns of liability for
data leakage or negative publicity. Other proposed deployments [BJSV15, SvA+19, RQA+18] are
motivated by similar concerns about the legal and security implications of hosting sensitive data and
a general reluctance to identify a single trusted party to perform data aggregation and computation
in the clear.
However, as Lindell suggests, many of these deployments required a team of expert cryptographers
to develop a custom MPC protocol or implementation for their specific use case. Secure computation
has been proposed as a solution for a wide range of practical applications, from general computations of
secure statistical analysis [BKL+14, BKLS14, BNTW12, DA01a, DA01b, DA01c, DHC04, LP09b], to
more domain-specific uses like financial oversight [AKL12, BKK+16, BTW12, FKOS13], biomedical
computations [CWB18, CH15, HCB18, JKS08, JWB+17, KBLV13, Zel14] and satellite collision
detection [HLOI16, HWB14, KW14]. However, MPC has yet to be deployed successfully across
this broad application spectrum. The work in this dissertation aims to identify specific barriers
to adoption of MPC, develop tools and techniques for simplifying deployments by various types of
practitioners, and present several novel applications with proof-of-concept deployment software.
1.1 Overview
This dissertation examines barriers to practical deployment of secure multi-party computation
practical with three main studies: (1) analyzing the capabilities and maturity of software tools for
MPC; (2) adapting existing, non-private algorithms to be efficient under MPC; and (3) designing
and implementing a component-wise integration of MPC into a larger protocol. Overall, this
dissertation aims to show that software analysis and practical case studies are effective methods
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for identifying limitations of current MPC frameworks, even as they demonstrate the feasibility of
current technologies for practical use.
Chapter 2 introduces the cryptographic building blocks that underlie MPC protocols, surveys the
main varieties of secure computation protocols, and outlines the simulation paradigm used in this
dissertation to prove the security of protocols.
Chapter 3 surveys software frameworks for MPC. These end-to-end frameworks include a full
toolchain for describing and securely executing a function among multiple parties. Development
of such software is nontrivial; it requires implementation of cryptographic protocols, complex
distributed systems, and language compilers that can translate high-level function descriptions
into the simplified representations consumed by an MPC algorithm. The survey describes eleven
end-to-end software frameworks, recording characteristics including threat and computational models;
data types, operations, and data structures supported; and software architecture. It also defines a
set of usability criteria based on documentation and software examples.
One finding of the survey is that simple usability issues are a major barrier to effective use of the
software frameworks. A severe lack of documentation and complex software requirements to build and
execute the tools introduce a significant up-front cost to a potential deployment. In order to reduce
these issues, Chapter 3 is accompanied by an open-source software repository with complete build
environments (Docker containers) and simple programs for each framework, along with additional
documentation derived while using the tools. This work has significant impact: the repository has
272 stars and over 70 forks1 and the paper [HHNZ19] has been cited more than 40 times in two years,
illustrating widespread community interest and active use of these resources.
Implementing sample programs illuminated other features and limitations of the frameworks that
would not have been obvious from simply reading their accompanying papers. The development
process identified software bugs in several of the tools. In other cases, the capabilities and claims
made in the papers seemed to require an incredibly deep understanding of the software, and lack of
such knowledge prevented successful implementation of the sample programs for this work. This
was particularly common in frameworks that integrated tools and techniques from other fields, e.g.
formal guarantees about the custom programming language, or circuit compilers typically used for
designing hardware circuits. Although some errors are to be expected with software produced in
1See https://github.com/mpc-sok/frameworks, as of 20 January 2020.
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a academic-focused environment, this finding indicates that particular care must be taken as the
complexity of the software increases.
Chapter 4 explores a use case drawn from the literature on financial networks. Existing work
in this setting typically relies on a central data aggregator to collect information from each node
in a network and execute some algorithm on it. This chapter centers on the problem of identifying
and mitigating systemic risks in financial networks. The setting assumes a group of asset-owning
participants, such as banks, who construct a network of liabilities among themselves. The existing
literature [EGJ14, EN01] determines whether a network is solvent if all participants attempt to
pay back their debts, but it requires each participant to share a great deal of potentially sensitive
information about their institutional interdependencies with a central agent.
This chapter converts network analysis algorithms to data-oblivious versions suitable to execute
under MPC. It describes implementations using three separate MPC software frameworks with
different threat models and discusses the overall costs and feasibility of this approach to network
analysis. This is one of the first practical implementations of such an algorithm and the first to
measure realistic benchmarks. This work also presents two contributions that aim to simplify future
MPC applications: it (1) defines a clear set of principles for transforming an arbitrary algorithm into
an MPC-friendly representation and (2) explores the limitations of existing MPC software on complex
algorithms. These contributions aim to solve problems for two groups of people. First, experts in
non-cryptographic fields now have a clearer roadmap to scoping appropriate MPC applications within
their domain. Second, MPC framework designers can consider this case study as they improve on
existing frameworks. This application significantly exceeds the complexity of the sample programs
from Chapter 3, with arithmetic and comparison operations over fixed-point numbers and complex
matrix operations. This work identifies additional usability issues and efficiency bottlenecks that
may generalize to other computations, and are worth addressing in future work on MPC frameworks.
Chapter 5 describes the design and implementation of a protocol for unlinkable payment channels
that address privacy, scalability, and latency issues that arise in traditional cryptocurrencies and
digital payment systems. The zkChannels protocol uses MPC in conjunction with other privacy
technologies to achieve security and usability properties that cannot be efficiently implemented with
MPC alone. A payment channel allows two parties to escrow funds on an existing blockchain and
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make payments directly to each other off-chain. Channels guarantee that honest parties cannot lose
money with an on-chain arbitration process. The zkChannels protocol adds an unlinkability property
to these guarantees: a merchant maintaining channels with a set of customers cannot link any given
payment with a specific customer or to any other payment. The protocol is flexible with respect to
the underlying arbiter and can be used to add additional privacy guarantees on top of almost any
existing cryptocurrency.
zkChannels is a three-phase protocol: users interact with a cryptocurrency network to Establish
and Close a channel, but only communicate among themselves to Pay. Payments use MPC to produce
an updated closing transaction signed by both parties while maintaining privacy on their identities
and signing keys. However, zkChannels includes other techniques to prevent double-spending, ensure
that both parties can close on the correct balances, and prevent denial-of-service attacks.
This work implements a complex MPC computation with specific requirements, which may provide
new challenges to framework designers. The complexity in this design arises from the practical
requirements of the protocol; for example, the MPC solution must provide different outputs for
different parties and efficiently support public input values. To maintain unlinkability, the setting
does not allow participants to generate significant preprocessing data ahead of time, so any “function-
independent” data must be efficient to compute. Further, the protocol integrates with other software
components and requires a framework with a flexible development environment.
These chapters rely on software frameworks developed, for the most part, in academia (including
[WMK16, AKR+19, Sch]), Chapters 3 and 5 include open-source, proof-of-concept implementations
of their applications. This software provide reasonable guarantees for academic work, but deployments
on highly sensitive data require high quality software to ensure that the privacy guarantees of MPC
are not compromised by vulnerabilities. Chapter 6 describes work on one such framework developed
at Microsoft Research, which includes an extensive testing framework, significant documentation,
and an integration into a more general platform for deploying secure computation. This chapter
describes one attempt to break down a major barrier to practical adoption of secure computation:
the lack of high-quality software suitable for use with private data.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with specific takeaways from the studies, illuminating concrete areas
for improvement and future work.
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1.2 Contributions
Chapter 3 is drawn largely from joint work with Brett Hemenway Falk, Daniel Noble and Steve
Zdancewic [HHNZ19]. My contributions include design of the survey criteria, analysis and software
implementations for 9 of 11 frameworks, and ongoing maintenance of the repository.
Chapter 4 is drawn largely from joint work with Brett Hemenway Falk and Gerry Tsoukalas [HHFT20].
My major research contributions include implementing the network algorithms in two software frame-
works, benchmarking them, and discussing the advantages and limitations of each option.
Chapter 5 is drawn from joint work with J. Ayo Akinyele, Gabe Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, Colleen M.
Swanson, Darius E. Parvin, and Gijs Van Laer [AGH+21]. My major research contributions include
designing, implementing, and benchmarking the MPC implementation, designing the FzkChannels ideal
functionality, and refining and debugging the zkChannels protocol.
Chapter 6 is drawn from a summer 2020 internship project at Microsoft Research, where I was
mentored by Hao Chen. I was supported in this work by Melissa Chase, Esha Ghosh, Radames Cruz




This chapter introduces the cryptographic underpinnings of MPC protocols, describes three basic
classes of MPC protocol, and briefly covers the simulation paradigm used to describe the security
of MPC. This background material provides useful context for the complexities of implementing
protocols.
2.1 Cryptographic building blocks
This section describes secret sharing and oblivious transfer, techniques used to represent and share
data in many MPC frameworks. Their MPC context is described in greater detail in Section 2.2. It
also briefly covers the common threat models used to describe the security guarantees of cryptographic
protocols.
2.1.1 Secret sharing
Cryptographic secret sharing protocols [Sha79, Bla79] allow a dealer to break a secret value into
shares and distribute these shares to group of recipients with the property that any unqualified set of
recipients learns nothing about the secret, while any qualified set of recipients can reconstruct the
secret from their shares. In practice, most secret-sharing protocols are threshold protocols, where any
collection of fewer than t shares reveals nothing about the secret – and any subset of size at least t can
reconstruct the secret. Many general secret sharing schemes exist [BL90, Bri90, BI93, VD97, CF02],
as well as constructions of secret-sharing schemes for general (non-threshold) access structures










Figure 2.1: Oblivious Transfer
In practice, most MPC protocols rely on a linear secret sharing scheme: either simple, additive
secret sharing, Shamir sharing, or replicated secret sharing. Each satisfies linearity: the sum of two
secret shares is equal to the share of the sum.
2.1.2 Oblivious transfer (OT)
Oblivious Transfer (OT) [Rab81, Wie83, EGL82] is a cryptographic protocol that allows a party to






-OT, where one secret is chosen from two options.
From a theoretical standpoint, MPC protocols can be built from OT alone [Kil88, IPS08], but
the key feature that makes OT suitable for building efficient MPC protocols is that OT is equivalent
to a seemingly weaker functionality called Random OT (ROT) [Cré88], where the choice bit b is not
provided as an input, but instead is randomly generated by the protocol itself. The output of a ROT
protocol is two correlated pairs of bits (x0, x1) and (b, xb), where x0, x1, b are uniformly distributed
in {0, 1}. Given a random OT correlation (the pairs (x0, x1) and (b, xb)) Alice and Bob can compute
the OT functionality using only three bits of communication.
Since ROT implies OT, parties can compute all the necessary ROTs needed for a protocol in
advance, in an input-independent pre-processing (“offline”) phase. Then, in the “online” phase, they
consume these pre-generated OTs and execute the protocol with minimal communication cost and
no computationally expensive public-key operations. This offline-online separation makes the online
phase of such a protocol extremely efficient, but there is still the problem of making the pre-processing
phase efficient. There are two fundamentally different approaches to handling the offline phase, either
through a trusted dealer or a cryptographic batched correlation-generation protocol.
In the trusted dealer model, a semi-trusted dealer simply distributes correlated randomness to all
the parties. The trusted dealer has no inputs, and never handles any secret information, thus the
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dealer need only be trusted to generate and distribute random values to the appropriate parties. In
the presence of a trusted dealer, the offline phase of many MPC protocols can be extremely efficient.
Even without a trusted dealer, OTs can be generated efficiently through OT extension, where
a small number of “base” or “seed” OTs are converted into a massive number of ROTs [IKNP03]
through the use of efficient symmetric-key primitives (e.g. AES). Since its introduction, there
have been many variants of OT-extension [ALSZ13, IPS08, HIKN08, NNOB12, Lar15, KOS15] and
OT-extension has become an essential feature in almost all MPC implementations.
2.1.3 Threat models
MPC most commonly deals with two types of adversary. Semi-honest participants, also known
as passive or honest-but-curious adversaries, execute the protocol correctly but attempt to glean
additional information from the input and messages they receive. A malicious or active adversary
may break the protocol arbitrarily in order to learn information about other inputs or to cause the
protocol to output an incorrect result. Some schemes also describe covert adversaries, who behave
arbitrarily but wish to avoid revealing themselves as an adversary. For example, a covert participant
would avoid aborting or sending obviously invalid messages during a protocol execution. However,
the protocols and implementations in this dissertation do not use this model.
The adversary model is independent of the number of parties that can be corrupted. An honest
majority requires that fewer than half of parties are corrupt; a dishonest majority allows up to n− 1
corruptions (in the number of participants n). If multiple parties are corrupted (for either semi-honest
or malicious adversaries), they may pool their data to attempt to learn additional information.
2.2 Secure multi-party computation
Secure multi-party computation protocols allow a group of mutually distrustful stakeholders to
securely compute any function of their joint inputs in such a way that the execution of the protocol
provably reveals nothing beyond the result of the computation. Security is often defined using
a simulation paradigm, described in Section 2.3. In this model, MPC cryptographically emulates
a trusted party who accepts each participant’s private input, computes the desired function, and
returns the result.
Early MPC protocols used a circuit model for secure computation, first representing the target
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function as either a Boolean or arithmetic circuit (over some finite field), then securely evaluating
the circuit gate-by-gate. Many software frameworks still use this circuit model of computation, but
others have expanded to a more robust model. In the remainder of this section, we sketch key design
characteristics of the major protocol families that underpin modern MPC systems.
2.2.1 Garbled circuits
Circuit garbling is a method for secure two-party computation, originally introduced by Yao [Yao82,
Yao86]. In this framework, there are two participants, a garbler and an evaluator. The participants
begin by expressing the desired function as a Boolean circuit. The garbler then proceeds to garble
the circuit gate-by-gate using a standard symmetric-key cryptosystem (usually AES), as follows. For
each wire in the circuit, the garbler selects two uniformly random and independent “wire tokens.”
The garbler then expresses each gate in the circuit as a truth table by encrypting each output wire
token with the two input wire tokens that generate it (for Boolean circuits with fan-in two, each
truth table will have four rows). The garbler permutes the rows of the truth-table, and sends the
entire collection of “garbled” gates to the evaluator. The garbling procedure is designed so that
learning one wire token for each input wire of a gate allows you to decrypt exactly one row of its
garbled truth-table, revealing a single wire token belonging to the output-wire of that gate. Thus an
evaluator that learns a single wire token for each input wire of the circuit can iteratively produce the
wire token for each wire in the circuit, and completely evaluate the circuit.
To provide its secret inputs, the garbler sends the correct wire tokens directly to the evaluator.
For each bit of the evaluator’s inputs, the garbler and evaluator engage in an oblivious transfer where
the evaluator secretly selects one of two wire tokens offered by the garbler. Once the evaluator has
a wire token for each input bit, it can evaluate the circuit (performing symmetric-key decryptions
for every gate) and learn the result. In the semi-honest model, the evaluator forwards the result of
the computation to the garbler. For a formal description of the garbling procedure, see Bellare et
al. [BHR12].
The initial garbled circuit protocol provided security against semi-honest adversaries [LP09a],
but there exist many different improvements and implementations that provide security against fully
malicious adversaries (e.g. [LR14, Lin13, WRK17a, WMK17, LR15]. Similarly, the vast majority of
garbled circuit protocols are for two parties, but recent work has expanded support to three or more
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parties [LPSY15, MRZ15, LSS16, WRK17b].
Two key performance improvements are the “free XOR trick” [KS08], which evaluates XOR
gates in a single round without any cryptographic operations required by the garbled tables; and
Half-Gates [ZRE15], which reduce the number of ciphertexts required to garble AND gates. The
addition of the AES-NI instruction set made computing AES encryptions on modern processors
extremely efficient, and has dramatically reduced the computation cost (but not the communication
cost) of garbled-circuit-based protocols.
Key Features: Circuit garbling is typically (but not exclusively) a two-party protocol, and requires
only a constant number of rounds of communication (independent of the circuit depth). The number
of (expensive) public-key operations depends only on the input size (OT is a public-key primitive)
and the number of private key operations depends on the number of gates. The total communication
cost is proportional to the size of the circuit. Since garbled circuit protocols represent each gate by its
truth table, the circuit size grows quadratically with the field size when garbling arithmetic circuits.
Thus almost all garbled circuits protocols operate on Boolean circuits. There are different methods
for garbling arithmetic circuits over large fields [AIK14], but these have never been implemented.
2.2.2 Multi-party circuit-based protocols
The GMW [GMW87], BGW [BGW88] and CCD [CCD88] protocols allow an arbitrary number of
parties to securely compute a function represented as a circuit. In these protocols, each party uses
a linear secret sharing scheme to share its input, and the parties engage in a protocol to compute
the answer gate-by-gate. Each gate computation securely transforms secret-shares of the gate’s
inputs to secret-shares of the gate’s outputs. For each addition gate in the circuit, participants can
locally compute shares of the output using the linearity of the secret-sharing scheme. Evaluating
multiplication gates requires communication, and the schemes differ in how they handle multiplication.
The GMW protocol can evaluate either Boolean or arithmetic circuits, and multiplication
gates are executed using Oblivious Transfer for Boolean circuits and with Oblivious Polynomial
Evaluation [NP06] or Oblivious Linear Evaluation [DGN+17] for arithmetic circuits. See Ishai et
al. [IPS09] for a summary of methods for securely computing multiplication gates.
Oblivious communications for multiplication gates dominate the cost of circuit evaluation. All
practical GMW-based implementations have taken steps to reduce their overhead. Whether evaluating
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arithmetic or Boolean circuits, the approach is the same: in an offline pre-computation phase, the
participants generate correlated randomness (or receive it from a trusted dealer), and in the online
phase, they use these random correlations as masks, or one-time-pads, to compute shares of the
output of a multiplication gate based on the shares of the inputs.
Boolean-circuit GMW-based protocols use OT-extension [IKNP03] to pre-compute ROT correla-
tions, which are then consumed in the online phase of the protocol. Arithmetic-circuit GMW-based
protocols usually generate some form of “Beaver Multiplication Triples” (secret shares of random
triples (a, b, a · b), where a, b are field elements) [Bea92] that are used as masks in the online phase.
Information-theoretic protocols, like BGW [GMW87] and CCD [CCD88] rely on secret-sharing
schemes supporting strong multiplication [CDM00, CC06, PCCX09, CDN15] rather than on public-
key primitives. These protocols can be faster, since they do not require computationally expensive
public-key operations, but require an honest majority of participants. They generally do not benefit
from including a pre-computation phase of the protocol.
Key Features: Multi-party circuit-based protocols can support an arbitrary number of participants.
The number of rounds of communication is proportional to the multiplicative depth of the circuit,
and the total amount of communication depends on the number of multiplication gates in the circuit.
These protocols allow independent computation parties to receive input and pass output to other
parties without compromising security.
2.2.3 Hybrid models
Recent systems have moved away from a strict circuit representation and instead use a hybrid model,
where functions compile into a set of optimized subprotocols for common operations. This set of
primitives, which may include traditional circuit-based operations, is seamlessly described in a single
protocol. Hybrid systems often represent intermediate values as secret shares over a large finite field.
They may use a mix of information-theoretic and cryptographic protocols, and as such, the number
of computation parties and threat models vary.
Hybrid models allow for very different performance characteristics than strict circuit-based models.
For example, in a finite field, operations like comparisons, bit-shifts, and equality tests are expensive
to represent as an arithmetic circuit. However, specialized sub-protocols that operate on secret shares
(e.g., [DFK+06, DGK08, Cou18]) can compute a sharing of the result far more efficiently.
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2.3 Simulation security
The security of cryptographic protocols is often defined using the notion of indistinguishability of
random variables (Definition 1). Roughly, two families of random variables (indexed by natural
numbers) are computationally indistinguishable, if the probability that any polynomial-time algorithm
can successfully distinguish a single sample of one distribution from a single sample of the other
decreases super-polynomially in the instance size.
Definition 1 (Indistinguishability). Two families of random variables {Xk}k∈N, {Yk}k∈N are said
to be computationally indistinguishable, denoted Xk
c≈ Yk, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms A, and all c > 0, there is an K such that for all k > K,
|Pr [A(Xk) = 1]− Pr [A(Yk) = 1]| < kc. (2.1)
A multi-party computation protocol is called secure if the execution of the protocol itself reveals
nothing more about the participants’ (private) inputs than what is revealed by the output alone. In
protocols where there is no output (or the output is secret-shared), the participants should learn
nothing about the inputs. Roughly, this means that each player’s view of the protocol (i.e., the
messages they send and receive) should be independent of the other participants’ private inputs
(after conditioning on the output).
This ensures that each participant (or certain colluding subsets of participants) learn nothing from
executing the protocol that they could not have learned from the output alone. In this way, MPC
cryptographically emulates a trusted party who accepts each participant’s private input, computes
the desired function and returns the result.
In the simulation paradigm, a protocol is said to be secure if there exists an efficient (polynomial-
time) simulator that, when interacting with an ideal functionality (an incorruptible third party
that always executes the protocol correctly), can produce views for each participant that are
indistinguishable from the transcript created by a real execution of the protocol.
To formalize this notion of security, in a setting with n participants, define, for i = {1, . . . , n}, a
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function of interest that needs to be computed in a privacy-preserving way:
fi : X
n → Y
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ yi.
The variables xi, yi are the input and output of participant i. Note that in many scenarios all fi
(and thus, yi) are equal, i.e., all participants receive the same output.
The view of player i in a multi-party protocol on inputs x1, . . . , xn, denoted viewi(x), is the
collection of all messages sent and received by player i when the protocol is run on input x.
A protocol is (t-n)-secure if any set of at most t participants can gain no information about the
remaining n− t players’ private inputs by colluding together. Setting t = n− 1 provides the strongest
notion of security, i.e., each individual’s privacy is preserved even if all other participants collude
against her.
The proof defines two modes of execution. In the Ideal experiment, all parties send their inputs
to an ideal functionality F , a incorruptible party that always produces the correct output on a
set of inputs. Corrupted parties communicate with the ideal functionality via a simulator Sim
that translates regular inputs into the format accepted by F . In the Real experiment, all parties
collaborate to run the real protocol. The output of each experiment is full view of the corrupted
parties and the outputs of the honest parties.
Definition 2 (Simulation-based security). An n-party computation protocol for computing the
function f
def
= (f1, . . . , fn) is said to be (t-n)-secure against a malicious adversary if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time real-world adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
ideal-world adversary Sim such that for any corrupted parties T ⊂ [n], with |T | ≤ t,
{IdealSim,F,T (1λ,x)}x
c≈ {RealA,Π,T (1λ,x)}x.
where the security parameter λ ∈ N.
Further details on this technique can be found in [Lin16].
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CHAPTER 3
General-Purpose Frameworks for Secure
Multi-Party Computation
Despite a demonstrated demand for MPC technology, practical adoption has been limited. This can
be attributed to many causes, but a common concern is the efficiency of the underlying protocols.
General-purpose MPC protocols, capable of securely computing any function, have been known to
the cryptographic community for 30 years [CCD88, GMW87, Yao82, Yao86]. Until recently such
protocols were mainly of theoretical interest, and were considered too inefficient (from the standpoint
of computation and communication complexity) to be useful in practice.
To address efficiency concerns, cryptographers have developed highly-optimized, special-purpose
MPC protocols for a variety of use cases. Unfortunately, this mode of operation does not foster
widespread deployment or adoption of MPC in the real world. Even if these custom-tailored MPC
protocols are theoretically efficient enough for practical use, designing, analyzing and implementing
a custom-tailored protocol from the ground up for each new application is not a scalable solution.
General-purpose MPC frameworks, could drastically reduce the burden of designing multiple
custom protocols and could allow non-experts to quickly prototype and deploy secure computations.
Frameworks can amortize the engineering effort devoted to making general-purpose MPC protocols
practical and secure across all of the uses of such a system.
Many significant challenges arise when designing and building an MPC framework. In general,
implementing any type of multi-round, distributed protocol robustly and efficiently is a major
engineering challenge, but MPC presents additional requirements that makes it especially challenging
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to build correctly. For efficiency, both the front-end compiler and the cryptographic back-end need
to be highly optimized. For usability, the compiler needs to be expressive, flexible, and intuitive for
non-experts, and should abstract away many of the complexities of the underlying MPC protocol,
including circuit-level optimizations (e.g. implementing floating-point operations as a Boolean circuit)
and back-end protocol choice (e.g. selecting an optimal protocol for a particular computation). With
today’s frameworks, optimizing performance often still requires a fair degree of knowledge and effort
on the part of the user.
Fairplay [MNPS04] was the first publicly available MPC framework. It translated code written in
a high-level Secure Function Definition Language (SFDL) into a garbled circuit representation, which
could then be (securely) evaluated by two parties. Fairplay was subsequently extended to allow for
true multi-party computation in FairplayMP [BNP08], using a modified version of the BMR protocol
[BMR90]. It was followed shortly by VIFF [GTK+, DGKN09] and SEPIA [BSMD10], which used
the same basic architecture: they took programs written in fairly high-level languages, converted
them to a circuit format, and executed the circuit using a secure computation protocol.
These early frameworks showed that general-purpose MPC was achievable, and, although their
performance rendered them unsuitable for most real-world applications, they launched what is now a
very active field of research in MPC framework design and implementation.
Thanks to these efforts, dramatic improvements in secure computation algorithms coupled with
a steady increase in hardware performance have made MPC a viable solution to a large class of
real-world problems. Modern MPC protocol implementations are fast enough to securely evaluate
complex functions on moderately-large data sets, such as the numerous implementations of secure
regression analyses with tens to hundreds of thousands of observations, and tens to hundreds of
variables [BKLS14, CDNN15, GSB+17, KLSR09, NWI+13].
The rush of activity in this field can be difficult to navigate: dozens of new protocol implementations
and supporting frameworks encompass a wide variety of architectures and features which influence
their efficiency, usability and suitability for different tasks. The goal of this chapter is to provide a
guide to the powerful new breed of MPC frameworks, and is primarily aimed at four distinct types
of readers.
1. Developers looking to choose a framework with which to implement a specific secure computation
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2. Theoretical cryptographers looking to understand state-of-the-art in practical, secure computa-
tion
3. Framework designers looking to understand the limitations of existing technology and identify
new research directions
4. Managers and policy-makers looking to understand whether existing technology is mature
enough for their needs
This chapter surveys the state-of-the-art MPC frameworks, evaluating them based on their
general architecture, underlying technology, threat models, and expressiveness. Our comparison
focuses on usability features rather than performance metrics, and we report on our experience with
implementing three small test programs in each case. Casual readers may wish to skim Section 3.3,
which discusses each framework in greater depth, and focus on the final discussion section, where we
advocate for improved documentation and standardization and suggest future directions in compiler
research.
Many of these frameworks are themselves research projects or works-in-progress: they have
nontrivial build dependencies and complicated work flows. Indeed, implementing our simple example
programs in each system required significant engineering effort: we estimate over 750 person-hours.
To allow others to experiment more easily with these systems, we have created an on-line Github
repository1 with two artifacts: (1) a set of Docker containers, each of which provides a development
environment configured with the required software infrastructure for each MPC framework, along
with executable examples of our test cases, and (2) a wiki page that collects much of the evaluation
presented here with additional documentation about each framework. These online resources have
been updated with additional software frameworks that are not described in this chapter, including
JIFF [LDAI+19, DAF], MP-SPDZ [Kel20], and MPyC [Sch]. It includes partial infrastructure
for ABY3 [MR18] and FRESCO [Ale], and notes other frameworks that have yet to be added
(EzPC [CGR+17], MOTION/HyCC [BDST20, BDK+18], and swanky [CMR]).
Related surveys. There is a small literature dedicated to surveying the state of MPC. Archer
et al.’s survey [ABPP15] of secure computation tools across several paradigms, including garbled
circuit schemes, defines a maturity taxonomy that aims to describe the practical readiness of several
1https://github.com/MPC-SoK/frameworks
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schemes. Shan et al.’s survey [SRBW18] outlines different threat models and computation techniques
for securely outsourcing many specific types of computation. The authors of Frigate [MGC+16]
include a short survey of existing MPC frameworks, which focuses on correctness and covers a slightly
older body of work. The SSC protocol comparison tool [PGFW, PGFW14] allows users to find
published protocols matching certain security or privacy criteria, but this tool classifies theoretical
protocols rather than implementations and does not include protocols developed in the past few
years. The awesome-mpc repository [Rot18] provides an up-to-date list of frameworks, back-ends
and special-purpose protocols, with a short description of each.
To the best of our knowledge, these previous works did not actually install and experiment
with each of the systems they surveyed, but drew their conclusions based on the descriptions of
the systems in their published papers and documentation. Unfortunately, we have found that the
features, functionality and syntax of the actual implementations do not always match those found in
the documentation.
Alternatives to MPC. Fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09] provides an alternative method for
securely computing functions encoded as arithmetic circuits. There are several libraries implementing
fully homomorphic encryption including HELib [HS15, HS14], PALISADE [RR16] and SEAL [SEA20].
We do not include these in our comparisons; they are surveyed in [VJH20]. There are efforts to
garble RAM-model programs [LO13, GHL+14, GLO15], instead of circuits, but these have not been
implemented. There is a great deal of software for special-purpose secure computation, such as
private set intersection, and tailored to specific use cases, such as machine learning. We omit these
from this survey.
3.1 Frameworks survey
We survey eleven general-purpose MPC compiler frameworks, all of which follow the same general
approach: first, a compiler converts a program written in a specialized, high-level language to an
intermediate representation (often a circuit). Then the circuit is passed as input to a runtime,
which executes an MPC protocol and produces an output. We survey two compilers (Frigate and
CBMC-GC) that do not have a runtime component.




































































EMP-toolkit [WMK16] GC 2+ G#   # #  #  05/2019
Obliv-C [ZE15] GC 2   #  #  G#  02/2019
ObliVM [LWN+15] GC 2   # # #  #  02/2016
TinyGarble [SHS+15] GC 2 #  # # # G# # G# 10/2018
Wysteria [RHH14] MC 2+   # G# #  G#  10/2014
ABY [DSZ15] GC,MC 2   #  #    05/2019
SCALE-MAMBA - Hy 2+ G#      G#  11/2020
Sharemind [BLW08] Hy 3   #     G# 03/2019
PICCO [ZSB13] Hy 3+   #  # G# #  10/2017
Frigate [MGC+16] - 2+ # - -  #  #  05/2016
CBMC-GC [HFKV12] - 2+ # - - G# #  #  04/2018
Table 3.1: A summary of defining features and documentation types. Partial support (G#) is explained in
Section 3.2.1.
settings, availability, and some usability features such as documentation. We limit our scope to recent
work: each framework has had a major update since 2014. We do not consider frameworks that are
primarily protocol implementations: all the projects included have a developed front-end. We also
do not consider standard libraries and APIs related to secure computation. In many cases, we only
consider the latest work by a research group.
These frameworks are typically introduced in an academic Paper. Although many develop
a custom or optimized protocol, we group them broadly into Protocol Families as described in
Section 2.2: Garbled Circuits (GC), Multi-party Circuit protocols (MC), and Hybrid models (Hy).
We also note the number of computation Parties Supported in a protocol evaluation.
We identify two main threat models as described in Section 2.1.3: Semi-honest and Malicious
adversaries. In practice, security against a malicious adversary is implemented as a “malicious-with-
abort” scheme, where the protocol aborts if malicious activity is detected; a malicious adversary
cannot cause an honest party to receive an incorrect result, but may prevent them from receiving
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an output altogether. These descriptors do not apply to frameworks that do not execute a secure
computation.
We note whether the framework allows Mixed-Mode computation: a way to execute both secure
and insecure operations in a single program.
In all tables, partial support is indicated by a G# symbol; these limitations are explained in detail
later in the text.
3.1.1 Engineering challenges
Many protocols use a circuit-based model to represent the function being computed. This has the
advantage that circuit-based computations are input independent and thus the run-time of the
protocol leaks nothing about the user inputs. However, using a circuit model introduces serious
challenges and limitations that are present to some degree in all of the frameworks we tested.
Arithmetic circuits operate over a finite field whose size must be set in advance, and must be
large enough to prevent overflow (which will vary by application). Arithmetic circuits do not natively
support non-arithmetic operations like comparisons and equality checks.
Boolean circuits need to redefine basic operations for every bit width: supporting arithmetic on
n-bit integers in such a protocol requires implementing n-bit addition and multiplication circuits.
We found no standardization in this area, and most Boolean circuit compilers design and implement
their own arithmetic operations. This leads to many restrictions on acceptable programs, and most
Boolean-circuit-based frameworks do not support arbitrary bit-width operations.
Compiling high-level programs into circuits requires unrolling all loops and recursive calls. For
privacy, the number of loop iterations and recursion depth cannot depend on private inputs. In some
situations, static analysis techniques can infer loop termination conditions, but most compilers do
not support such analysis, and instead force the programmer to manually define loop bounds at
compile time. Few compilers support recursion.
Conditional operations on secret data can reveal which branch was chosen if the branches take
different amounts of computation, so they are typically implemented as a multiplexer, where both
branches are evaluated. Similarly, a simple array lookup on a private index must be expanded into a
linear-size multiplexer circuit. Frigate, CBMC-GC, and PICCO implement private indexing in this
way. Oblivious RAM [GO96] provides a method for making RAM access patterns data independent,
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but few frameworks have ORAM support, either natively (ObliVM and SCALE-MAMBA) or via a
library (Obliv-C). Most languages do not even allow private array indexing syntactically: if i is a
“secret” integer and v is a “secret” array, then v[i] is not valid syntax.
Balancing transparency and flexibility is a key challenge for the MPC compiler designer. MPC
protocols often have very different performance characteristics than the corresponding insecure
computation, and a compiler that completely hides these differences from the end-user (e.g. automatic
multiplexing) in order to provide a more versatile, expressive high-level language can lead developers
to write code that is not “MPC-friendly.” Alternately, a framework that provides direct access to
different back-end representations assumes a high degree of cryptographic expertise on the part
of end-users but allows expert users to write highly optimized MPC protocols. It is possible to
provide both expressiveness and protocol efficiency without requiring a high degree of cryptographic
knowledge on the part of the developer by automatically selecting the optimal MPC protocol for
different parts of the code. This type of automatic optimization is difficult, however, and the MPC
compilers we analyzed do not attempt it. The EzPC project [CGR+17], HyCC framework [BDK+18]
and ABY3 project [MR18], all designed similarly to ABY (Section 3.3.6), attempt to automatically
optimize the back-end representation among three protocols. At the time of this writing, none of
these projects had code available and we have not included them in our tests.
3.2 Evaluation criteria
3.2.1 Usability
We consider the tools and documentation a developer needs to install, run, and write programs using
the framework. Our findings are summarized in Table 3.1. We identify several types of valuable
documentation. Thankfully, every framework we tested includes some form of basic installation
documentation. Language Documentation gives an overview of the high-level language: a language
architecture and design document, a start-up guide or tutorial, or a generated list of types and
built-in functions. Some larger systems also have Online Support, such as an active mailing list or
paid personnel who provide technical support2. Functional Example Code demonstrates end-to-end
execution of a program within a framework and is often more up-to-date than general language
2Although we received support from academic authors, we do not count responsive authors as “online support;”
this model is not scalable.
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documentation (a G# indicates we needed additional files or tools to run examples). Explicit Example
Documentation provides context for these programs, either in the comments of the code or a separate
document (a G# indicates limited documentation; details in Section 3.3).
Most frameworks are Open Source under a standard GNU or BSD license (a G# indicates closed-
source tools or code are required for full functionality). We record the date of the Last Major Update
(as of this writing): either ongoing development or the latest tagged release. Dates in italics indicate
the framework remains actively under development.
3.2.2 Sample programs
We implemented three sample programs to evaluate usability, expressiveness, architecture, and
cryptographic design of the frameworks.
Multiply Three. This program takes integer input from three parties and computes the product.
The simple function demonstrates the structure of each framework. The program tests whether the
implementation supports three or more parties, or if there is a simple way to secret-share multiple
inputs across the two computation servers. It also tests basic numeric capabilities of the framework:
input and output of integers and simple computation on secure types.
Inner Product. The inner product takes the sum of the pairwise product of the elements of two
vectors. It tests array-related functionality. Parties should be able to pass an array as input, store
secret data within, and access and iterate over the contents. Some frameworks provide ways to
parallelize operations over arrays, either through explicit syntactic support or through a parallel
architecture device like SIMD gates.
Crosstabulation. The crosstabulation program calculates averages by category, where the category
table and value table share a primary key but are owned by different parties. This tests framework
expressiveness, including input, output, and modification of arrays and conditionals on secret data.
In some cases, we tested whether user-defined data types (structs) are supported. We used a simple,
brute-force algorithm, and typically returned a list of sums by category (rather than averages).
3.2.3 Functionality
We assess the expressive ability of the high-level language used to define secure functions. These
criteria are summarized in Table 3.2.
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EMP-toolkit               #  #
Obliv-C   #              Lib
ObliVM #    G#  G#          oram
TinyGarble - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Wysteria   # # G# -  #    G# # #  # #
ABY G#  # G#  #      # # #  G# #
SCALE-MAMBA #  G#   # G# #         oram
Sharemind   #              #
PICCO G#                Mux
Frigate #   #  #  #         Mux
CBMC-GC   # G#  #           Mux
Table 3.2: A summary of functionality and expressibility of each high-level language. Partial support (G#) is
explained for individual frameworks in Section 3.3.
Data types. A fully-supported data type must have both public and secret forms, and the language
should allow input and output of the type. These include Booleans, signed or unsigned Fixed -length
Integers, and more complicated numerical types, such as Arbitrary-length Integers and Float ing- or
fixed-point numbers. Although libraries for these types can be built using fixed-length integer types,
we only mark them supported if they are available by default. Combination types include Arrays
and Dynamic Arrays, where the latter has a size not known at compile time, as well as Structs,
user-defined types that can hold other data types as sub-fields. These complex types are marked
supported if they can contain secure data.
Operators. Supported operators can be applied to secret data types to get a secret result. We
consider Logical operators on Booleans and Comparisons (equality and inequalities) between integers.
We group Addition and subtraction as one category, and Multiplication and Division separately. We



















































EMP-toolkit C++  Lib (C++) #     G#  
Obliv-C OCaml, C  Ext (C) #       
ObliVM Java # Ind #   #  # #
TinyGarble C/C++  Ext (Verilog) #   - - - -
Wysteria OCaml - Ind #  - # # - G#
ABY C++  Lib (C++)   #     
SCALE-MAMBA Python,C++ - Ind  # -   G#  
Sharemind C/C++ - Ind  # -     
PICCO C/C++ - Ext (C)  # - #    
Frigate C++ - Ind #  # -   G#
CBMC-GC C++ - Ext (C) #  # #   G#
Table 3.3: Details on architectural and implementation details. Partial support (G#) is explained in
Section 3.2.4.
Grammar. Conditionals on a secret Boolean condition can be implemented either with if-statement
syntax or a multiplexer operator, though we require an explicit language construct. We consider
Array Access with a public index and the harder problem of array access with a Private Index. The
latter can be implemented as a linear-time multiplexer (Mux), native ORAM support (ORAM) or a
library for ORAM (Lib).
3.2.4 Implementation criteria
In this section we define architectural and cryptographic criteria, summarized in Table 3.3. We note
the main Development Language for each framework. Garbled circuit protocols can significantly




We define three broad architecture categories. Independent (Ind) frameworks develop novel languages
and compilers: from limited, domain-specific languages that interface with existing general-purpose
languages to stand-alone environments. Some frameworks are Extensions (Ext) of an existing
language. These may modify or extend existing compilers to add functionality or take a compiler
intermediate state as input. Library (Lib) frameworks are fully implemented in an existing language.
They generally define a secure type class and methods for circuit construction and protocol execution.
Library and Extension types both depend on a host language, which we specify in the table.
Computation model
We consider whether the underlying computation model is over an Arithmetic field or is based on
Boolean circuits. Garbled circuit implementations can generate circuits On-the-Fly, starting runtime
execution before the circuit is fully generated. This can reduce resource consumption, allow dynamic
array and loop bounds, and reduce overall program runtime.
I/O
Input is typically read from a file, but some frameworks allow Arbitrary Formatting, rather than
a specific input format. (We’ve produced input generation scripts for our sample programs.) We
note whether the framework supports Different Input types from each party. Frameworks should
support Array Output (a G# indicates array elements must be returned one at a time) and Multiple
Output, where a single party receives two or more output values in a single computation (a G# indicates
multiple values must be wrapped in a struct).
In Section 3.3, we comment specifically on restrictions in the I/O file formats, including support
for arbitrary-size integers. We recognize that many frameworks are produced in an academic setting
that may not value “engineering problems” such as I/O, but we found that the significant usability
impact of these capabilities make them worth discussing in this survey.
3.2.5 Performance
In this work, we focus on usability and do not benchmark framework performance (e.g. run-time,
bandwidth, memory-usage, circuit depth). We believe a quantitative evaluation of our sample
programs would not accurately represent the performance abilities of each framework. There
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are several reasons why theoretical efficiency metrics are not always applicable in practical MPC
architectures, and we found that direct comparison between different models was often misleading.
Circuit size and depth have different implications in garbled circuit and secret-sharing-based protocols,
and many frameworks never generate a full circuit for comparison. Execution time varies based on
the framework architecture, and preprocessing phases and other variations in execution architecture
further complicate timing measurements.
Variations in protocol family and threat model mean that most frameworks are not directly
comparable, and our choice of benchmarking function will have a major effect on the relative speed
of the frameworks. Our sample programs are designed to reveal the expressive capabilities of a
framework and do not necessarily represent a practical MPC use case. A stand-alone measurement
for a single run of one of our programs would not take into account the context (typically part of a
larger system) in which a secure computation may be evaluated in practice.
We do not wish to disservice incomparable frameworks by providing concrete numbers for
impractical test cases. Although a worthwhile and practically useful endeavor, producing a realistic
testing framework is beyond the scope of this project.
3.3 Frameworks
In this section, we discuss each framework in detail, elaborating on limitations noted in the tables and
on the overall usability of each framework. We make recommendations on appropriate use for each
framework. We emphasize that many of these frameworks are academic projects, and are therefore
subject to the engineering constraints of such an endeavor. Even as we describe the limitations of
these compilers, we wish to emphasize the significant contributions that each has made to the field.
3.3.1 EMP toolkit
EMP toolkit [WMK16] is an extensive set of MPC frameworks based on garbled circuits. The core
toolkit includes an oblivious transfer library, secure type classes, and several custom protocol imple-
mentations. We tested two protocols: a semi-honest implementation of Yao’s garbled circuit protocol,
and a maliciously secure protocol with authenticated garbling [WRK17a]. The toolkit includes
three maliciously secure protocols we did not study: a two-party computation that checks input
validity [KMW16], a two-party computation library [WMK17], and a multi-party protocol [WRK17b].
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Semi-honest. The implementation of Yao’s garbled circuit protocol is a C library defining secure
type classes and operations. We found it intuitive for non-expert C developers. The library structure
allows developers to use C arrays and structs to hold secure values, and provides simple mixed-mode
computation and can generate circuits on-the-fly.
The framework supports arbitrary-size integers and floating-point numbers. Arbitrarily large
values can be initialized from a string and returned similarly; they are not restricted to C types.
There is little explicit language documentation, but the code was relatively clear. The library can
output a protocol-agnostic circuit, but this is not documented.
Malicious Authenticated Garbling. This library is primarily an implementation of a custom
garbling protocol. We were able to run the included pre-compiled circuit examples and several of our
own examples. However, supporting features are limited: functions must be encoded as a circuit
prior to computation using the semi-honest library (thus, this version does not support mixed-mode
computation), and I/O is encoded in Boolean arrays.
Recommendation: We recommend the EMP-toolkit semi-honest library for general use. The
entire platform is well suited to academics looking to implement a novel circuit-based protocol due
to the available circuit generation and cryptographic libraries, but we note that the end-to-end flow
is not seamless.
3.3.2 Obliv-C
Obliv-C is an extension of C that executes a two-party garbled circuit protocol. The main language
addition is an obliv qualifier, applied to C types and constructs. Typing rules enforce that obliv types
remain secret unless explicitly revealed. Code within oblivious functions and conditionals cannot
modify public data, except within a qualified ~obliv block, in which the code is always executed.
These rules allow programmers to reason about data security and develop modular libraries.
The compiler combines these extended functionalities with supporting C code to produce an
executable. The executable generates circuits on-the-fly. This allows circuit sizes to depend on values
not known during compilation, but may result in under-optimized circuits.
We successfully used an Obliv-C ORAM library, Absentminded Crypto Kit3, which implements
several ORAM variations and other useful primitives [ZWR+16, Ds17].
3https://bitbucket.org/jackdoerner/absentminded-crypto-kit
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Obliv-C extends C but many of the examples imply an independent-language architecture,
separating Obliv-C code from C code. Example programs typically read, process, and output data in
native C code, performing only the secure computation in Obliv-C code. However, this abstraction is
not enforced: it is possible to perform I/O and call native C functions in Obliv-C files. While many
of the examples implement a strict separation between supporting C code and secure Obliv-C code,
example documentation uses a mixed paradigm.
Several groups have used Obliv-C to implement secure functionalities, including linear regression
[GSB+17], decentralized certificate authorities [JLE17], aggregated private machine-learning models
[TJGE16], classification of encrypted emails [GFAW17] and stable matching [DEs16].
Recommendation: Obliv-C is a robust garbled circuit framework. We recommend it to developers
for general use and to academics who wish to implement and optimize useful libraries such as ORAM.
3.3.3 ObliVM
ObliVM compiles a Java-like language called ObliVM-lang and executes a two-party garbled circuit
protocol. It aims to provide a language intuitive to non-experts while implementing domain-specific
programming abstractions for improved performance.
ObliVM-lang allows custom data types and type inference. It implements a built-in efficient
ORAM scheme. ObliVM natively supports fixed-size integers, and includes a library for arbitrary
sized integers.
However, documentation is limited, both for the language (we identified several undocumented
reserved keywords), and for general usage. I/O is limited: it requires a non-human-readable format,
and we did not find a method to return complex types (including structs and arrays) or more than
32 bits of information. We did not successfully implement the crosstabulation example.
Recommendation: Although ObliVM implements advanced cryptographic constructs, its usability
for practical applications is significantly limited by its minimal documentation and restricted I/O
functionality.
3.3.4 TinyGarble
TinyGarble [SHS+15] repurposes hardware circuit generation tools to create optimized circuits
appropriate for a garbled circuit protocol. It takes a three-step approach: first, it converts a function
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defined in Verilog to a netlist format. Then it converts the netlist format to a custom circuit
description (SCD) and securely evaluates the Boolean circuit using a garbled circuit protocol.
We found that the first step of this process requires a closed-source logic synthesis tool (the
Synopsys Design Compiler) that converts a Verilog file to the unstandardized netlist format. The
authors reference an open-source tool, Yosys Open SYnthesis Suite, but we were unable to compile
any examples (conversions from Yosys-produced netlist files to SCD failed). The source code for
TinyGarble includes some pre-compiled netlist files. While we could see every step for these examples
(Verilog source, netlist file, computation output), we were unable to compile examples end-to-end
and thus do not make any claims about language functionality.
TinyGarble is preceded by JustGarble [BHKR13], a library for circuit garbling and evaluation.
JustGarble does not include communication or circuit generation. The garbled circuit implementa-
tion in TinyGarble is a strict improvement over JustGarble, including recent protocol and circuit
optimizations. A follow-up to TinyGarble [DDK+15] leverages hardware logic synthesis tools to
optimze for GMW-style computations.
Recommendation: TinyGarble aims to leverage powerful circuit optimizers developed for producing
hardware circuits. Unfortunately, from a usability standpoint, the lack of compatibility for Verilog
compilers and lack of standards around netlist formats meant that we were unable to compile or run
any new examples using the TinyGarble framework. We believe, however, that the MPC community
could benefit greatly by leveraging the power of existing circuit optimizers.
3.3.5 Wysteria
Wysteria [RHH14] introduces a novel high-level functional programming language. It guarantees
that a distributed secure computation produces the same output as a single trusted party. Wysteria
supports an arbitrary number of computation parties, and the software contribution includes a
front-end language, a type checker, and a run-time interpreter that executes a Boolean-circuit-based
GMW protocol implementation [CHK+12].
Wysteria supports mixed-mode computation via a language construct called a secure block. A
secure block is initialized with a set of parties and their inputs. All operations in the block’s scope
are compiled to a Boolean circuit and executed as a separate computation.
The Wysteria codebase has changed since the original publication of the paper, and the examples
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presented in the paper do not compile. However, they provide useful context for the architecture
of a working program. The repository includes several example programs that run without errors,
including a 6-party version of the millionaire’s problem.
Wysteria includes a record type, which holds named values of other types and can be returned
from a secure block. Although Wysteria includes working examples that input an array to a secure
block, we were unable to replicate this for our inner product or crosstabulation programs. The
language has support for iterating over arrays in secure blocks, and allows access to individual array
elements outside of a secure block. We encountered other significant language limitations: Wysteria
only supports division by 2 in secure blocks, and we did not find a way to use logical operators on
Booleans.
The Wys* project [RSH17] built on the ideas of Wysteria, and attempted to create a fully-verified
toolchain for secure computation based on the F* programming language. The F* language is
undergoing rapid development, however, and we were not able to compile Wys*.
Recommendation: Wysteria’s limited support for complex data types, current lack of development,
and outdated back-end circuit parser, mean that it should not be used for developing complex or
efficient protocols. On the other hand, Wysteria is the only compiler we examined that intends
to provide a system for automatically verifying that the underlying multi-party computation has
the same functionality as the monolithic program implemented by the developer, and the only
compiler with a functional-style programming language. We recommend future compiler developers
use Wysteria’s type-based correctness and security guarantees as a model.
3.3.6 ABY
ABY [DSZ15] is a mixed-protocol two-party computation framework implemented as a C++ library.
It aims to give developers fine-grained control over computation efficiency by providing a mechanism
for mixing protocols. ABY switches between three protocols: The GMW-based Arithmetic protocol
uses an additive sharing scheme with multiplicative triples on an arithmetic circuit. The protocol is
based on those by [ABL+04, KSS13, PBS12]. The other protocols use Boolean circuits: the Boolean
protocol implements the original GMW protocol with an XOR-based sharing scheme, while the Yao
protocol uses an optimized version of Yao’s garbled circuit protocol.
ABY has a significant amount of documentation that provides a helpful framework for under-
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standing the capabilities of the framework. This includes a slightly outdated developer guide, an
extended README file, and a variety of commented examples.
Secure data is limited to unsigned C integer types: ABY does not support arbitrary-length
integers or an explicit Boolean type, although it allows one-bit integers that function equivalently. It
supports some floating-point operations and is actively developing this functionality. ABY can store
secure data in a C struct, and supports both C++ arrays and SIMD constructions for efficient parallel
operations. ABY provides functions for creating and populating SIMD “shares”, but retrieving
individual elements requires operating on the internal representation of secret data, which is not
well-supported.
ABY has been used to implement several secure computation systems [ARS+15, CDC+16,
CDC+17, DHSS17, KLS+17, PSWW18].
Recommendation: ABY provides a powerful, low-level cryptographic interface that gives the
developer significant control over performance. ABY is targeted at users who are familiar with MPC
protocols and the circuit model of computation. We recommend it to developers with sufficient
cryptographic background.
3.3.7 SCALE-MAMBA
SCALE-MAMBA implements a maliciously secure two-phase hybrid protocol and supersedes the
SPDZ framework. MAMBA is a Python-like language that compiles to a bytecode representation.
SCALE implements a two-phase protocol which offloads all public-key operations to an offline
pre-processing phase, generates three types of shared randomness to use during protocol execution,
and executes an optimized hybrid protocol based on previous work [BDOZ11, DPSZ12, NNOB12].
SCALE-MAMBA has a significant amount of documentation, covering the differences from the
previous SPDZ system, installation and runtime instructions, updated language documentation, and
protocol primitives. The example programs are unit-style tests but are not explicitly documented. A
community bulletin board [SPD18] hosts discussion and questions about the framework. The custom
language runs a virtual machine that supports operations on both secure and public values, but is
not particularly efficient on public values; we recommend using a separate program for any significant
operations in the clear.
The SCALE-MAMBA framework allows developers to define their own I/O classes. This provides
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an extremely flexible interface. We did not implement a custom I/O class. The framework’s secure
channel setup requires users to produce a mini certificate authority in order to run a computation.
Running our sample programs with a simple full-threshold secret sharing scheme required
significant memory resources. However, the system offers multiple, customizable options for a
secret-sharing scheme, and includes programmatic tools for offline data generation in certain contexts.
For testing purposes, SCALE includes an option to run with fake (insecure) offline data.
Integer size is determined by the field size, which must be chosen at compile time. Standard
full-threshold sharing supports a modulus of up to 1024 bits. SCALE-MAMBA supports most
bit-shift operations and includes Python-style tuples, which we consider to be a less powerful type of
struct. Fixed-point numbers are fully supported, and floating-point numbers partially implemented.
It has ORAM support, which we did not test.
Recommendation: We recommend SCALE-MAMBA for a variety of uses: it is flexible, supports
an arbitrary number of parties and has strong security guarantees, though it may require significant
computing resources.
3.3.8 Sharemind MPC
Sharemind [BLW08] is a secure data processing platform and a trademark of Cybernetica, a research-
and-development-focused technology company based in Tallinn, Estonia. We used the Sharemind
MPC platform, which securely executes a function written in the SecreC language. The framework
executes a three-party hybrid protocol using an additive secret sharing scheme.
The Sharemind MPC platform explicitly defines three parties: clients, who input values; servers,
who define and run the secure computation; and outputs, who receive the output of the computation.
Server code is written in the SecreC language and executed using Sharemind’s secure runtime, while
client and output code uses a client library in a common programming language and is executed
using standard compilers. We developed our sample programs using a C client library; the platform
also provides libraries in Haskell, Java, and JavaScript.
Sharemind MPC implements a custom additive secret-sharing scheme over a fixed-size ring. These
fixed-size integers have behavior consistent with traditional C integers, and the framework includes
a floating point library. The protocol is written for exactly three servers, but there is support for
arbitrarily many parties secret-sharing their inputs among the three computation servers into a
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database structure. Our samples passed all input values from a single client program. The SecreC
language is expressive and well documented online4. The supporting client libraries are not as well
documented.
The Sharemind MPC platform has several licensing options5 through Cybernetica. We used the
academic server. This license gave us access to the protocol implementation. The platform also
includes an open-source simulator, which includes the SecreC language, its standard library, and an
emulator for the secure computation. The emulator is available as a VM and as compilable source
code; we successfully ran our examples on both versions. The emulator does not support client code
and arguments must be passed on the command line.
As part of the academic license, we had access to several Sharemind employees who provided
“reasonable assistance” throughout the development process, and we consider this to be an online
resource.
Recommendation: The Sharemind MPC platform is suitable for a wide variety of purposes. We
recommend it to companies looking to implement secure computation, particularly for large or
complex functionalities, as well as to academics who require MPC as a tool for a project.
3.3.9 PICCO
PICCO [ZSB13, ZBA17] is a general-purpose compiler with a custom secret-sharing protocol. It
includes three main software contributions: a compiler that translates an extension of C to a native C
implementation of the secure computation; an I/O utility that produces and reconstructs secret-shared
input and output; and a tool that initiates the computation. PICCO executes computations under
a hybrid model, using an information-theoretic protocol for multiplication [GRR98] and custom
primitives for other operations. It supports an arbitrary number of parties but requires an honest
majority.
PICCO allows conditionals on private variables, but does not allow public variables to be assigned
within the scope of such a conditional. It also allows indexing arrays at a private location, though
this is implemented as a multiplexer, not an ORAM scheme. It supports pointers to private data and




types to approximate Booleans and while we ran provided examples, we were unable to successfully
write our own program that uses them.
The language is well-documented in the paper. The code repository includes many examples
in a C extension, but doesn’t include examples of the additional files needed to compile and run
a program end-to-end. The process to compile and execute a secure computation is lengthy but
well-documented and requires multiple configuration files and explicit generation and reconstruction
of secret-shared inputs and outputs.
Recommendation: PICCO is appropriate for developers or academics who require a true multi-
party implementation. We found no correctness issues and it allows a great deal of flexibility in
configuring the computation.
3.3.10 Frigate
Frigate [MGC+16] compiles a novel C-like language to a custom Boolean circuit representation for
any number of inputs. The framework emphasizes the use of good software engineering techniques,
including an extensive testing suite and a focus on modularity and extensibility. The circuit format
minimizes file size, and the framework includes an interpreter to efficiently interface between generated
circuits and other applications.
Frigate produces a circuit, so all operations are secure by default. The type system is extremely
simple, with only three native types: signed and unsigned integers and structs. While there is no
explicit Boolean type, integers are of arbitrary size and the language defines comparison and bitwise
operators, so it supports equivalent functionality. Global variables are not allowed. Frigate allows
arrays but they must be contained within structs. The circuit compiler provides useful errors, and
the source code includes a brief description of interpreter options and a language description.
One usability issue is that basic arithmetic operations are defined only for operands of the same
type and size. This may increase circuit size for some applications. The framework does not include
a simulator, so any correctness checking requires a separate back end. To test the circuits generated
by Frigate, we wrote a tool that converts Frigate circuits into a format suitable for execution in an
implementation of the BMR protocol [BLO16].
Recommendation: Frigate provides an expressive C-like language for fast circuit generation
and is a good way to estimate the circuit size of a given computation. However, even with our
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conversion tools that connect Frigate’s circuit form to useful back-ends, executing an end-to-end
MPC computation requires relatively burdensome action from the user.
3.3.11 CBMC-GC
CBMC-GC [HFKV12, FHK+14] produces Boolean circuits from a subset of ANSI-C. It is based on
CMBC [CKL04], a bounded model checker that translates any C program into a Boolean constraint
then adapts the output of this tool to produce an optimized circuit for an MPC computation. The
compiler can optimize for minimal size or minimal depth circuits. It produces circuits for any number
of input parties; we compiled and simulated sample programs with up to ten parties.
We did not find adequate documentation for the limitations of the adapted subset of ANSI-C
that CMBC-GC compiles. For example, variable names for inputs to the main file must be prefixed
by INPUT . Arrays cannot be passed natively as arguments; they must be wrapped in a struct.
Non-default integer types, such as specific-width integers, can be used but need to be explicitly
included. We were unable to compile a program using C Boolean types. The framework includes a
rudimentary set of floating-point operations, and allows conditionals on secret data. There are some
configuration options, such as circuit optimization technique, depth to unroll loops, and a time limit
on minimization.
CBMC-GC includes a tool for running circuits with ABY (Section 3.3.6). We were unable to run
an example with this converter; it appears that the CBMC-GC code references a deprecated ABY
API. CBMC-GC also includes a tool to output circuits in other formats, including the Simple Circuit
Description (SCD) used by the TinyGarble compiler; Fairplay’s Secure Hardware Definition Language
(SHDL); and the Bristol circuit format [ST]. We tested the output of this tool with TinyGarble’s
compiler (Section 3.3.4), but were unable to run any examples; we weren’t able to determine whether
the errors were due to circuit generation by CBMC-GC or execution by TinyGarble.
Recommendation: CBMC-GC uses powerful tools to produce optimized circuits, but we were not
able to successfully execute any of the circuits it produced.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Leveraging Existing Compiler Research
Programming language research is a field dedicated to creating compilers but little MPC research
leverages these techniques. Wysteria is a notable exception, but it has significant engineering gaps
that make it unusable for practical computations. However, the MPC community would benefit if
frameworks took a more principled approach to language design and verification.
One notable area for improvement is compiler correctness. We found that while the frameworks
were generally successful in preventing security mistakes, many had correctness issues. Defining and
implementing type rules that guarantee a correct output could reduce these issues, which were often
silent failures.
3.4.2 Documentation
Universally, the biggest obstacle when using MPC frameworks was a lack of documentation. The
community has put thousands of hours into producing the work presented herein, and even mediocre
documentation makes these contributions significantly more accessible.
Documentation comes in many forms and having multiple types of documentation is helpful when
using a complex software system such as these. Our evaluation criteria suggest several types we
found particularly useful, and we encourage developers and researchers to produce multiple resources
for system users.
In addition to static documentation provided by the authors, active online resources can be
extremely valuable. These include archived correspondence, like an archived mailing list, Google
group or issue tracker on GitHub. These resources can reduce the burden on researchers who may
be asked the same (or similar) questions repeatedly via private correspondence. Example programs
are also an important resource, and a repository where the community can archive simple example
programs (e.g. like http://www.texample.net) would dramatically improve usability and utility of
these systems.
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3.4.3 Standardization and benchmarks
Many of these frameworks are designed around a particular feature, such as a type system or an
optimization technique. Standardizing essential features common across frameworks allows researchers
to concentrate their efforts on core features of their systems and provides a level of consistency for
users. Standardization could also set a more consistent baseline for performance measurements. One
potential issue is standardizing on a soon-to-be-obsolete technology. For example, while we could
recommend a circuit format, this would not be useful for modern hybrid framework models that use
a different intermediate representation.
Several projects are developing standardization in the field. SCAPI [Bar, EFLL12] defines a general
API that provides a common interface for cryptographic building blocks and primitives commonly
used in secure computation. It aims to provide a uniform, flexible, and efficient standard library
for cryptographers to use in their MPC implementations and includes significant documentation.
FRESCO [Ale] defines a set of Java APIs for function description and protocol definition and
evaluation. As a demonstration, the project includes front-end code for several sample projects and
a new implementation of the SPDZ protocol with MASCOT preprocessing. The SCALE-MAMBA
systems use a set of bytecodes as an intermediate representation that have been reused in other
projects, such as the Jana compiler [ABL+18].
Benchmarking performance across frameworks presents a challenge due to the variety of de-
pendencies on processing power, network bandwidth, network latency, computation structure, and
framework architecture. Theoretical performance measures can be difficult to measure in practice
and frameworks that excel in one benchmark environment may fare poorly in another. Nevertheless,
benchmarks can provide insight into a framework’s strengths and weaknesses, and do have value
if they are not used as a sole measure of a framework’s contribution. Recent work by Barak et
al. [BHKL18] provides an approach for performance comparison between frameworks with compatible
architectures. Keller [Kel20] builds off the sample programs in this work to benchmark the inner
product operation across many frameworks.
We recommend that the community collectively develops a consistent set of problems and
associated metrics that demonstrate the expressive capabilities of a framework and serve as a baseline
for performance comparison. Standardized benchmarking has some known issues: certain metrics may
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not be relevant to every protocol; compilers may optimize for performance on benchmark problems
rather than in the general case; and the performance measurement issues from Section 3.2.5 remain.
We hope that careful design of benchmarking problems will mitigate these issues and provide a useful
tool for practitioners in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
Privacy Preserving Network Analytics
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the fragility of existing financial networks and directly led
to legislation, such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and consumer protection act [DF10],
designed to identify and mitigate systemic risks. A core component of this legislation mandates that
financial institutions, and banks in particular, meet capital requirements and engage in “stress-testing”
against various hypothetical adverse scenarios. The effectiveness of such measures has understandably
received considerable academic attention.1
Extant work commonly presumes that complete information about the network structure is avail-
able. This assumption is crucial because network-level dynamics depend on interactions between the
institutions in the network, and emergent properties generally cannot be identified by examining each
institution in isolation. In practice, however, complete information is not available to the institutions
themselves. Each institution (presumably) knows its own assets, liabilities and interdependencies,
but given these are commercially sensitive, they cannot be openly shared with the other—sometimes
competing—institutions in the network.2 What’s more, security, liability and information leakage
concerns can also distort information sharing incentives even in the presence of a “trusted” central
agent.
For example, in 2015, the City of Boston and the Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC)
launched an initiative to identify salary inequities. While data owners were willing to entrust salary
and other sensitive data to a third party, “one of the major hurdles [...] was the unwillingness of any
1See, e.g., [AG98, AG00, Mor00, EN01, GK10, BEK+11, GHM12, EGJ14, AOTS15, JP19].
2In practice, direct network information about the network may be so hard to come by that firms may have to
resort to inferring network structures from coverage in the mainstream news [SZ19].
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single entity (including a major local university, originally enlisted to perform the study) to assume
the liability in case of leakage or loss of data entrusted to them.” [BLV17]. 3 This fragmentation of
knowledge presents a serious barrier to understanding basic properties of the network and can even
make it impossible for individual members of the network to accurately carry out mandated stress
tests, assess their own risk, or even compute their own market value. To the best of our knowledge,
this tension between data privacy and regulatory oversight is highlighted in previous literature, but
is not directly addressed.
In this chapter, we resolve this tension by leveraging cryptographic techniques from the multi-
party computation (MPC) literature to compute privacy-preserving network analytics. We show how
critical network-level statistics can be computed without any individual node revealing its private
information to any third party, be it other nodes in the network, or even a central agent. As proof of
concept, we deploy network analytics using MPC software tools using real and synthetic data. Below,
we describe the problem and our contributions in more detail.
Stress-testing with limited information
In practice, many stress tests are performed individually by each firm (e.g. those mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests [DFA19]), but given the aforementioned informational limitations, these
tests cannot adequately take account of network effects. This problem is highlighted in [JP19]:
“...running stress tests for each bank separately overlooks a significant source of systemic
risk. Indeed, without detailed information on the overall network, a bank-specific stress
test does not capture the fact that a decrease in a bank’s direct asset holdings is also
likely to depress other banks’ values, and hence also depress the value of its inter-bank
assets.”
For example, Figure 4.1 depicts a simple n-bank network where local stress testing reveals one
failure, but in reality all but one of the institutions would fail. More specifically, assume bank 1
begins with reserve of 1 and all other banks have no reserves. The arcs between nodes represent
liabilities between each bank. If bank 1’s reserves drop by 10%, only bank 1 will fail its local stress
test, whereas in reality, such a drop would cause n− 1 cascading failures, and only bank n would
3Another reason institutions may be reluctant to share their data with a trusted party, is that it may still be at
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Figure 4.1: A n-bank example where local stress testing fails to identify systemic risk.
remain solvent given it has no liabilities.
Local stress testing can also fail to provide information about how to structure bailouts. Figure 4.2
gives an example of a simple 4-bank network (a scaled version of the one described in [JP19]) where
local stress-testing gives insufficient information. Locally, banks 1 and 4 look similar in that they
both have 4D of incoming debt, and 5D outgoing. Yet if both banks 1 and 4 fail (their reserves drop
to 0) which bank should be bailed out? If we assume that bankrupt banks pay none of their debt,4
then bailing out bank 1 by injecting D dollars saves banks 1, 2 and 3, whereas a bailout of D dollars










Figure 4.2: An example of a 4-bank network debt model adapted from [JP19]. Arrows point in the direction
debt is owed.
Firm-level implications
The aforementioned limitations not only reduce the effectiveness of regulations imposed by a central
entity, but can also have significant adverse effects on the individual institutions themselves. Consider
that, depending on the network structure, each institution may not even be able to accurately assess
its own market value without knowing the assets and liabilities of all other institutions! What’s
more, certain types of networks can have high sensitivity, which means that small imperfections in
knowledge can lead to significant errors when assessing market values [FPR+18].
These examples show that even in the simplest, most idealized network settings, financial
4In the original debt model of [EN01], debts were paid proportionally. Other debt models (e.g. [GK10]) have
assumed a zero recovery rate as in this example.
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institutions cannot be expected to calculate (or even accurately estimate) their own market values.
To make matters worse, the problem extends to most statistics of interest to the stakeholders.
Complete, perfect knowledge of the network is also necessary to assess risk, or identify business
strategies. Consider simple questions like: How many institutions would default if the underlying
assets experienced a uniform drop of 10% in value? Or, how much would a given firm’s market value
increase if an asset class increased in value by 5%? These questions cannot be answered accurately
by the institutions themselves without knowing the detailed portfolios of all the institutions in the
network.
In brief, the privacy and security requirements of the individual institutions in the network
prevents them from engaging in cooperative risk assessment and can be a serious practical barrier to
institutions and central regulators alike.
Contributions
This chapter addresses some of the aforementioned issues by designing and implementing privacy-
preserving MPC algorithms in two seminal network settings: the liabilities model of [EN01] (in
Section 4.2) and the equities cross-holding model of [EGJ14] (in Section 4.3). We outline two
contributions in particular: (i) The design of novel data-oblivious algorithms (see Definition 3) for
computing market values in network settings under privacy preservation; (ii) a complete software
implementation of our protocol, together with benchmarks of its computational and communication
costs in real-world environments. We expand on each of these next.
(i) Data-oblivious algorithms: Data-oblivious algorithms guarantee that information isn’t leaked
by the algorithm operations themselves. Most existing MPC protocols focus on hiding the data
in a computation, rather than the operations (see Section 4.1.2 for further discussion). Thus,
before an algorithm can be implemented securely, its sequence of operations must be made data
independent. Previous works have avoided this problem by focusing on simple algorithms (e.g.
securely computing means and variances) where the sequence of arithmetic operations is fixed,
and hence independent of the input data. In our setting, the algorithms for computing market
clearing values in network settings are significantly more complex, and the algorithms developed
in the extant literature (outside the context of secure computation) are not data-oblivious.
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(ii) Robust multi-party implementation: The benefits of using MPC for privacy-preserving risk
assessment is discussed in recent literature [AKL12, FKOS13, CK19]. These works, however,
do not specifically focus on network settings, do not provide implementations, nor do they seek
to design concrete protocols with realistic network data. Closer to our setting is [NPH14], who
conduct a preliminary study showing the feasibility of using MPC to compute stress tests in
financial networks. In contrast to this work, however, they do not seek to develop a globally
secure algorithm nor benchmark it on real network data.5 Our second main contribution—
a robust multi-party implementation—shows that our data-oblivious algorithms are indeed
practical.
The computational and communication costs of MPC protocols is typically a barrier to adoption.
The exact cost of these protocols has a complex dependency on the underlying algorithms, the
software implementation as well as the computing hardware and networking infrastructure,
thus the best way to assess the practicality of an MPC algorithm is to actually implement and
benchmark it. To this point, we implement and benchmark our algorithms using three different
open-source software packages (each with their own advantages and disadvantages) and evaluate
their suitability for practical implementation: SCALE-MAMBA [AKR+19], MPyC [Sch] and
EMP-Toolkit [WRK17b].
Cryptographic methods also have the potential to resolve some of the tension between privacy
and regulatory oversight [FKOS13, AKL12]. There are two distinct privacy issues related to securely
computing analytics on private data: computing the statistics and revealing the results. The first
issue, privacy-preserving computation, is addressed by secure multi-party computation (MPC). The
second issue, revealing the results without compromising privacy, is addressed through tools like
differential privacy [Dwo11]. The work of [FKOS13] focuses more on differential privacy, whereas
the work of [AKL12] focuses on secure computation, but neither work proposes concrete network
analytics in a realistic network model, and neither includes any implementation.
Related practical applications. The past few years marked a dramatic increase in the number of
applications and implementations of MPC protocols, and we highlight some of the recent applications
5To avoid the costs of doing a global secure computation, [NPH14], breaks the network until smaller groups of
nodes, and performs secure computation within the groups. This leaves the system vulnerable if a small number of
institutions within a group collude, and it leaks information about debts between the groups. In addition, the protocol
leaks information about the whether debts exist between institutions (while hiding their magnitude).
43
of MPC towards privacy-preserving financial analytics here. For instance, continuing the example
mentioned earlier, the city of Boston together with the Boston Women’s Workforce Council used
MPC to calculate aggregate payroll analytics across over 150 different companies in Boston, with the
aim of studying gender-based discrepancies in employee compensation [LJDA+18].
Protocols have also been developed for linking sales and purchase records in Estonia in order
to identify potential cases of tax fraud without revealing the underlying sales and purchase data
[BJSV15, BJSV16]. [SvA+19] used homomorphic encryption, a different model of secure computation,
to identify fraudulent transactions in banking networks.
This work contributes to this literature by providing a novel set of generalizable MPC algorithms
for network applications and evaluating the feasibility of implementing these algorithms using
real data. More broadly, our work contributes to a recent and growing literature studying the
implications of new technologies in finance (FinTech). While the bulk of this literature focuses on
blockchain/cryptocurrency and crowdfunding applications,6 privacy-preserving technology is being
increasingly adopted in practice, as the computational methods and algorithms underlying it continue
to improve. This chapter, much like [AKL12], seeks to expand the boundaries of the extant fintech
literature into this novel direction.
To summarize, the methods we develop can help resolve the tension between the privacy re-
quirements of the individual institutions and the collective value of aggregate network statistics
in virtually any type of network setting. Our work helps to bridge the gap between our extant
theoretical models of financial networks—that generally assume complete information—and the real
world—where information sharing is hindered by privacy concerns.
4.1 MPC and network algorithms
As previously discussed, secure multi-party computation is a cryptographic technique that, in theory,
allows a group of data owners to securely compute any function of their private data, without revealing
their underlying data to each other or to any outside party, and without the need for a central
agent. This section addresses practical issues that arise when using MPC in a network setting. We
describe the outsourced computation model, which reduces communication complexity but increases
6For instance, see [BMT20a, TMB19, BMT20b, BBBC19, CS20, CL20, CTT+20, CLW20, GTN20, HJS19, RS20,
TF20]
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the vulnerability of a computation to collusion. We also describe common implementation challenges,
including the data-oblivious model.
4.1.1 Outsourced computation
Secure computation protocols require repeated rounds of communication between all of the partic-





. To avoid this, it is common to use secret sharing to decouple the number of participants in
the computation from the number of participants contributing (private) information.
For example, in a network with 1000 banks, the banks could choose 3 of the larger banks to be the
“computation parties”, and secret-share all private inputs to these three privileged banks. The three
banks could then engage in a secure computation to compute the vector of market values. Since the
secure computation only requires three participants (instead of 1000), the reduction in communication
could speed up the overall computation. The drawback is that this type of outsourcing changes
the security guarantees, and collusion between 2-out-of-3 of the computational parties could break
the security (instead of collusion between 501 of the input parties). The different architectures are






























(b) A communication diagram of secure computation
with 12 participants.
Figure 4.3: Outsourcing computation to a small number of parties drastically reduces the communication
complexity of the protocol but makes it more vulnerable to collusion.
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4.1.2 Obstacles to privacy preservation
In principle, any function can be computed securely using one of the early MPC protocols (e.g.
[GMW87, BGW88, CCD88]). Unfortunately, there are many obstacles to deploying MPC in practice.
Efficiency. Early MPC protocols were efficient in the sense that they ran in polynomial time, but
the actual cost (in terms of computation and communication) was too high for practical applications.
Decades of algorithmic improvements, coupled with a steady increase in raw computing power
has made MPC practical for a variety of real-world problems. Nevertheless, efficiency remains a
primary obstacle when developing and deploying novel MPC protocols. The practical efficiency of
MPC protocols depends on a number of factors beyond the basic algorithms, including computing
hardware, networking environment, software implementation, and the topology of the circuit being
executed. This means that effectively measuring the efficiency of an MPC protocol requires actually
implementing and benchmarking the protocol under real-world conditions.
Implementation. Despite progress in the last decade, implementing MPC protocols remains a
significant engineering challenge. These are multi-participant networked protocols that require several
rounds of communication interleaved with complex local cryptographic operations. These challenges
are explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.
However, the network setting requires multi-party computation, which eliminates the many two-
party frameworks. Only a few frameworks support computations with more than two participants, and
we focus on three of the most recent works: EMP-toolkit, [WRK17b], SCALE-MAMBA [AKR+19],
and MPyC [Sch].
Designing data-oblivious algorithms. In general, MPC protocols are designed to execute
algorithms that are data-oblivious, i.e., algorithms whose control flow does not depend on their
(private) inputs [MZ14]. Formally:
Definition 3 (Data-oblivious algorithms). An algorithm is called data-oblivious if the control-flow
( i.e., the sequence of computations and memory accesses made by the algorithm) is independent of
the algorithm’s inputs.
For example, if an algorithm’s runtime depends on the input data, executing the algorithm
leaks information about its inputs, even if the internal state of the algorithm is hidden. Developing
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a compact, data-oblivious representation of a given functionality or algorithm is a fundamental
challenge that must be overcome before executing a computation securely.
One method for ensuring that an algorithm is data-oblivious is to represent it as a circuit, either
a boolean circuit (consisting of AND, XOR and NOT gates), or an arithmetic circuit (consisting
of addition and multiplication gates over a finite field). Most secure computation frameworks (e.g.
[Yao82, Yao86, GMW87, BGW88, CCD88]) take this approach, and these frameworks can only
securely execute circuits.7
Although, in principle, any algorithm can be represented as a circuit, the circuit representation
may be large, and finding the minimum circuit representation of an algorithm is difficult [HOS18].
The development of MPC compilers (described above) represent a crucial step toward making secure
computation usable in practice. However, these compilers still require the user to provide a data-
oblivious algorithm. For instance, many compilers do not allow conditionals on private data; instead
they provide syntax for multiplexing. Consider the simple conditional program on the right, which
can be rewritten without a conditional if x is a boolean:





⇐⇒ y = x · w + (1− x) · z
Comparisons can be handled similarly. If x and y are boolean values, then the comparison
operation is equivalent to two boolean operations:
x < y ⇐⇒ ¬x ∧ y.
Comparisons between integers can be handled bit-by-bit. Similarly, few compilers support “for” loops
with private input bounds.
7There has been significant work developing MPC protocols for RAM-model computations, but these protocols
are extremely complex, and are only useful in settings which are particularly ill-suited to circuit-model computations
[LO13, LHS+14, BCP15, GGMP16].
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4.2 The Eisenberg & Noe network model
Before diving into the details of the debt and equity models in the following sections, we note that
the underlying methods we develop could be applied to compute network statistics in essentially
any network model. In this document, we apply the methods to the debt model by Eisenberg and
Noe [EN01] and the equity model by Elliot, Golub, and Jackson [EGJ14], which generalize under the
Jackson and Pernoud model [JP19]. Other applicable settings include time-based models that consider
both short- and long-term investments [AG98, AG00, AOTS15], local contagion models [Mor00], and
other debt and equity based models [Els11, GHM12].
4.2.1 The Eisenberg & Noe (2001) debt model
Consider a system with n financial institutions that have reserves and debts. Institution i’s reserves
are represented by ei, and the debts (liabilities) are represented by Lij , indicating a debt from
institution i to institution j of Lij dollars. Thus the entire network is a weighted, directed graph,
where financial institutions are represented and debts are represented as (weighted, directed) edges
between the institutions.










if p̄i > 0
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
In this proportional specification, failed or bankrupt institutions make partial payments on their
outstanding debts, and the same proportion of every debt is assumed to be paid.
The total amount of money in the system is the sum of the reserves of all the stakeholders, and in
this simple model, money is neither created nor destroyed. If every institution has enough reserves to
pay all its debts, then each institution’s market value can be computed locally by adding its reserves
and incoming debt obligations and subtracting its outgoing debts. On the other hand, if some
institutions fail (i.e., they do not have enough money to cover their debts) other institutions that may
appear to be solvent (based on their local view) may actually be insolvent (if their incoming debts
are not paid in full). This highlights the essential networked nature of the stress test – institutions
48
cannot effectively assess their risk based on knowledge of their debts alone.
Formally, the action of institution i can be characterized by its total payment, pi. We use p ∈ Rn
to denote the vector of total amounts paid by each institution. If pi <
∑
j Lij then institution i is
said to fail or default. Assuming that defaulting institutions must pay as much as they can, we have
the following equations.
pi = ei +
∑
j
pjΠji for defaulting institutions (4.2)
pi = p̄i for non-defaulting institutions. (4.3)
Computing the market-clearing vector absent privacy concerns
In this model, every institution will have a uniquely-defined equilibrium market value, based on its
remaining reserves after all possible debts are settled. Assuming all information is public, [EN01]
suggest a simple, iterative algorithm for calculating the market clearing vector.
Algorithm 1 Calculating the equilibrium payment vector in a network [EN01]
1: Input: A network with assets e ∈ Rn, and debts L ∈ Rn×n
2: Initialize defaulter list, D = ∅
3: Initialize payment vector p = p̄ . Everyone attempts to pay full debts
4: Compute proportional liabilities with Equation (4.1)
5: Update the defaulter list assuming payments p
6: if Defaulter list grows then
7: Update p using Equations 4.2 and 4.3




From here, a natural network-scale stress-test can be run by adjusting (decreasing) the underlying
reserves held by different institutions and calculating the number of failures (or the financial shortfall)
that arise in equilibrium. This type of stress testing, however, requires knowledge of the debt structure
of all institutions in the network. Performing this type of stress test using standard tools would then
require all institutions to share all the details of their reserves and liabilities with some centralized
regulator or testing authority who could perform the test.
What’s more, this model is very sensitive to small changes in the debt structure [FPR+18], so
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high-fidelity data about the debt structure is required for effective stress testing. In particular,
regulators who have only rough estimates of the inter-bank liabilities cannot effectively compute the
equilibrium market values in the network.
4.2.2 Identifying data dependencies in Algorithm 1
The [EN01] Algorithm 1 was not designed with privacy in mind, and thus is not data-oblivious. For
example, in line 6, the algorithm terminates when the defaulter list stabilizes. Thus the number of
iterations of the algorithm depends on the (private) debt-holdings. More subtly, Line 8 traditionally
requires a matrix inversion (an operation useful in many network settings), and most algorithms for
matrix inversion (e.g. row-reduction) are not data-oblivious.
Overall, there are three main issues that we need to overcome in order to make the algorithm
data oblivious.
1. Line 5: How can the defaulter list be updated when the current payment vector p must
remain private? The current payout vector depends on the debts of all the participants in the
network, so updating the defaulter list requires testing whether an institution fails under a
private payment vector p.
2. Line 6: A data-oblivious algorithm cannot change its control flow based on private information,
so when calculating the clearing vector, the termination condition cannot depend on the set of
failures.
3. Line 8: How can the current payout vector, p, be updated obliviously? Updating the payout
vector p requires solving Equation 4.8, which depends on the current payout vector, as well as
the current set of failed institutions, both of which must remain private.
One implication of making an algorithm data-oblivious is that its running time becomes in-
dependent of the underlying data. For instance, when calculating the market values of a large
network, if all the banks had zero liabilities and zero assets, a traditional algorithm might take a
“shortcut” and return that all market values are zero. On the other hand, a data-oblivious algorithm
must perform exactly the same computations when the inputs are all zero as it does on real-world
inputs. One consequence of this is that all the running times we report would be the same whether
we used real-world data, or simply ran the algorithms on an all-zero input. This is an instance
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of sacrificing efficiency for security – in the real-world, both software and hardware implement
computational “shortcuts” that can drastically improve performance when the inputs satisfy certain
criteria. Unfortunately, if these shortcuts cannot be applied to all inputs, the fact that a shortcut
was taken leaks information about the inputs, and hence cannot be applied in a privacy-preserving
manner. In other words, data-oblivious algorithms can never be faster than the “worst-case” running
time of its non-oblivious counterpart.
4.2.3 A data-oblivious version of Algorithm 1
In this section, we describe the algorithms we develop for computing the defaulter list in a data-
oblivious manner and explain how we can address the issues raised in Section 4.1.2. In general, such
an analysis examines the control flow of the program, including loops with data-dependent bounds
or early-termination conditions and conditionals (“if” statements) whose conditions depend on input
values. To make an algorithm data-oblivious, we remove data-dependent optimizations, rewrite loops
to use a fixed number of iterations, avoid conditionals, or rewrite them to evaluate both branches and
multiplex the results. These changes can be inefficient compared to a data-dependent program: the
upper bound for a loop might be large, and the complexity of a multiplexer can grow exponentially
if the conditionals are nested. For example, in Gaussian Elimination, determining the next pivot
location requires testing whether an element is zero.
Notably, we do not have to modify simple arithmetic operations (sums and products), since these
directly translate to the circuit model.
The algorithms in this section do not provide security by themselves—they are only data-oblivious.
In order to provide security, the operations required (additions, multiplications, etc.) at each step of
the algorithms need to be executed securely e.g. using the open-source MPC protocols described in
Section 4.1.








For a given payment strategy, p, we can define the defaulting matrix
Λ(p) =

1 if i = j and i defaults under p
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
If complete information about the network (including all reserves and debts) were known, then the
equilibrium values of each institution, the total number of failures and the total shortfall could be
computed using Algorithm 1.
As noted in Section 4.1.2, the three major obstacles to making Algorithm 1 data-oblivious are:
updating the current payout vector; updating the defaulter list; identifying termination conditions.
Below, we outline the methodology we suggest to overcome these obstacles, culminating in Propo-
sition 2 which shows that our solution efficiently computes an approximation to the true clearing
vector and market valuations.
Payout vector. For a fixed defaulting set given by Λ, the equilibrium payouts are obtained by
solving the linear equations
p = Λ
[
ΠT (Λp + (I − Λ)p̄) + e
]
+ (I − Λ)p̄, (4.6)
where Λ is the diagonal matrix with Λii = 1 if and only if institution i has failed, Π is the n × n
proportional liability matrix, p̄ is the debt vector, and e is the vector of underlying assets. Given a
fixed defaulting set, an equilibrium payout strategy is a solution to Equation (4.6). Rewriting this
equation, we have







= ΛΠT (I − Λ)p̄+ Λe + (I − Λ)p̄,
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Equation (4.7) becomes
p = Ap + b. (4.8)
This makes p a fixed point of the transformation defined by A and b: it maps onto itself. This has
the solution
p = (I−A)−1 b. (4.9)
Traditional matrix inversion algorithms such as Gaussian Elimination are not data-oblivious,
and thus cannot be implemented directly as a secure computation. Instead, Algorithm 2, below,
outlines a simple, iterative method for (approximately) solving Equation (4.8). Subsequently, in
Proposition 1, we show that Algorithm 2 will converge to the correct result given enough iterations or
under special circumstances. We report on empirical convergence speeds in Section 4.4.2. Algorithm 2
is data-oblivious in the sense of Definition 3 because the number of rounds of the “for”-loop, k, does
not depend on the inputs A,b,p0. The matrix and vector arithmetic is data-independent, since it
derives entirely from basic arithmetic.
Algorithm 2 FindFix
Input: A,b,p0
for i = 1, . . . , k do
pi = Api−1 + b
end for
return pk
Proposition 1 (FindFix Algorithm Properties). (i) Let A ∈ Rn×n be an matrix with spectral radius
ρ
def
= ρ(A). If ρ < 1 then x = Ax + b has a unique solution, x∗, and Algorithm 2 will return an
approximation, y, such that as the number of iterations, k →∞, y→ x∗. In addition, if p0 ≥ x∗,
then pk ≥ x∗ for all k. (ii) In an acyclic debt network with n nodes, Algorithm 2 (with k = n) solves
Equation (4.8) with no error.
Defaulter list. Next, to deal with Obstacle 1, we develop Algorithm 3, below, which takes a
proportional liability matrix Π, an asset vector e, and a proposed payout vector p, and calculates
which institutions will fail under the proposed payout vector. If institution i fails, Λii is set to 1. The
loop in Algorithm 3 has a public number of iterations n, and the conditional can be evaluated using
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a multiplexer, as described in Section 4.1.2. Thus, the whole algorithm is entirely data-oblivious.
Algorithm 3 UpdateLambda
Input: Π, e,p
for i = 1, . . . , n do









Market values (main algorithm). Putting these pieces together, we propose Algorithm 4 to
compute the market values of the institutions in the debt network model obliviously. To overcome
the early termination problem (Obstacle 2) we run the algorithm for n steps, independent of the
inputs, and show in Proposition 2 that after n steps the defaulter list will always have stabilized.
Algorithm 4 A data-oblivious algorithm for calculating the market values in a debt network.
1: Input: e ∈ Rn, Π ∈ Rn×n
2: Initialize Λ = 0 ∈ Rn×n . No defaults yet
3: Initialize p = p̄ . Everyone attempts to pay full debts
4: for i = 1, . . . , n do
5: A = ΛΠTΛ
6: b = ΛΠT (I − Λ)p̄+ Λe + (I − Λ)p̄
7: p = FindFix(A,b,p) . Alg 2: Find equilibrium
8: Λ = UpdateLambda(Π, e,p) . Alg 3: Update defaulter list
9: end for
10:
11: for i = 1, . . . , n do . Compute market value:
12: vi = ei +
∑




Remark 1. For financial stress testing, it may be desirable to calculate the number of defaulting
institutions or the total shortfall of the system, rather than the market values of the institutions.




statistics can easily be calculated with only slight modifications to Algorithm 4.
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Proposition 2. (i) Algorithm 4 is data-oblivious and computes an approximation to the market
values in an n× n debt network using only (k + 3)n3 + 6n2 multiplications and n2 comparisons. (ii)
If there are no defaulters, Algorithm 4 will converge to the exact solution, when k = 1.
Algorithm 4 has no conditionals and the two loops (Steps 4 and 11) both have fixed bounds (n).
The remaining steps are either sub-algorithms that we have already demonstrated oblivious (FindFix
and UpdateLambda) or are simple arithmetic (Steps 5, 6 and 12). Thus, the entire algorithm is
data-oblivious.




(secure) multiplications, because it makes n calls to FindFix, which




operations using schoolbook matrix
arithmetic). These multiplications dominate the cost of executing Algorithm 4 securely and motivate
the development of a reduced-complexity FindFix algorithm, which we do in Section 4.4.3.
4.3 The equity cross-holdings model
In this section, we develop privacy-preserving algorithms in an alternative model of financial networks,
in which institutions to hold shares of other institutions rather than debt contracts [EGJ14]. The
algorithms rely on the same methods developed for the debt model in Section 4.2.3; the overall
conclusion of this section is that the methods remain applicable in alternative network settings.
In this alternative model, each institution represents a node in the network and institutions
are connected by proportional cross-holdings, which are represented as weighted, directed edges in
the graph. An edge from institution i to institution j of weight p (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1) represents the
statement that institution i owns a p-fraction of institution j. In addition to these proportional
cross-holdings or shares, each bank can have some underlying assets, and these assets are the sole
source of value in the network. These assets could represent tangible, physical assets or any investment
the institution has made outside the network. This model can also be viewed as a flow, where at
each time step money flows between institutions, and the total incoming flow to a node is divided
among its outgoing edges according to their edge weights. With this intuition, the “market value” of
a bank is the steady-state flow through that institution.
The possibility of cycles in the network (where institution a owns shares of b, who owns shares of c,
who owns shares of a) means that the market value of institutions can be extremely sensitive to small
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changes in the cross-holdings [HK16]. In fact, if institutions can have arbitrarily small self-ownership,
then an ε-change in cross-holdings can have arbitrarily large impact on market values. Figure 4.4a
illustrates this in a simple network with 4 banks. The banks all have self-holdings (“reserves”) of r,
and the cross-holding values reported in the figure. Focusing on Bank 2, one can see that this bank
would need to know the value of ε to be able to determine its own market value. If Bank 2 has an
outside asset with value 1, and no other banks have any external assets, one can readily compute the
vector of market values in closed form.8
In Figure 4.4b, we show the final market value of each bank, assuming each bank retains r = 10%
self-holdings. The key point is that the value of Bank 2 drops significantly from .37 to .1 as ε goes






























(b) Market values of the banks in Figure 4.4a.
The high sensitivity of market values to small changes in cross-holdings means that institutions
must have a near perfect view of all other institutions’ cross-holdings in order to calculate their own
market value! In Section 4.3.1, we give Algorithm 5 for securely computing the approximate market
8Namely, the market value vector is given by
v =
1
(ε+ r − 1)(1− r)2 + 1






The sum of all market values is 1 (which is the total value of all external assets).
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values of each institution without requiring the institutions to share their cross-holdings.
More formally, we will use the notation Cij to denote the fraction of institution j owned by
institution i. We will use n× n matrix C = (Cij) to denote the cross-holdings within the network.
As in [EGJ14], we define Cii = 0. The matrix C corresponds to the weighted, directed graph on n
vertices that has an edge from j to i with weight Cij whenever Cij > 0. With this notation,
∑
i Cij
represents the proportion of j that is owned by other institutions. We assume that
∑
i Cij < 1,
i.e., that each institution retains some proportion of self-ownership. We define S to be the diagonal
matrix with Sjj
def
= 1−∑i Cij to be the fraction of self-ownership of institution j. We will use Di to
denote the value of the assets of institution i, and the vector D to denote the vector of asset values.
This type of model leads to two different notions of valuations of an institution, the equity
valuation, and the market valuation [BBC89]. The equity valuation of institution i is denoted by
Vi = Di︸︷︷︸





Values of institutions held by i
(4.11)
In matrix notation, this becomes
V = D + CV
V = (I−C)−1 D. (4.12)
As noted in [EGJ14], since the columns of C sum to strictly less than one, the matrix I − C is
guaranteed to be invertible. (Actually, I−C is an M-Matrix, see [Wil77, Joh82]).
It is relatively straightforward to see that the equity valuation significantly overcounts the
underlying value of the system, since the value of each asset is counted towards its primary owner
institution as well as the shareholders in that institution. Formally, this means ‖V‖1 ≥ ‖D‖1. This
property of the equity valuation is well-known [FP91, FHT94].
The market valuation eliminates this overcounting, by scaling each institution’s equity value by
its percentage of self-ownership. Thus the market valuation of institution i is
v = SV = S(I−C)−1D. (4.13)
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4.3.1 Privacy-preserving equity model
As with the debt model, Equation (4.13) was not designed with privacy in mind. Happily, it does
not introduce any new types of data dependencies not seen in the previous analysis. The only data
dependency in the original algorithm is the matrix inversion step, since, as mentioned, traditional
matrix inversion algorithms are not oblivious. Fortunately, we can use the same solution: an iterative
method to find a fixed point, described in Algorithm 2. This leads to the following algorithm
(Algorithm 5) for computing the market values in an equity network.
Algorithm 5 An iterative algorithm for calculating the market values in a equity cross-holdings
network model.
1: Input: n× n cross-holdings matrix C
2: Input: n× 1 asset vector D
3: Input: n× n diagonal self-holding matrix S
4: V = FindFix(C,D,0)
5: v = SV
6:
7: return v
Proposition 3. If C,S,D is an equity-network with mininum self-holdings smin
def
= mini Sii > 0,
then Algorithm 5 gives an approximate solution v to the true market values vtrue with
‖v − vtrue‖1 < (1− smin)k+1D, (4.14)
using only kn3 + n2 additions and kn3 + n2 + n multiplications.
4.4 Implementations with real data
Secure computation protocols can be extremely resource intensive, with high processing and band-
width costs. In fact, the costs (real or perceived) of running MPC protocols has been a signifi-
cant barrier to adoption. To assess the feasibility of securely computing financial analytics, we
implemented and benchmarked Algorithm 4 using three different software frameworks for MPC:
SCALE-MAMBA [AKR+19], EMP-toolkit [WMK16], and MPyC [Sch]. Each of these frameworks


























Figure 4.5: The full 21-country BIS dataset.
performance characteristics.
All the benchmarks reported in this section were collected on a single 15-core machine with
3.6GHz Intel Xeon Gold 5122 processors and 128GB of RAM. We ran all parties locally on this single
machine which implies we had to simulate n instances of individual machines running the MPC
protocols. While this limits the scale of the computations we are able to perform, it is important to
note that in practice, the computational burden would be split across the parties of the network,
each thus requiring a fraction of the computational power of our own setup.
4.4.1 Data sources
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international institution that collects and reports
consolidated financial statistics on international claims and liabilities. Each quarter, a small set of
(typically 25-30) countries report statistics relating to a larger set of several hundred countries.
We use these statistics to model a financial network in the debt model (Section 4.2.1). In
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this setting, network participants are countries, cross-holdings are international claims on other
participants, and cash reserves are total domestic capital/equity.
In order to provide the complete liability network, we limit network participants to only the
reporting countries who provide statistics on their total assets and equity. We used data for quarter
2 of 2018 but our data parsing tools can be used for any time period. This left us with 21 countries,
as shown in Figure 4.5. Cross-country liabilities and represented by arrows, with darker arrows
representing higher debts. The node size represents the country’s underlying capital.
To model smaller networks, we worked with subsets of the BIS data set, and to model larger
networks, we generated synthetic data. Note that a crucial feature of all secure computation
algorithms is that the running times and memory usage depends only on the size of the network, and
not the actual cross-holdings, since any dependence on cross-holdings would constitute a data leakage.
Thus the estimates of running time and memory usage will be the same for any collection of real or
synthetic data. In particular, this means our resource usage measurements are consistent across real
and synthetic data as long as our generated data is the same size as the real data (i.e., the values
can be represented using 64-bit fixed point numbers, and the number of participants is the same).
Table 4.1 shows the full 21-country network we extracted from the BIS data set. To test on smaller
networks, we considered the subnetworks obtained by the considering only the first t banks in the table
for t ≤ 21. The equilibrium market values are computed using the non privacy-preserving Algorithm 1.
The privacy-preserving market values are computed using our data-oblivious Algorithm 4. There is
only one defaulter in this network, so it is not surprising that the error term is zero (Proposition 2(ii)
shows that if there are no defaulters the error will always be 0).
In addition to the BIS data set, in some of our implementations we also considered the 6-country
network consisting of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain analyzed in [EGJ14],9
visualized in Figure 4.6.
4.4.2 Correctness of the oblivious algorithms
Rate of convergence of Algorithm 2. The MPC algorithms we develop in Section 4.2.3 are
error-free, in the sense that the privacy-preserving adjustments do not introduce any bias in the final
9Although [EGJ14] analyzed this as an equity network, the underlying data consisted of debts. In that work, they
converted the underlying debt network to an equity network by assuming each country retained 2/3 self-holdings, and
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(b) Six-country network (from Figure 4.6)
Figure 4.7: FindFix Algorithm 2 convergence over k.
output, with one exception: Algorithm 2, which replaces matrix inversion, is only asymptotically
exact.
Figure 4.7 shows the algorithm’s relatively quick rate of convergence in two different types of
networks. Figure 4.7a considers a set of (synthetic) random 20-bank networks, and shows how the
error in calculating market values decreases as a function of k, the number of iterations in Algorithm 2.
The networks were generated with Lij for i 6= j uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The relative error was
calculated as
‖papprox−ptrue‖1
‖ptrue‖1 . The error bars show the 95% confidence interval based on 200 samples.
Figure 4.7b shows the accuracy of the oblivious FindFix algorithm on the real-world data set
from [EGJ14] (as represented in Figure 4.6). In this 6-country network, all the countries are solvent,
and in this particular case, the FindFix algorithm converges with no error (see Proposition 2(ii)).
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Table 4.1: Equilibrium market values of the 21-country BIS data set. Values are in millions of USD.
Exact Privacy-Preserving
Name Reserves Market Value Market Value Error
Australia 196,291 324,605 324,605 0
Belgium 35,992 110,776 110,776 0
Canada 242,895 802,207 802,207 0
Chinese Taipei 112,044 146,500 146,500 0
Finland 7,231 21,196 21,196 0
France 476,060 1,726,679 1,726,679 0
Germany 509,167 1,367,904 1,367,904 0
Greece 31,955 37,005 37,005 0
India 10,622 99,027 99,027 0
Ireland 38,679 38,483 38,483 0
Italy 247,149 529,981 529,981 0
Netherlands 160,377 376,396 376,396 0
Portugal 30,689 34,555 34,555 0
Singapore 88,725 79,733 79,733 0
South Korea 173,528 213,149 213,149 0
Spain 293,666 573,661 573,661 0
Sweden 96,427 157,070 157,070 0
Switzerland 165,399 1,002,046 1,002,046 0
Turkey 58,544 732,388 732,388 0
United Kingdom 473,852 2,010,311 2,010,311 0
United States 1,605,782 2,429,208 2,429,208 0
In this setting, we tested the stability of our algorithm by simulating stress tests, reducing each
country’s underlying assets by a random variable, and re-running Algorithm 4 while keeping the
underlying network fixed. shows the relative error of the market-clearing vector returned by the
oblivious algorithm (Algorithm 4) compared to the ground truth for increasing number of iterations,
k. The bars represent a 95% confidence interval. In all tests, the inter-country debts remained fixed,
and only the countries’ self-holdings dropped.
In both cases, setting k = 10 effectively reduces the error to 0.
Four-bank example of Figure 4.4a
Figure 4.8 shows the banks’ true market values as well as their approximate market values obtained
from the privacy-preserving Algorithm 5, with k = 10. As in Figure 4.4b, r = .1 (each bank retains
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10% self-ownership), and only Bank 2 possesses any outside assets (these are normalized to have
value 1).
























Figure 4.8: Four-bank Network of Figure 4.4a. The solid lines are the true market values, and the dotted
lines represent the approximate market values calculated by the iterative algorithm (Algorithm 5).
Convergence of Algorithm 5
For a set of random 20-bank networks, Figure 4.9 shows how the error in calculating market values
decreases as a function of k, the number of iterations in Algorithm 5. The networks were generated
with Cij for i 6= j uniformly distributed in [0, 1], Sii uniformly distributed in [.1, .5], then rescaled so
that the columns of C + S sum to 1. The relative error was calculated as
‖vapprox−vtrue‖1
‖vtrue‖1 . The error
bars show the 95% confidence interval. Setting k = 10 (as we did in the rest of our implementations)
effectively reduces the error to 0.
4.4.3 Implementations and benchmarking
In Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.3.1, we showed how to compute network statistics in a data-oblivious
manner, using only simple operations (addition, multiplication and comparisons). The three MPC
frameworks we use provide secure (indistinguishable) executions of those basic operations. We
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Figure 4.9: Market value error for varying numbers of iterations in Algorithm 5 for 20-bank networks
SCALE-MAMBA.
SCALE-MAMBA is an open-source software system developed at KU Leuven. It implements a custom
multi-party computation algorithm based on linear-secret sharing [BDOZ11, DPSZ12, NNOB12] that
is secure against a malicious adversary with an honest majority of participants. The system runs in
three parts: the compilation phase consumes a user-described program to produce an executable
format, the offline phase generates cryptographic material that is independent of the participants’
input data Finally, the online phase executes the computation.
The offline phase is the most time- and resource-intensive. It generates and validates several forms
of cryptographic material in the form of samples of correlated random variables. This correlated
randomness is independent of the participants’ private inputs, and can be generated and stored at
any point prior to executing the protocol. These values are then used to mask or “blind” secret
values during the execution of the protocol. This pre-processing data is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 3. Since this offline phase is independent of the participants’ data, it can be it can be
run before the participants know their (private) inputs. For example, the offline phase could be run
overnight while markets are closed, then when the markets open, the (faster) online phase could be
executed using up-to-the-minute market data.
In Figure 4.10, we show total resources used per party to evaluate our network algorithms. These
resources are for the cumulative computation, including both online and offline phases. The figure
compares the debt model and the equity model with all parties participating, and the debt model
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computed in the “outsourced” setting described in Section 4.1.1, with three computation parties.
The equity model is less resource-intensive than the debt model with all parties participating: it
only requires one iteration of the iterative fixed-point algorithm (Algorithm 2), while the debt model
requires n in the number of banks. The outsourced model is the most efficient; communication is a





















































Figure 4.10: Per-party resources required to run Algorithm 4 using the SCALE-MAMBA MPC framework.
Given we chose to run all parties on a single machine, we benchmarked our implementation for smaller
numbers of parties and extrapolated to determine resources required for a larger number of parties.
SCALE-MAMBA provides extremely strong security guarantees (security against malicious
adversaries), however, the processor and memory requirements are significant. Our single machine
could not handle the full 21-party BIS dataset due to memory limitations, but this should not be
an issue in practice given that the computational burden would be split between the nodes in the
network. We estimate that each machine would require around 18GB of RAM per party, which
is highly feasible. Unfortunately, the running time is high – with an estimate of over 30 hours of
computation to compute market values in a 21-bank network. Although this is, perhaps, acceptable
in some situations (e.g. computing weekly stress tests), it does not seem likely to scale to much
larger networks without significant algorithmic advances. The 3-party reduction affords meaningful
efficiency gains (40% reduction in runtime), but is still within the same order of magnitude. The
next implementation (using MPyC) is orders of magnitude faster, but uses a weaker security model.
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MPyC.
This framework is secure against a semi-honest adversary when there is an honest majority. This is
a weaker security setting than the other two frameworks and it does not require a pre-processing
stage to generate cryptographic material. MPyC is implemented as a Python package and runs as
interpreted language.
MPyC includes an implementation of a special-purpose secure protocol for solving linear equations
of the form Ax = b for an unknown vector x [BBSdV19]. The LinSol algorithm (Protocol 4 in
[BBSdV19]) securely solves linear equations using integer operations only. We take advantage of this
custom implementation by replacing the FindFix Algorithm 2, which uses a simple iterator to invert
the input matrix, with Algorithm 6, which calls LinSol as a subroutine.
Algorithm 6 FindFix v.II
Input: A,b
Ā = I−A
(adj A)b,det A = LinSol(Ā,b)
p = (adj A)b/ det A
return p
LinSol(·) computes solutions directly, without resorting to iterative methods, but only works
with integer inputs. All of our algorithms require real-valued inputs. To convert between real-valued
(fixed-point) values and integer values requires, we follow the method proposed in [BBSdV19]. We
choose a scaling factor α, left-shift10 all values in A and b by α and truncate into an integer. If α is
too small, information about the fractional part of the value is lost. If α is large, we must use more
storage to store each integer, which hurts efficiency. In our implementation, we represent initial data
as 64-bit fixed point numbers with a 32-bit fractional part and set parameter α = 15.
Although LinSol can operate efficiently on integer inputs, it adds an additional source of overhead
cost by returning the adjugate matrix. To compute the final market values, we need to securely
divide out the determinant from each value in this matrix. Division under MPC is slow and requires
relatively large fixed-point integers to avoid truncation errors. In our implementation, we convert to
212-bit fixed point numbers in the equity model and 256-bit fixed point numbers in the debt model.
10i.e., multiply by 2α.
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The data sizes we chose avoid truncation and overflow errors on the sample data with up to
eight participants. We implemented both FindFix algorithms in MPyC and measured resource
usage on the BIS data described in Section 4.4.1. Figure 4.11 compares the debt model using both
the iterative (Algorithm 2) and inversion (Algorithm 6) methods, and the equity model using the
inversion method. In the debt model, the iterative algorithm is slower with larger numbers of parties
(Figure 4.11a), however, it also has a lower memory overhead (Figure 4.11b). As in SCALE-MAMBA,
the equity model is faster than the debt model. Our implementation is one of the first to show the












































Figure 4.11: Total resources required to run Algorithms 4 and 5 using the MPyC framework.
Based on these measurements, the computation on the full 21-bank network is only expected
to take about four minutes. This makes it extremely feasible for networks of this size, and much
faster than the SCALE-MAMBA toolkit. However, there are several caveats to this extrapolation.
First, the bitsize required to correctly represent values increases with the number of data points in
the computation. If the value of a computation “overflows” its container, we get incorrect results,
but increasing the bit size requires more resources (both time and RAM), especially for operations
like divison and comparison.11 The bit sizes used to benchmark up to 8 parties are too small to
benchmark the full set of 21 parties, so the computation would likely take longer than 4 minutes.
Second, we note that, with the given bit sizes, the matrix inversion FindFix algorithm is actually
11These operations require some “extra” bits in the operands or they will overflow. The amount of space required is
not documented; we discovered this by trial and error. For comparisons, we converted the 64-bit fixed point operands
to 128-bit integers, then converted the result back to fixed points. This was less overhead than comparing fixed points.
For divison, we converted the operands to a larger fixed point: from 64 bits to 256.
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slower than the iterative version for fewer than 8 parties, although the difference decreases with
larger number of parties. An increase in bit sizes may add additional overhead and “reset” this
advantage. To make this benchmark more consistent with a realistic setting, it may be valuable to
produce an adaptive tool that selects an appropriate12 bit size based on the input data, rather than
selecting a fixed size and using it for all input.
Finally, MPyC only provides security against passive adversaries. By contrast, SCALE-MAMBA
(and EMP-toolkit, discussed next) provide security against malicious adversaries, and supporting this
more robust security model adds to the complexity of the underlying secure computation protocol.
EMP-toolkit.
EMP-toolkit includes implementations of several garbled-circuit-based MPC protocols as well as
a general-purpose circuit compiler. To provide a point of comparison to SCALE-MAMBA, we
used the multi-party protocol secure against a dishonest majority of malicious adversaries. Like
SCALE-MAMBA, the algorithm runs in two phases: given a circuit describing the function, the
parties run two preliminary protocols to generate cryptographic material. Then they run the secure
computation protocol to evaluate the circuit.
EMP-toolkit works in the boolean circuit model, first converting the desired computation into a
circuit consisting of AND, XOR and NOT gates, and then securely executing the circuit. Algorithm 4
requires matrix operations over the reals, and their corresponding boolean circuits are extremely
complex, requiring hundreds of millions of gates. To illustrate the complexity of the secure computation
algorithm we used EMP toolkit to generate boolean circuits computing Algorithms 4 and 5. The
circuit sizes (as a function of the number of participants n) are in Figure 4.12. In contrast to the
experimental results from SCALE-MAMBA and MPyC, the equity model produces much larger
circuits. This is likely due to a discrepancy in bit sizes: the equity model uses 50-bit fixed point
numbers (with a 16-bit fractional part), but the debt model uses only 32 bits (with an 8-bit fractional
part).
12i.e., the smallest sizes that don’t overflow
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Parties Time (s) RAM (gigabytes)
2 0.65 0.15 - 0.19
4 14.58 1.97 - 3.92
Table 4.2: Resource requirements for EMP-toolkit to run Algorithm 5. In our experiments, one party
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Equity model
Debt model
Figure 4.12: Circuit sizes for computing network statistics in the debt (Algorithm 4) and equity (Algorithm 5)
models. The plot shows the number of boolean gates required to securely execute the algorithm with k = 10.
These circuits are large, requiring over 800 million gates when n = 30.
The circuit size gives an indication of the complexity of the computation that is independent from
the specific computing hardware and networking architecture. Unfortunately, we were unable, for the
most part, to execute these circuits using EMP toolkit. Table 4.2 shows the runtime for Algorithm 5
with a small number of parties.
Previous work [KsS12] showed how to execute a garbled-circuit protocol in the malicious security
model extremely efficiently. They report executing a circuit with 5.9 billion gates in 14,700 seconds.
Extrapolating to our scenario (where our circuits have only 800 million gates), the computation time
on their setup would only be around 20 seconds.
Summary.
Our experiments show that although the calculations are computationally intensive, they are feasible
for small networks (n ∼ 20) on commodity hardware. If performance were a consideration, real-world
deployments could dramatically increase the run-times with more powerful hardware and a more
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highly optimized software implementation.
It is also interesting to note difference in runtimes between SCALE-MAMBA and MPyC. The
two frameworks use extremely different MPC back-ends so it is hard to pinpoint a single cause of
the performance differences. Nevertheless, it seems likely that providing security against malicious
adversaries (as in SCALE-MAMBA) is a primary cause of its slower performance. If this is the
case, it is an interesting question whether practitioners (e.g. banks or regulators) feel the need to
provide security against malicious adversaries, or whether security against semi-honest adversaries is
sufficient.
4.5 Discussion, limitations and conclusion
4.5.1 Feasibility and future work
Although prior work has suggested the use of MPC for privacy-preserving financial computations
[AKL12, CK19], these works only considered generic protocols (e.g. sums, variances, moments, linear
inference) rather than more complex protocols (e.g. market-values) from the literature. The one prior
work that develops MPC for financial networks [NPH14] provides weaker security guarantees than
ours, and does not analyze the convergence of their algorithms. This work is the first to provide strong
security and convergence guarantees and to provide benchmarks on real-world data. To demonstrate
feasibility, we have implemented two different market-value computations, one in the debt model,
and one in the equity model, using three different secure multi-party computation frameworks.
Our implementations show that these secure computations are indeed feasible for realistic networks.
In terms of efficiency, we claim that existing tools are sufficient for use in some applications, including
computing market values for small networks. We estimate SCALE-MAMBA requires less than 20GB
of RAM and around 30 hours per party to compute market values of a network with 21 participants.
This is a relatively low cost for a small group of banks who wish to run monthly risk assessments
amongst themselves. There are a variety of known optimizations that could improve our results as
well, such as porting Algorithm 6 to SCALE-MAMBA or EMP-toolkit and carefully tuning software
parameters and bit sizes to optimize the computation. At a higher level, using special-purpose MPC
protocols designed for highly efficient operations over real-valued matrices could dramatically improve
runtimes.
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The software tools we use here were developed as academic projects and are not, generally
speaking, production quality code. Despite this, they demonstrate the feasibility of this approach.
In a real application setting, a coalition of financial institutions could fund the development an
open-source, production-quality implementation. Coupling this with a moderate investment in
hardware, we believe that these protocols could easily see significant performance improvements over
our prototype implementations. We believe this is an investment worth making, as the development
of such a tool would enable widespread adoption of secure computation.
Our work shows that key calculations in financial networks can be calculated in a privacy-
preserving manner. Our work also highlights the key variables that affect the performance. Thus,
any coalition of institutions considering this type of system needs to ask (1) How many institutions
want to participate in the calculation (using secret-sharing, the number of institutions providing
data can be larger than the number of institutions actively participating in the computation, see
Section 4.1.1), (2) Do the institutions need security against malicious adversaries, or is semi-honest
security sufficient? (3) How often do the calculations need to be run (e.g. is a running time of 6
hours acceptable)?
4.5.2 Limitations
Second-order inference: In this work, we focus on the question of securely computing market values,
and financial stress-tests, without a trusted third party, and without revealing the stakeholders’
underlying data. Like extant literature in this space, we do not address the scenario that the result
of the calculation (e.g. the market values of the institutions, the number of institutions that fail,
or the total financial shortfall) could reveal sensitive information about the underlying institutions.
In principle, one could use secure computation to implement a differentially private stress-test to
achieve both privacy against an adversary monitoring network traffic, and an adversary performing
inference on the result [NPH14].
Garbage-in-garbage-out problem: Our algorithms do not ensure that the participants behave
truthfully. In fact, MPC protocols in general can only enforce “truthful” behavior if such behavior
can formally (mathematically) defined. For example, our protocol could be easily extended to enforce
simple consistency checks (e.g., in the debt model if i reports a debt to j, then j should report the
same debt from i), but without a mathematical definition of “truth” for each participants private
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inputs, the protocol cannot enforce that the participants behave truthfully. Of course, if participants
provide incorrect inputs, the calculated market values will also be incorrect.
Scalability: Our implementations show that these types of computations can easily scale to dozens
(or even hundreds) of participants. Unfortunately, the communication costs of the underlying secure
computation algorithms scale quadratically with the number of participants, so it is unlikely that
this architecture, in its current form, can scale to thousands of participants. To address settings with
more participants, it is common to change the network architecture, separating the number of data
owners (i.e., the number of banks) from the number of computation parties (e.g. a subset of larger
banks, or outside agencies). This allows us to increase the number of banks without increasing the
number of computational parties. Figure 4.10 shows that running Algorithm 4 with three parties
instead of 21 reduces the runtime by about 40%. Unfortunately, this reduces security in the sense




zkChannels: Fast, Unlinkable Payments for Any
Blockchain using 2PC
Since the introduction of Bitcoin [Nak19], blockchain-based digital currencies have flourished and now
process billions of dollars worth of transactions daily [Coi]. However, cryptocurrencies suffer from
significant privacy, scalability, and latency limitations that reduce usability. In particular, (1) most
blockchains do not provide robust anonymity properties, and (2) processing transactions is quite
slow and often expensive.
Each of these problems has been addressed in isolation. Some cryptocurrencies integrate cryp-
tographic anonymity features to prevent observers from tracking the flow of transactions, such as
shielded transactions in Zcash [SCG+14] and ring signatures in Monero [Mon]. Various off-chain
solutions, including payment channels, have been developed to make processing transactions faster
and cheaper [PD16]. These protocols work by moving the bulk of transactions off chain and relying
on the chain to resolve disputes. In its simplest form, a payment channel allows two parties to
escrow funds in an on-chain account and then make payments to each other off chain. An on-chain
arbitration mechanism allows participants to close on their most recent balances. The most widely
used of these off-chain solutions is the Lightning Network [PD16], which combines many payment
channels into a larger Payment Channel Network (PCN) that allows two parties who do not have an
established channel together to still engage in a mutual transaction.
Payment channels and PCNs are an active research area [SVR+20], with many important,
unresolved usability and privacy limitations. Most solutions involve channels that provide no
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cryptographically-enforced privacy guarantees to the participants, either with respect to one another,
other parties in the larger PCN, or observers of the underlying blockchain.
Privacy-preserving payment channels, which Green and Miers introduce in the Bolt proto-
col [GM17], are an important step towards simultaneously improving scalability and achieving robust
privacy. These channels enable anonymous, unlinkable payments between a customer and a merchant,
a natural use case for point-to-point payments. In this context, anonymity and unlinkability mean
that the merchant has no advantage in guessing which customer is making a given payment, or
even that the source of any two payments is the same customer, unless the included purpose and
amount of the payment reveals identifying information. This means the merchant cannot link a
payment to a customer, nor can the merchant construct payment histories. As is standard in payment
channels, the participants set up the channel by escrowing funds on a blockchain; after this initial,
potentially non-anonymous phase, the customer can initiate payments to the merchant anonymously
in an unlinkable fashion. Ideally, either party can initiate a channel closure, starting the process
of allocating the escrowed funds according to the latest balances in the channel. Channel closures
should not leak anything beyond the closing balances and should guarantee that an honest party
cannot lose money.
In this work, we present, implement, and prove secure a novel privacy-preserving payment
channels protocol, which we name zkChannels. zkChannels is a generalization of Bolt designed to
integrate easily with existing cryptocurrencies, requiring that the underlying blockchain support only
basic features that are already nearly ubiquitous. The heart of our protocol is a secure two-party
computation (2PC) [Yao86, LP09a]. While secure 2PC protocols have been known for decades,
they have only recently become efficient enough for use as a building block without compromising
practicality [WRK17a]. zkChannels also introduces new techniques that improve the security and
usability of privacy-preserving preserving payment channels that cannot be realized by 2PC alone.
The resulting protocol is carefully designed to provide strong privacy and security, despite the
impossibility of fairness for two-party protocols [Cle86].
The zkChannels protocol has several desirable properties compared to previous work: (1) Customer
payments are fully unlinkable, both with respect to each other and to the channel, even in the
presence of merchant aborts. A key limitation of Bolt is the failure to provide strong privacy against
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a merchant that aborts during a payment, instead relying heavily on funding the channel with a
fully anonymous cryptocurrency, a feature that is not widely available. In zkChannels, the customer
always has an unlinkable way to close the channel down. (2) Our protocol does not require the
integration of any channel-aware logic into the blockchain or the deployment of new opcodes or
primitives, instead relying on 2PC to support our on-chain arbitration process with existing blockchain
functionalities. Bolt, in contrast, tightly binds its off-chain and on-chain components using shared
cryptographic primitives, meaning the underlying blockchain must support specific cryptographic
operations (none currently do). Their approach requires the introduction of new op-codes for blind
signature verification and additional, channel-aware logic to enforce correct opening and closure.
While a few blockchain developers have signaled a willingness to do this [ZIP, Tez], there appears to
be no interest from the most active cryptocurrencies, e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum. (3) We provide
a complete specification for the escrow and arbitration mechanisms of zkChannels, including how
to guarantee the merchant the ability to close channels. In Bolt, escrow and closing mechanisms
are left mostly unspecified: detailing, implementing, and auditing the full scope of changes that
must be made to the underlying blockchain to support their approach is a significant engineering
and community consensus effort [Zca]. Additionally, no solution for guaranteed merchant closures
is provided in Bolt, which significantly impacts the incentive a merchant has to participate in a
payment channel, as funds are locked in escrow until a customer chooses to close. (4) We specify how
to integrate the purpose of a payment into zkChannels, answering the question of when a merchant
can reasonably consider a payment complete, which Green and Miers [GM17] leave open.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
– We formally define zkChannels, the first fully privacy-preserving, unlinkable payment channel
protocol suitable for deployment on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies without requiring modifica-
tions. We give a complete specification of our protocol, including how to integrate zkChannels
with a payment network and codify our protocol’s privacy guarantees and improvements over
Bolt [GM17]. In particular, zkChannels provides the customer with a closing method that cannot
be linked to their payments on the channel, even in the case of a malicious merchant abort, and
uses a simple trick to provide the merchant the ability to force channel closure, even without
knowing the current balance allocation. We also show how to integrate zkChannels payments with
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respect to the payment’s purpose, allowing the merchant to safely provide the requested service,
refund, or item.
– We define and prove zkChannels security in the context of an abstract, currency-controlling
functionality we call an arbiter. This captures that zkChannels can work with many different
types of payment networks. We provide a summary of our security proof in the standalone model.
We emphasize that most UTXO cryptocurrencies1 satisfy the requirements needed to realize our
arbiter functionality, meaning that zkChannels can be instantiated on many blockchains. Our
abstraction of the arbiter may be of independent interest and can serve as a useful tool for defining
protocol extensions, such as state channels and modified closing approaches.
– We provide a complete, tested, end-to-end implementation of zkChannels for Bitcoin. This includes
an efficient 2PC for both semihonest [Yao86] and malicious [WRK17a] security. Our circuit builds
and signs actual Bitcoin transactions bit-by-bit. Our circuit has 10 million gates, including 2.5
million AND gates. Evaluating the semihonest version of this circuit as part of our payment
protocol takes ≈ 355ms; the malicious version takes ≈ 10s. We believe this is one of the first
substantial uses of generic 2PC frameworks with the potential to process real, sensitive information.
5.1 zkChannels overview and intuition
The zkChannels protocol allows a customer (C) and a merchant (M) to open a bidirectional payment
channel with respect to a payment network capable of arbitration, which we refer to as the arbiter
(J ). As is standard for payment channels, both parties may close the channel at any time and an
honest party is guaranteed to be paid at least the balance they are owed. Our protocol, however, is
asymmetric and private: the customer initiates all payments, each of which is anonymous and cannot
be linked to any other payments.
Privacy preserving payment channels are composed of two primary parts, an off-network mechanism
to allow payments and a set of on-network procedures that allow for escrow and arbitration during
closure. To design a protocol that works for virtually any payment network, we design a payment
subprotocol that integrates with a simple arbiter.2
1“Unspent transaction output” (UTXO) refers to the method of tracking accounts as sets of unspent coins.
2It may be possible to instantiate a more efficient payment subprotocol if the payment network supports advanced
features, like account-based cryptocurrencies with smart contracts. In this work, we focus on the harder case, with a
simpler UTXO Bitcoin-like network in mind.
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At a high level, the arbiter allows funds to be kept in accounts. Accounts have encumbrances
that specify how funds may be disbursed. Accounts may be created, modified, or closed through
transactions. In the case of a cryptocurrency network, transactions that are accepted and/or
confirmed are public; participants are responsible for monitoring the ledger for relevant transactions.
Theoretically, an arbiter without a public ledger may be used, but requires direct communication
between the arbiter and channel participants and is not the focus of this paper. The arbiter J is
responsible for receiving, validating, and processing transactions. If the arbiter is a payment network
such as a cryptocurrency, all zkChannels transactions must be well-formed according to the given
payment network’s rules; the instantiation must give an exact specification.
We formally define an arbiter in Section 5.2.2 and zkChannels in Section 5.3. In the next few
subsections, we give the key intuitions behind our protocol.
5.1.1 Privacy properties
The merchant is at most pseudonymous and remains identifiable across all channels. The customer C
is afforded privacy for individual payments, but the zkChannels protocol is agnostic as to whether or
not the merchant learns C’s identity during channel opening and, by consequence, closure. This does
not affect C’s ability to make payments anonymously as long as they have an open payment channel
with sufficient balance. The anonymity set for a payment is the set of all customers with whom the
given merchant has an open channel. We do not require the use of an anonymous cryptocurrency to
achieve payment privacy.
The unlinkability property ensures that a merchant will not obtain any cryptographic evidence
from the protocol that can tie a customer to a specific payment (or payments to each other). However,
it does not eliminate inference or timing attacks by the merchant. For example, a merchant can track
payment amounts and, upon channel closure, search for a subset of payments that add up to the
final channel balances.3
The protocol includes optional auxiliary information as input and output to each payment. This
can be used to facilitate the provision of services, e.g., to provide the customer with a randomizable
token that can be redeemed for a service. The protocol does not consider the extent to which auxiliary
information can leak additional information.
3The subset-sum problem is NP-complete, but is likely feasible to compute in this setting.
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The zkChannels protocol does not address networking privacy. Interactive subprotocols between
the parties take place over sessions, in which the merchant is authenticated, but the customer is
not. In practice, parties concerned about traffic analysis by third parties or the merchant can use an
anonymizing networking tool such as Tor.
Use cases. zkChannels is suited to any use case with a traditional customer-merchant relationship.
A simple example has a neighborhood coffee shop as the merchant. In this setting, zkChannels act as
a pre-paid gift card. Many customers visit regularly for short periods of time; their payments are
processed efficiently (e.g. faster than drinking an espresso) and do not leave the shop with a record
of their visiting habits. The merchant saves money on individual transaction fees charged by a credit
card processor or a direct on-chain cryptocurrency transaction.
A similar gift-card approach applies in many scenarios, such as large online retailers, VPN providers,
or ISPs. These retailers can maintain their regulatory (“know your customer”) requirements by
verifying customer identity before establishing a channel, but zkChannels improves customer privacy
across individual transactions.
Comparing to private cryptocurrencies. As discussed, zkChannels can layer privacy guarantees
on top of a wide variety of existing, non-private payment networks. We compare the privacy and
efficiency guarantees of zkChannels to those of cryptocurrencies that provide privacy by design.
Monero [Mon, NMRL16] provides unlinkability for all payments: observers cannot link payments
to the sender or receiver, the receiver cannot identify the sender of a payment. The anonymity set
includes all participants in the Monero network. ZCash [SCG+14] offers two types of addresses:
shielded and transparent. Transactions between shielded addresses maintain sender and receiver
privacy, with the anonymity set as the set of shielded addresses. Monero and ZCash shielded
transactions both hide the transaction amount. zkChannels provides sender unlinkability by default
for all payments, although a customer can optionally reveal their identity via the auxiliary payment
information. The anonymity set is the set of customers that maintain an open channel with the
receiving merchant.
A simple efficiency measure is the minimum time for payment confirmation. The Kraken
cryptocurrency exchange publishes the minimum number of confirmations required for a valid
deposit [Kra21]. For Monero, this takes roughly 30 minutes; for ZCash, close to 60 minutes. This is
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comparable to non-private cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin’s 40 minutes, but much slower than the
benchmarks in Section 5.5: zkChannels takes less than 2 minutes to process a payment.
5.1.2 Channel opening
The goal of channel opening is for the customer and merchant to agree on initial channel parameters,
safely escrow funds on network, and provide the customer the ability to start making unlinkable
payments. To avoid the need for a special-purpose 2PC for opening, the parties pick channel
parameters in the clear, including the customer’s initial state, denoted by s0. Since customer states
in our protocol contain secrets that should not be revealed before making a payment, we have the
customer make an initial zero payment, which gives the customer a fresh, unlinkable version of s0, in
order to bootstrap the channel.
Channel parameters consist of auxiliary information needed to form network transactions and the
state s0, which includes the starting customer balance, B
C
0 , and merchant balance, B
M
0 , a channel
identifier, and two additional, randomly generated values, which we describe later. In order to escrow
channel funds safely, the two parties first collaborate to create special transactions that allow each
party to close; this prevents a malicious party from “locking” the other’s funds indefinitely. With
these transactions in hand, the parties post the escrow transaction, escrow, on network. Once the
escrow transaction is confirmed, the merchant sends the customer a payment tag on the initial state,
denoted by pt0. This tag is a merchant authorization on the state s0 under a well-known, longterm
public key, e.g., a signature, and can be used to make a payment.
5.1.3 Channel payments
From the customer’s perspective, the payment channel consists of a sequence of states, denoted by
{si}i∈N, each of which has a corresponding payment tag, pt i, and a closing authorization that allows
the customer to close on the balances embedded in a given state when presented to the arbiter J .
To make a payment of (possibly negative) value ε, the customer C needs to privately “spend” a




i ), to get a new state and tag pair, (si+1, pt i+1),
that embeds and authorizes a balance of (BCi − ε, BMi + ε). For privacy, the customer requires the
pair (si+1, pt i+1) be:
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(1) not linkable to any previous payment session;4 and
(2) usable in an unlinkable manner either to make another payment or to close the channel.
To preserve functionality, the merchant M requires that the following are true:
(1) The new state, si+1, is properly formed from the previous state and the payment amount.
(2) The balances satisfy BCi − ε ≥ 0 and BMi + ε ≥ 0.
(3) The customer’s new closing authorization is with respect to the correctly updated state.
(4) The customer has never made a payment on state si before, preventing off-network “double
spends”.
(5) If the customer tries to close on the old state, si, then the merchant can use the on-network
arbitration mechanism to dispute the dishonest transaction.
zkChannels uses a maliciously secure, generic 2PC that takes as input a pair (si, pt i) and the
merchant’s secret key material, and computes all the outputs the customer needs at the end of the
pay session: a payment tag pt i+1 on state si+1 and a new set of closing authorization signatures.
Producing the closing authorization signature(s) involves non-black box use of the arbiter J ’s
authorization mechanism, i.e., , the 2PC must run a signing algorithm supported by J . This 2PC
also performs correctness checks that ensure that the channel has sufficient funds for making the
payment. This includes checking that the existing tag pt i is valid and corresponds to the input state
si, and that the new state si+1 is correctly formed and embeds the correct balances.
Although a powerful primitive, 2PC alone cannot meet all the goals outlined above. Specifically,
2PC cannot prevent a malicious customer from reusing old state and cannot provide an unlinkable
arbitration mechanism. To address these problems, we include additional secrets in each state: a
nonce, denoted by n, and a revocation pair, denoted by (rl , rs ).
Preventing reuse via nonces. To ensure a “spent” state cannot be reused, we include a nonce
that is sent to the merchant in the clear at the beginning of the payment subprotocol. The merchant
keeps a database of previously seen nonces and continues the pay session only if the revealed nonce
is fresh. The 2PC checks that the input state does indeed contain the revealed nonce.
4zkChannels only guarantees that the customer’s payments are unlinkable if the customer acts honestly. If the
customer deviates from the protocol, it may be possible to link their payments.
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Invalidating old states via revocation pairs. To disincentive the customer from closing the
channel on an old state, we use revocation pairs to embed a punishment mechanism into the closing
transactions. After making a payment, the customer invalidates the closing transactions for a given
state s with an embedded revocation pair (rl , rs ) by sending this pair to the merchant. If the
customer later closes on s, the merchant can use the revocation secret rs to claim all the funds in
the channel. As such, we require that it be infeasible to extract rs from the revocation lock rl . As
with nonces, the 2PC checks that the revealed value rl is exactly the one stored in its input state.
We formalize revocation pairs in Section 5.2 and instantiate them as hash locks for Bitcoin.
It may be tempting to use the same mechanism for preventing reuse and invalidating old state, as
in Bolt [GM17]. However, this allows a malicious merchant to abort a payment session after learning
the nonce and then wait for this value to appear in a closing transaction on the payment network.
This means a customer must either forfeit their channel funds or link their on-network identity to
this aborted payment session. When we separate these mechanisms, the nonce never appears on
network and an honest customer never posts a previously revealed revocation lock to the network.
Composing the pay protocol. The payment protocol is an exchange of information: the customer
receives a new state pair, (si+1, pt i+1) and the merchant receives the nonce ni and the pair (rl i, rsi)
from the spent state si. This exchange ideally happens atomically. If only the customer C receives
output, they can reuse si at will; if only the merchant receives output, they obtain a revocation secret
for all closing transactions C can create. However, two-party protocols cannot achieve fairness [Cle86],
so we cannot simply have the 2PC send the outputs to the customer and we must compromise. We
focus on privacy and take a similar intuitive approach to Bolt [GM17]: the customer risks the value
of the payment when they request a service, but can always close the channel unlinkably.
To accomplish this, we ensure that each participant receives their new information in an order
that protects their interests: the customer will not reveal (rl i, rsi) until they have a way to unlinkably
close on the new state, i.e., , the closing authorization for si+1, and the merchant will not issue
the tag pt i+1 until they have received (rl i, rsi). As such, the 2PC computes masked versions of the
outputs, and then the parties do a step-by-step release of information during an unmask phase. If
either player aborts during this phase, unlinkable closure is still possible. For a detailed description
of the unmask phase, see Section 5.3.3.
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5.1.4 Arbiter mechanics: escrow and closing
The zkChannels protocol aims to operate within a generic payment network, where each party has
an account containing funds and can authorize spending those funds via transactions. However, the
design space of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies is large and varied. Some payment networks can
embed complex logic into transactions to define exactly when and how a payment should occur;
others have far more limited expressive capabilities. This work focuses on UTXO networks, which
tend to be less expressive.
To allow for these varied abilities, the zkChannels protocol interacts with a generic arbiter and
uses a sequence of transactions to open and correctly close channels. This section defines the required
capabilities the underlying network must satisfy in order to serve as a zkChannel arbiter, describes the
transactions used for the escrow and close protocols, and briefly discusses other possible instantiations
of the arbiter beyond the UTXO model.
Requirements for a UTXO arbiter. This work uses a generic arbiter J for a UTXO network.
This design is motivated by Bitcoin, but is generic enough to apply to other, similar cryptocurrency
networks.
A major design constraint is that such an arbiter is zkChannel-agnostic: transactions specified using
J do not encode any zkChannel-specific logic and the arbiter cannot explicitly or implicitly identify
these transactions as part of a zkChannel instance. Any party that can satisfy the encumbrances
of the transaction can claim the funds. Thus, we define the three main requirements for a UTXO
arbiter as types of encumbrances that it must support.
The first is signature-based verification. The transaction embeds a public key and the arbiter
only releases funds to a party that can provide a signature that validates under the public key.
zkChannels requires a 2-of-2 threshold signature scheme.5 The second is support for revocation-based
encumbrances. The transaction embeds a revocation lock rl ; funds are released to a party that
can provide a matching revocation secret rs . Finally, the arbiter must allow relative timelock
encumbrances. These release funds to a party only after a certain amount of time (relative to the
transaction’s confirmation) has passed. The transaction embeds a time δ and a set of additional
encumbrances.
5For Bitcoin, we instantiate this using 2-of-2 multi-sigs.
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Figure 5.1: High level snapshot of the zkChannels lifecycle, with off-network subprotocols (left) and network
transactions (right). Off network, the parties establish the channel and post escrow on network. A customer
can initiate a sequence of payments off network. Channel closure can be either merchant-initiated, via expiry,
or customer-initiated. The customer can post a transaction closing on any post-payment intermediate state,
but should post close(n), which reflects the state after the final, nth payment. If they do not, a disputing
merchant can claim all channel funds with dispute. Dark and light blue shading in each node shows the
customer and merchant balances at each step, respectively; this example shows only positive payments for
clarity.
The arbiter must be able to combine and evaluate these encumbrances logically (that is, using
and and or relations). Any arbiter that can authorize a transaction based on a combination of
these elements is compatible with zkChannels. This includes many popular cryptocurrencies such as
Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin.
Integration with zkChannels. The zkChannels escrow and closing sequences are captured in
Figure 5.1. Channel participants collaborate to create and fund the channel with escrow, producing
and authorizing initial closing transactions for both parties in the process. For each payment, the
parties use 2PC to create and authorize updated closing transactions for the customer. The initial
and subsequent closing transactions are authorized with signatures from both parties.
There are two primary types of closing sequences supported. In a unilateral customer flow, the
customer first posts a customer closing transaction, close, which pays out the merchant balance
and timelocks the claimed customer balance. This allows the merchant a chance to post dispute
and claim this balance (using a revocation secret) if the posted state is outdated. In a unilateral
merchant flow, the merchant first posts expiry, which puts a timelock on all the funds and allows
the merchant to claim them all with merch-claim once the timelock expires. This time delay allows
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the customer an opportunity to post their own closing transaction with up-to-date balances, which is
still subject to the same dispute mechanism as in the unilateral customer close flow. zkChannels
also supports an efficient mutual close procedure when the customer and merchant are willing to
cooperate.
Expanding to non-UTXO arbiters. This paper focuses primarily on zkChannels-agnostic,
UTXO networks, but the zkChannels protocol is also compatible with more expressive account-based
networks, such as Ethereum or Tezos. Such cryptocurrencies allow for a relatively natural realization
of an account as a defined object that is acted upon by subsequent transactions, i.e., , a smart
contract. This design opens the possibility of zkChannels-aware closing methods, where the arbiter
performs zkChannels-specific logic.
For example, Tezos accounts have memory that can be updated. A zkChannels contract can
contain the channel balances, status (whether the channel is initialized, funded and open, or closing),
and the revocation lock. The account defines entrypoints, which can update the account memory and
pay out funds. Encumbrances can still depend on signatures, timelocks, and revocation pairs, as above,
but the account itself can embed additional logic (such as updating balances and revocation locks)
that simplifies the off-chain logic. For example, a Tezos account can verify a randomized Pointcheval-
Sanders (PS) signature, which simplifies the pay protocol by replacing the “blind” signature under
2PC with a PS signature.
In practice, the capabilities of the arbiter span a spectrum, and explicit recognition of this fact is
helpful in deciding on the specifics of an instantiation. It is possible to make efficiency improvements
by shifting the implementation toward zkChannels-aware methods where possible. In future work,
we aim to describe a generic, channel-aware arbiter functionality that can be instantiated by a smart
contract, a series of UTXO transactions with additional non-arbiter logic, or some middle ground.
Another degree of freedom in our design is the closing model : at the extremes, we have a choice
between punishment, in which a dishonest customer that posts an old view of the channel state to
the network can lose all their funds to the merchant, and reconciliation, in which closing allows for
on-network recovery of the most recent channel state. We focus on the former in this paper, as
this is common in practice [PD16], but we observe that achieving a combined punishment and/or




We establish notation and give definitions for the building blocks used in our protocol. We refer the
reader to [KL14] for details on standard cryptographic primitives.
Notation. Let y1, . . . , ym = f(x1, . . . , xn; r1, . . . , rs) denote an algorithm f taking as inputs the vari-
ables (x1, . . . , xn) and random coins (r1, . . . , rs) and generating as outputs the variables (y1, . . . , ym).
When clear from context, we may omit some parameters, such as the public values or random coins.
Message Authentication Code (MAC). A MAC scheme ΠMAC is a tuple (KeyGen,Mac,Verify),
with the following interfaces:
– KeyGen(1λ) outputs a key K with security parameter 1λ;
– Mac(K,m) outputs a tag t on a message m; and
– Verify(K,m, t) outputs a boolean b ∈ {false, true}.
We assume standard existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Digital Signatures. A digital signature scheme ΠSig is a tuple (Setup,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) with
the following interfaces:
– Setup(1λ) outputs public parameters pp;
– KeyGen(pp; r) outputs a keypair (sk , pk);
– Sign(sk ,m; r) outputs a signature σ on a message m; and
– Verify(pk ,m, σ) outputs a boolean b ∈ {false, true}.
We assume existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme ΠCom is a tuple (Setup,Com) with the following
interfaces:
– Setup(1λ) outputs public parameters pp; and
– Com(m; r) outputs a commitment com(m; r) on a message m and random coins r.
We assume ΠCom is hiding and binding.
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Revocation Locks. We define a revocation lock scheme, ΠRlock = (Gen,Verify), as follows:
– Gen(1λ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1λ as input and outputs a
revocation lock pair (rl , rs ); and
– Verify(rl , rs ) takes in a revocation lock rl and a revocation secret rs and outputs a boolean
b ∈ {false, true}.
We require that these functions satisfy the following properties:
Correctness: For every λ and every pair (rl , rs ← Gen(1λ), we have
Verify(rl , rs ) = true.
Security: For all p.p.t. adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr[Verify(rl , rs ) = true | (rl , ·)← Gen(1λ), rs ← A(rl )] < negl(λ).
Revocation locks are a formalization of the hash lock construction, discussed next.
Hash-based Constructions. In our implementation, we instantiate commitments and revocation
locks with hash based primitives, relying on the collision resistance of some standard cryptographic
hash function H. To commit to a message m, we sample randomness r
$←− {0, 1}λ and output the
commitment H(r‖m). We use this hash-based commitment scheme to create revocation locks by
setting ΠRlock.Gen(r) = (com(r;⊥), r). This construction is a standard hash lock commonly used in
blockchain applications.
5.2.2 Arbiter abstraction.
We describe transactions processed by the arbiter J as a pair (κ, T ), where κ is a tuple of instruc-
tions specifying one or more accounts and the new encumbrances, and T is an authorization set :
accompanying evidence that shows the terms of the instructions specifying disbursement have been
met.
In a UTXO network, an account is realized through a sequence of ephemeral objects, called
addresses, that are acted upon by a corresponding sequence of transactions. For this reason, we
sometimes abuse terminology and refer to an account by the most recent transaction that places
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encumbrances on the funds in question. We say an account is current if we are referencing the most
recent set of encumbrances on the given funds. That is, we define accounts via a one-to-one mapping
with (funds, encumbrance) pairs; transactions can split, combine, create, or remove accounts.
The set of well-formed transactions depends on the formal language of the chosen arbiter, but
must be precise in its specification of which funds are being acted upon and how. In a UTXO network,
transactions specify sending and receiving accounts, together with the associated encumbrances on
those receiving accounts, and provide evidence meant to satisfy the encumbrances on the sending
accounts. In order to be legitimate, transactions must be well-formed, the instructions must specify a
current account(s), and the authorization set and transaction context must be deemed satisfactory by
J . That is, the transaction must actually satisfy any encumbrances placed on the specified account(s),
which may include restrictions on the type of allowable encumbrances for receiving accounts.6 We
assume transactions can be verified as legitimate by any entity, in keeping with the public nature of
blockchain ledgers.
Key assumptions and notation
The arbiter J must implement a threshold signature scheme ΠSig and a revocation lock scheme
ΠHlock.
7 Further, transactions must have canonical identifiers, called transaction IDs, defined by a
function fID : tx 7→ txid. That is, any two transactions that have the same effect (i.e., , instructions)
should have the same transaction ID, independent of any possible differences in the transactions’
authorization sets.8 When we wish to make this explicit, we write J (ΠSig,ΠHlock,fID).
As mentioned, the arbiter must also have a method of specifying timeouts. That is, J allows for
encumbrances of the form “After time δ has passed, a transaction may specify the transfer of these
funds provided a sufficient authorization set.”
We name and parametrize transactions with zkChannel-specific vocabulary and variables (these
names and parameters are not provided directly to J ). Notationally, we describe a given transaction
tx as a pair of instructions κ and an authorization set T = {t0, . . . , t`}. We write tx(params) to refer
only to the instructions κ and tx(params; t0, . . . , t`) to denote the complete, authorized transaction.
6More formally, transactions must adhere to the semantics of the arbiter’s language and the formulas used to
define encumbrances must be valid given the current state of the network.
7Technically, a threshold signature scheme suffices for revocation locks. On a UTXO network, we can use multi-sigs
instead of threshold signatures.
8Canonical transaction IDs allow us to unambiguously reference even as-yet unconfirmed transactions, allowing for
unconfirmed dependency chains; account-based smart contracts obviate this requirement.
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At a high level, we can think of an account holder as an entity that has the necessary information
to create an authorization set spending from the account in question. We denote the collection
of accounts for which a given entity P is an account holder by J [P], and the amount of funds P
controls by ‖J [P]‖.
5.3 zkChannels protocol
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 describe the zkChannels protocol in detail. We now define
and contextualize the parameters and variables used therein. We describe transactions, closing
authorizations, and the escrow process with respect to a UTXO arbiter, but this generalizes for a
non-UTXO arbiter.
5.3.1 Setup
– Setup(1λ,J (ΠSig,ΠRlock,fID)): On inputs of security parameter 1λ and arbiter J (ΠSig,ΠRlock,fID), outputs
pp, which consists of (1) public parameters for a signature scheme ΠSig, hash lock scheme ΠRlock, and
transaction identity function fID that are supported by the arbiter J ; and (2) public parameters for
a message authentication code scheme ΠMAC, and a commitment scheme ΠCom.
– InitM(pp): On input pp, initializes Sunlink and Sspent to ∅ and outputs (1) the external (on-net-









M ), each generated by running ΠSig.KeyGen; (2) a secret key K ← ΠMAC.KeyGen;
(3) randomness r selected uniformly at random as required for ΠCom; and (4) a public commitment
comM = ΠCom.Com(K; r) to ensure the merchant always uses the same MAC key.
To initialize zkChannels systemwide parameters, run Setup(1λ,J (ΠSig,ΠRlock,fID)). The merchant
M runs InitM(pp) to prepare for opening payment channels with customers. The merchant uses the
same longterm key material comM and PKM for all their channels.
5.3.2 Channel establishment
The Establish protocol consists of three subprotocols: Initialize (Figure 5.2), Activate, and Unlink
(both illustrated in Figure 5.3). In Initialize, the customer and merchant exchange information needed
to set initial channel parameters and form channel transactions. The customer provides their freshly
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Customer(J [C]) Establish(pp,J ,PKM, comM) Merchant(skM, (K, r),J [M],Sunlink,Sspent)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Initialize subprotocol:
Choose balance BC0 ≥ 0 and generate
– (pkC , skC)← ΠSig.KeyGen(pp);
– (rl0, rs0)← ΠRlock.Gen(); and
– n0
$←− {0, 1}λ.
Generate customer-side auxiliary information,
auxJ [C], and set
– s0 = (⊥,n0, rl0, BC0 ,⊥) and
– s̄0 = (⊥, rl0, BC0 ,⊥).
pkC , rl0, n0, B
C
0 , auxJ [C]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(accept, BM0 , auxJ [M], σ0) or reject←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check that pkC, rl0, n0, B
C
0 , and auxJ [C] are
well-formed. If the channel will not be ac-
cepted, send reject message and abort. Oth-
erwise, choose BM0 ≥ 0 and continue.
Generate merchant-side auxiliary information
auxJ [M]. Set





– txidesc = fID(escrow(argesc));
– txidexp = fID(expiry(PKM, pkC));
– cid = txidesc‖txidexp;















σ`0 = ΠSig.Sign(skM, close(PKM, s̄0, `))
Abort if reject, BM0 < 0, or σ0 invalid.
Set





– txidesc = fID(escrow(argesc));
– txidexp = fID(expiry(PKM, pkC));
– cid = txidesc‖txidexp;










Compute the customers’s authorization set for
escrow, denoted by σ
J [C]
esc , using J [C], and
compute
σCexp = ΠSig.Sign(skC , expiry(PKM, pkC)).






Abort if {σJ [C]esc , σCexp} invalid. Otherwise, set
status to initialized.
If BM0 = 0, send escrow instructions and autho-
rization set {σJ [C]esc } to J . Otherwise, use J [M]
to compute the merchant’s authorization set for
escrow, denoted by σ
J [M]
esc , and send escrow in-
structions and authorization set {σJ [C]esc , σJ [M]esc }
to J .
Figure 5.2: 2PC Establish protocol with UTXO-based arbiter: Initialize
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Activate subprotocol:
Once funds have been escrowed by J , send
activation request on s0.
activate(s0)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
pt0←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check cid from s0 is a valid channel with
status initialized. Check that J has confirmed
that funds have been escrowed and abort if
not. Otherwise,
– compute pt0 = MAC(K, s0);
– add n0 to Sunlink; and
– set channel status to activated.
Set channel status to activated.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unlink subprotocol: Run Pay with inputs ε = 0, s0, and pt0.
Figure 5.3: 2PC Establish protocol with UTXO-based arbiter: Activate and Unlink.
generated channel public key, pkC, and their initial revocation lock, rl0. Each party P ∈ {C,M}
provides BP0 , the amount of funds they wish to contribute to the channel, together with any auxiliary
information, auxJ [P ], needed by the other party in order to:




0 ). The escrow transaction instructions spec-
ify sending accounts for customer and merchant initial funds and encumber the channel funds
with a 2-of-2 multisig requirement with respect to pkM and pkC .
2. Form expiry(PKM, pkC). The expiry transaction instructions specify how the merchant
initiates channel closure.
3. Set the channel identifier, cid , based on the above instructions, the initial state s0 =










4. Form {close(PKM, s̄0, `)}`∈{um,uc}. The customer closing transaction instructions specify how
the customer closes on the initial state during a unilateral merchant (um) and a unilateral
customer (uc) close.
9For each customer state s, we have a special closing state, s̄, in order to ensure the customer has an unlinkable
way to close at all times.
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Further details on the transactions expiry and close and their roles in closing are discussed in
Section 5.3.4.
After receiving this information, the merchant authorizes the customer closing transactions by
signing the instructions under skM and sending the resulting signature set, denoted by σ0, to the
customer. If σ0 contains valid signatures on the expected transactions, the customer can safely
authorize the escrow and expiry transactions, as they now have a way to close the channel. The
customer creates (1) customer authorization, σCesc, on the escrow transaction instructions;
10 and
(2) customer authorization, σCexp, on the expiry transaction instructions; this consists of a signature
under skC in a UTXO network. These are sent to the merchant. If the authorization provided by the
customer is valid, the merchant can safely send the escrow transaction to J , as they now have a way
to close the channel.11
In the Activate subprotocol, once the escrow transaction is confirmed, the customer sends an
activation request on the initial state s0 and receives back a payment tag pt0 (computed by applying
a MAC to the state) from the merchant. We use a MAC here as an efficiently computable, designated
verifier signature. This mechanism could be replaced with a full signature scheme, but doing
so significantly increases the computational cost of the 2PC executed during Pay. The public
commitment comM = ΠCom.Com(K; r) acts as a public key here, allowing the customers to enforce
that the merchant always uses the same MAC key for each channel.
However, a payment made with this tag pt0 is linkable to the customer: the merchant knows the
contents of s0 and thus n0 and rl0, which will be revealed during a payment on pt0. To avoid this,
we have the customer exchange their payment tag for a fresh, unlinkable tag on a new initial state








0 ). As we see in the next section, we already have the machinery to do this
in Pay, and so we have the customer make a zero payment in the Unlink subprotocol. To do so, the
merchant stores the nonce n0 in a special set Sunlink. When a payment request for amount zero is
received, the merchant confirms that the nonce in the payment request is stored in Sunlink and allows
the payment to proceed.12 Pay provides the customer with a new payment tag pt ′0 that is unknown
to the merchant, revokes s0, and provides fresh closing signatures σ
′
0 on the initial balance allocation.
10The exact specification of the customer-side authorization depends on how the BC0 funds are encumbered with J
prior to opening a zkChannels.
11In the case of channel that is funded solely by the customer, the merchant need not provide any authorization to
complete the escrow transaction.
12We disallow zero payments otherwise as a DoS mitigation.
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Customer(si, pt i, ε, auxC) Pay(pp,J ,PKM, comM): Prepare Merchant(skM, (K, r))





. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generate
– (rl i+1, rsi+1)← ΠRlock.Gen()
– ni+1
$←− {0, 1}λ
– si+1 = (cid ,ni+1, rl i+1, B
C
i − ε, BMi+1 +
ε)
– s̄i+1 = (cid , rl i+1, B
C
i − ε, BMi+1 + ε)
ni, ε, auxC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
accept or reject←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Initialize complete to 0 and perform the fol-
lowing checks:
– ni ∈ {0, 1}λ and ni 6∈ Sspent;
– ε 6= 0 or ni ∈ Sunlink. If this fails, add
ni to Sspent; and
– Any additional merchant-specified
checks on ε and auxC .
If any check fails, send reject, abort, and
output (⊥,⊥, complete) and (ε, auxC). Oth-
erwise, send accept.
Figure 5.4: Pay Protocol Phase 1: Prepare
5.3.3 Channel payments
Pay has three phases: the prepare phase, the update state, and the unmask phase, shown in Fig-
ures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively.
During the prepare phase, the customer sends the payment amount, ε, to the merchant, along
with the nonce contained in their most recent state. The customer also sends auxiliary information
auxC associated with the service or good that the customer is purchasing. A natural use case is the
purchase of an anonymous credential, say for a subscription to a service; in this case, auxC details
the information that should be included in the credential provided by the merchant at the end of Pay.
Another example is for enabling refunds, i.e., , if ε < 0, the auxiliary data could include justification
for the negative payment. The merchant consults their internal state to determine whether to accept
the payment, including checking that the nonce is fresh.
The update state phase begins with the parties exchanging hiding and binding commitments on
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Customer(si, pt i, ε, auxC) Pay(pp,J ,PKM, comM): Update State Merchant(skM, (K, r))















. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sample ρi






$←− {0, 1}2λ, and sam-
ple randomness r1
$←− {0, 1}λ. Then form PTcom =
ΠCom.Com(K1; r1).
customer secrets:




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Public Inputs:
PKM, comM, ε, ni, PTcom, RLcom
The 2PC checks the following, outputing ⊥ if any
do not pass:




i − ε, and BMi+1 = BMi +
ε;
2. BCi+1 ≥ 0 and BMi+1 ≥ 0;
3. Public input ni ∈ si;
4. ΠMAC.Verify(K, si, pt i) = 1;
5. RLcom = ΠCom.Com(rl i, ρi) for rl i ∈ si;
6. PTcom = ΠCom.Com(K1, r1); and
7. comM = ΠCom.Com(K, r).
The 2PC computes:
1. pt i+1 = ΠMAC.Mac(K, si+1);




i+1), where for ` ∈ {um, uc},
σ`i+1 = ΠSig .Sign(skM, close(PKM, s̄i+1, `));
3. c1 = K1 ⊕ pt i+1; and
4. c2 = K2 ⊕ σi+1.
merchant secrets:
skM, (K; r), (K1, r1), K2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
success ∈ {0, 1}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
correctness of checks
If UpdateState fails from perspective of merchant, abort
and output (⊥,⊥, complete). Otherwise, add ni to
Sspent and continue.
Figure 5.5: Pay Protocol Phase 2: Update State
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Customer(si, pt i, ε, auxC) Pay(pp,J ,PKM, comM): Unmask Merchant(skM, (K, r))





si+1 = (cid ,ni+1, rl i+1, B
C
i − ε, BMi + ε)
s̄i+1 = (cid , rl i+1, B
C
i − ε, BMi + ε)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
K2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If ε < 0, set complete to 1 (i.e., , consider negative
payment successful).
Compute σ′ = K2 ⊕ c2.
With σ′ = (σumi+1, σ
uc
i+1), for ` ∈ {um, uc};
If ΠSig .Verify(pkM, close(PKM, s̄i+1, `), σ
`
i+1) 6= 1:
abort and output (⊥,⊥,⊥).
rl i, rsi, ρi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(K1, r1), auxM←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If any of the following conditions holds, abort and
output (ni,⊥, complete):
– rl i ∈ Sspent;
– RLcom 6= ΠCom.Com(rl i, ρi); or
– ΠRlock.Verify(rl i), rsi) 6= 1.
Otherwise, set complete to 1, (i.e., , consider positive
payment successful), and add (rl i, rsi) to Sspent. Form
auxM as appropriate.
If PTcom 6= ΠCom.Com(K1, r1), abort and output
(si+1, σi+1,⊥). Else set pt i+1 = K1 ⊕ c1.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
output:




i+1), pt i+1, and auxM
output:
(ni, (rl i, rsi), complete) and (ε, auxC)
Figure 5.6: Pay Protocol Part 3: Unmask
values used inside the 2PC and revealed after it completes; in this way, we create a binding between
the actual values used in the 2PC and the unmask phase. The customer first sends a commitment
RLcom to the revocation lock rl i, thereby ensuring that the revocation lock revealed during unmask
must be the one embedded in the provided state, si, while maintaining unlinkability against merchant
aborts. The merchant then sends a commitment PTcom to a random key K1 that will be used to
mask the payment tag pt i+1. Because the customer does not have the key K to the MAC scheme,
they cannot independently verify if the MAC revealed during the unmask phase is honestly computed;
committing to K1 makes it impossible for the merchant to manipulate this output of the 2PC.
The parties then execute a maliciously secure 2PC protocol. This computation checks the
correctness of each party’s inputs with respect to the publicly known values, outputing ⊥ if any of
the checks fails. The 2PC computes a new payment tag, pt i+1, and set of closing signatures. These
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values are masked with the new merchant-selected keys and output to the customer.
If the 2PC successfully completes, the parties alternate unmasking the values used and computed
in the 2PC; message order compensates for the inability of 2PC to guarantee fairness. First, the
merchant reveals the signatures on the new closing transactions. At this point, if the payment amount
is negative, the merchant should be satisfied that the refund is complete. Once the customer is
convinced that they can close on the new balances, they send the revocation pair to the merchant,
invalidating the old closing transactions. Once the merchant has a valid revocation pair for the old
state, they unmask the new payment tag, pt i+1, allowing the customer to continue to make payments.
Finally, the merchant sends the information for the service that the customer purchased, auxM.
5.3.4 Channel closing
Three types of closing are supported. We list them in order of desirability: from least to most
expensive in terms of number of transactions. Closing with a UTXO arbiter requires parties to watch
the network for relevant transactions. The close protocols are also formalized in Figure 5.7.
Mutual close. This subprotocol may be initiated by the customer or, if the merchant has a method
to directly contact the customer, the merchant. The parties collaborate to produce a transaction
mutual-close(cid , BC , BM;σC , σM) that sends B
C funds to a customer account and BM funds to
a merchant account. The authorization set consists of two signatures on the instructions, σC and
σM, formed under skC and skM, respectively. To prove correctness of the final fund allocation, the
customer sends the most recent state and payment tag pair, (s, pt ), to the merchant, along with
mutual-close(cid , BC , BM;σC , ·). The merchant checks the freshness of the included nonce, the
validity of pt , that the transaction is well-formed, and that σC verifies. If these checks pass, the
merchant adds the nonce to Sspent, signs the transaction instructions under pkM, and sends the
completed transaction to J to immediately distribute the channel funds.
Unilateral customer close. The customer posts a closing transaction, close(PKM, s̄, uc), on
closing state s̄ = (cid , rl , BC , BM). This transaction sends BM channel funds to an account
encumbered under pk claimM , reveals rl , and timelocks B
C funds. If the customer posts an old state, the
merchant can recognize rl and use the corresponding rs and skdispM to produce a dispute transaction,
dispute(cid , rl ; rs , σ), which sends all funds to an account controlled by the merchant. Otherwise,
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Close procedures
These are parameterized by the UTXO arbiter J .
Customer-specific closing procedures:
on (Close, cid, type) from self :
/ initiate customer close procedure
if (type /∈ {um, uc,mutual}) return
Retrieve most recent state s from memory





if (type = mutual){
if (chan-status 6= open) return
Retrieve payment tag pt from memory





Send (mutual-close, s, pt , σC) to M
}
if (type ∈ {um, uc}{
if (type = uc and chan-status 6= open) return
if (type = um and chan-status 6= pending-close) return
Retrieve σ
type
and aux cid from memory
Set instr← close(PKM, (cid, rl , BC, BM)
Compute σC = ΠSig.Sign(skC, instr, type))







Set chan-status = pending-close
}
on expiry(cid) from J :
/ procedure to respond to unilateral merchant close
Send (Close, cid, um) to self




), type), time) from J :
/ Finish processing close
Compute σC = ΠSig.Sign(sk
claim
C , claim(cid, C))
At time time + δ
′
, send claim(cid, C;σC) to J
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shared closing procedures:
on (claim(cid,P) or





)) from J :
Set chan-status = closed
Merchant-specific closing procedures:
on (Close, cid) from self :
/ initiate unilateral merchant close procedure
if (chan-status 6= open) return
Retrieve σ
C
exp and aux cid from memory
Compute σM = ΠSig.Sign(skM, expiry(cid))
Send expiry(cid;σ
C
exp, σM) to J
Set chan-status = pending-close
on (expiry(cid), time) from J :
/ process to finish unilateral merchant close
Compute σM = ΠSig.Sign(sk
claim
M , claim(cid,M))
At time time + δ, send claim(cid,M;σM) to J




, type)) from J :
if rl ∈ Sspent{
Retrieve entry (rl , rs ) from Sspent
Compute σM = ΠSig.Sign(sk
disp
M , dispute(cid, rl ))
Send dispute(cid, rl ; rs , σM) to J
} else {
Add rl to Sspent
Set chan-status = closed
}
on (mutual-close, (cid,n, rl , BC, BM), pt , σC) from Ci :
Retrieve pkC for cid
if ΠMAC.Verify(K, s, pt ) 6= 1 return
Set instr← mutual-close(cid, BC, BM)
if ΠSig.Verify(pkC, instrσC) 6= 1 return





;σC, σM)) to J
Set chan-status = pending-close
Figure 5.7: On-network close procedures for parties closing a given zkChannel, interacting directly and via
the arbiter.
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the customer can claim their funds with a signature under pk claimC once the timelock elapses.
Unilateral merchant close. The merchant posts expiry(PKM, pkC ;σC , σM). This transaction
spends from the escrow account and timelocks the channel funds. The funds may be spent before the
timelock period passes as long as signatures under both pkM and pkC are presented, or after with a
signature under pk claimM . This allows the customer time to post a closing transaction representing the
most recent state, proceeding as in the unilateral customer close flow.
5.3.5 Security proof
Our high level goal is to show that our protocol allows unlinkable payments and ensures an honest
player can eventually extract the money they are due from the escrowed funds of a channel. Creating
a sufficiently precise formalism for this notion of security is tricky, given the complexity of the
protocol and the many, interwoven sub-properties. For instance, we must simultaneously reason
about how parties can deviate from the payment protocol and how that impacts both unlinkability
and arbiter interactions. As such, we use a simulation-based security proof to argue the security of
our construction, which argues each of these properties simultaneously. This is a departure from
the work of Green and Miers [GM17], which argues the security of their protocol using multiple
game-based definitions.
In the simulation-based security paradigm, a protocol designer shows that their protocol realizes
some set of properties, formalized into an ideal functionality. The ideal functionality is a stateful entity
composed of a series of callable interfaces, each of which consumes inputs, (possibly) updates internal
state, and (optionally) produces output to specific parties. Intuitively, a simulation-based security
proof shows that the protocol provides at least as much “security” as if the protocol participants
instead interact with a trusted entity running the ideal functionality. Note that security in this context
is defined implicitly by the behavior of ideal functionality. As there is no prior ideal functionality
for unlinkable payment channels, the first step in our proof is to give this formal description. We
briefly explain the intuition behind our definitions here. Details of the proof are omitted from this
dissertation because they are primarily contributed by other authors.
Ideal functionality FzkChannels. Our ideal functionality, FzkChannels, captures both the flow of an
unlinkable payment protocol, and the security properties it must satisfy when run between an
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Ideal functionality FzkChannels
Upon initialization, for each party P ∈ {M, C0, . . . , Cn}, S set B[P ] to any value ≥ 0 and it is sent to P. Additionally,
initialize a monotonically increasing counter CurrentTime = 0. We allow the adversary to arbitrarily increase the
counter.
Time:
on (get-time) from P :
Send (CurrentTime) to P
on (increment-time) from P :
Set CurrentTime = CurrentTime + 1
Establish:
on (establish, BC) from Ci for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
if (BC < 0) return
Sample unique cid
Record C[cid , Ci, BC ,⊥, escrow-pending,⊥]
Send (establish, cid , Ci, BC) to Ci,M
on (establish, cid , BM) fromM :
if (@C[cid ] and C[cid ].chan-status 6= escrow-pending) return
Set C[cid ].BM = BM,C[cid ].status = escrow-confirmation-pending
Send (establish-accepted, cid , BC , BM) to Ci,M
on (reject-connection, cid) fromM :
if (@C[cid ] or (C[cid ].chan-status 6= escrow-pending)) return
Remove C[cid ]
Send (failed, cid) to C[cid ].customer ,M
on (establish-confirm, cid) from S :
if (@C[cid ] and C[cid ].chan-status 6= escrow-confirmation-pending) return
if (B[C[cid ].customer ] < C[cid ].BC or B[M] < C[cid ].BM) return
if (C[cid ].BC ≤ 0 or C[cid ].BM < 0) return
Set C[cid ].status = escrowed
Set B[C[cid ].customer ] −= C[cid ].BC ,B[M] −= C[cid ].BM
Send (established, cid , BC , BM) to Ci,M
on (activate, cid) fromM :
if (@C[cid ] and C[cid ].chan-status 6= escrowed) return
Set C[cid ].status = open
Send (activate, cid) to C[cid ].customer
Figure 5.8: Ideal functionality FzkChannels, Timer and Establish commands.
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on (prepare-payment, cid , ε, valid, tx-in) from Ci :
if (@C[cid ] or C[cid ].customer 6= Ci) return
if (C[cid ].pay-info 6= ⊥) return
if (valid = false and C[cid ].customer 6∈ S) return
Sample unique pid
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, prepared , valid,⊥)
Send (prepare-payment, pid , ε, tx-in) to Ci,M
on (accept-payment, pid , tx-out) fromM :
if (@cid s.t. C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, prepared , valid)) return
if ((C[cid ].chan-status /∈ {open, punitive-close}) or . . .
. . .C[cid ].BC − ε < 0 or C[cid ].BM + ε < 0) . . .
. . . ε = 0 or C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, prepared , false)){
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, failed , valid,⊥)
Send (payment-failed, pid) to Ci,M
} else {
Send (confirm-payment, pid) to S
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, pending, valid, tx-out)
}
on (complete-payment, pid) from S :
if (@cid s.t. C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, pending, valid, tx-out)) return
Set C[cid ].BC −= ε,C[cid ].BM += ε
Set C[cid ].chan-status = open
Send (paid, pid) to M and (paid, pid , tx-out) to Ci
on (freeze-channel, pid ,P) from S :
if (P uncorrupted) return
if (@cid s.t. C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, pending, valid)) return
if (P =M){
Set C[cid ].BC −= ε,C[cid ].BM += ε
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid ,⊥, frozen, valid, tx-out)
Send (channel-frozen, pid) to Ci
} else if (P = Ci){
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, frozen, valid, tx-out)
Send (channel-frozen, pid) to M
} else return
on (reject-payment, pid) fromM :
if (@cid s.t. C[cid ].pay-info = (pid , ε, prepared , valid, tx-out)) return
Set C[cid ].pay-info = (pid ,⊥, frozen, valid)
Send (reject-payment, pid) to Ci,M
Figure 5.9: Ideal functionality FzkChannels, Pay commands.
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on (merchclose, cid) fromM :
if (@C[cid ] or C[cid ].chan-status 6= open) return
Set C[cid ].chan-status = close-pending
Record T[cid ,CurrentTime + δ,⊥, 0,C[cid ].BC + C[cid ].BM]
Send (close-pending, cid) to Ci
on (custclose, cid , type) from Ci :
if ((@C[cid ]) or (Ci 6= C[cid ].customer)) return
if (C[cid ].chan-status /∈ {open,close-pending}) return
if (type = mutual){
if (C[cid ].chan-status 6= open) return
Set C[cid ].chan-status = closed
Record T[cid ,⊥,⊥,C[cid ].BC ,C[cid ].BM]
} else {
Set C[cid ].chan-status = close-pending
Set T[cid ] to T[cid ,⊥,CurrentTime + δ′,C[cid ].BC ,C[cid ].BM]
}
Send (close-pending, cid ,C[cid ].BC ,C[cid ].BM, type) to M
on (close, cid , B′C , B
′
M) from S :
if (@C[cid ]) or (C[cid ].customer /∈ S) return
if (C[cid ].chan-status /∈ {escrow-pending,open,close-pending}) return





if (T[cid ].cust-timelock 6= ⊥) return
if ((pay-info = (pid , ε, frozen, valid, tx-out)) and ((B′C = C[cid ].BC − ε) and (B
′
M = C[cid ].BM + ε)){
Set C[cid ].chan-status = close-pending
Set T[cid ] to T[cid ,⊥,CurrentTime + δ′, B′C , B
′
M]
} else if ((B′C 6= C[cid ].BC) or (B
′
M 6= C[cid ].BM)){
Set C[cid ].chan-status = punitive-close




on (cashout, cid) from P :
if (@T[cid ] or P /∈ {C[cid ].customer ,M}) return
if (C[cid ].chan-status ∈ {closed, punitive-close}){
Set B[C[cid ].customer ] = T[cid ].BC ,B[M] = T[cid ].BM
Send (cashout, cid ,T[cid ].BC ,T[cid ].BM) to P,C[cid ].customer ,M
} else {
Let (t1, t2) = (T[cid ].merch-timelock ,T[cid ].cust-timelock)
if ((t1 6= ⊥ has passed) and (P =M) or ((t2 6= ⊥ has passed) and (P = C[cid ].customer))){
Set C[cid ].chan-status = closed
Set B[C[cid ].customer ] = T[cid ].BC ,B[M] = T[cid ].BM
Send (cashout, cid ,T[cid ].BC ,T[cid ].BM) to P,C[cid ].customer ,M
} else return
}
Figure 5.10: Ideal functionality FzkChannels, Close commands.
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arbitrary number of customers and a single merchant. The ideal functionality integrates the desired
properties of both payment channels and currency management (handled by the arbiter in the real
protocol). The ideal functionality has three main sets of interfaces: (1) interfaces for establishing
a channel, (2) interfaces for making payments, and (3) interfaces for closing a channel. Our ideal
functionality provides the properties described above by controlling how its internal state is updated
and the information it shares with each party. FzkChannels is defined in Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10.
To establish a channel, the ideal functionality exposes an interface for customers to request a new
channel; a merchant can accept or reject this request. This interaction explicitly leaks the identity of
the customer to the merchant and internally handles the escrow of funds. After the merchant calls
an interface for activating the channel, the customer can initiate payments. When the customer
offers to make a payment, the ideal functionality sends a notification to the merchant that does not
leak the customer’s identity. The merchant can accept the payment, which increments balances in a
table held by the ideal functionality, or reject the payment, which freezes the channel. Finally, either
party can initiate a channel closure; the ideal functionality ensures that channels close on proper
balances or punishment is meted out, as appropriate.
To adequately capture the capabilities of the adversary, there are additional interfaces that only
the adversary can call. These interfaces allow the adversary to adaptively “back-out” of opening a
channel or making a payment on behalf of corrupted parties, capturing the real-world case of a party
maliciously aborting the protocol or sending a bad message. Backing out of a payment freezes the
channel, blocking all future payments; if the adversary freezes a channel during a payment, they are
able to force the channel to close on either the pre- or post-payment balance.
Hybrid model and security results. We define an ideal UTXO-arbiter functionality, which
acts as a funds-controlling entity that allows for movement of funds according to pre-specified
authorization rules. Our motivation is to formalize the range of operations we utilize in our
instantiation of zkChannels on a real-world UTXO-cryptocurrency like Bitcoin. Our definition
captures the basic notion of accounts on a UTXO-network and the types of encumbrances we need
for zkChannels, namely revocation locks, public-key signature requirements, and relative timelocks.
We parametrize the arbiter ideal functionality with schemes ΠRlock and ΠSig as tools to realize
the first two encumbrances; the arbiter also has access to a helper scheme ΠID, to create unique
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identifiers for network transactions. We also make use of a 2PC-ideal functionality, FΠSig,ΠCom,ΠMAC2PC ,
with non-black-box use of ΠSig,ΠCom, and ΠMAC.
We then prove that our zkChannels protocol Π realizes the ideal functionality FzkChannels in
the (2PC, arbiter)-hybrid model; that is, we assume Π has access to these functionalities. For our
corruption model, we consider probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries with abort capabilities,
and allow the adversary to corrupt either the merchant or any subset of customers. We show, in the
standalone model, in the presence of admissible corruptions, the following:
Theorem 1. The zkChannels protocol Π securely realizes the ideal functionality FzkChannels in the
(FΠSig,ΠCom,ΠMAC2PC ,F
ΠSig,ΠRlock,ΠID
Arbiter )-hybrid model with abort in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof. The proof is deferred to [AGH+21].
This result immediately implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Given secure realizations of FΠSig,ΠCom,ΠMAC2PC and F
ΠSig,ΠRlock,ΠID
Arbiter , the zkChannels protocol
Π securely realizes the ideal functionality FzkChannels with abort in the presence of malicious adversaries.
That is, as long as we securely instantiate our primitives, zkChannels achieves the desired
properties. In particular, any real-world UTXO arbiter that realizes the functionality captured by
FΠSig,ΠRlock,ΠIDArbiter will suffice. The Bitcoin instantiation of the arbiter is quite straightforward, relying
on ECDSA signatures, a SHA-256 hash lock scheme, and the standard SHA-256-based mapping of
serialized Bitcoin transaction instructions to transaction identifiers. We provide more details on our
implementation choices in Section 5.4.
5.3.6 Protocol discussion
The main focus of zkChannels is the achievement of customer payment history privacy. This choice
involves certain tradeoffs. While we always guarantee an unlinkable method to close and that no
honest party loses their share of the escrowed funds, we do not ensure (1) the usability of the channel
for future payments; (2) the merchant actually provides the requested service; or, most interestingly,
(3) payments occur only on channels with an open on-network escrow account. We argue that
the lack of these properties is relatively benign in the context of a traditional customer-merchant
relationship.
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Table 5.1: Gate counts for modules in the UpdateState circuit (K=thousand).
Module AND XOR INV
UpdateState 2510K 7220K 92K
SHA-256 (1 block) 42K 118K 2K
SHA-256 (5 blocks) 71K 212K 4K
ECDSA 673K 1760K 1K
From the perspective of a customer, the most natural use cases for a point-to-point private
payment channel involve a merchant who is semi-trusted. That is, the merchant either already has
an established reputation or the customer is willing to build a trusted relationship with an unknown
merchant over the course of a sequence of payments. The customer does not risk their entire channel
balance in engaging with the merchant; they risk only a single payment amount, a risk profile that
maps well to current practice. In other words, we do not attempt to replace all mechanisms of trust
in society with zkChannels.
The perspective of the merchant with respect to the lack of property (3) above is a more
interesting question. Say the customer makes a series of payments corresponding to intermediate
states s0, s1, . . . , sm, and then closes the channel on si for some i < m. Our use of on-network
punishment actually amounts to a soft punishment : the customer is still able to make a valid, correct
off-network payment using the most recent state sm, since they do not reveal the associated nonce or
revocation lock on closing. This amounts to the conversion of the payment channel from one backed
by on-network funds to one backed by a merchant gift card. The issue is that the transactions the
customer may use to close the escrow account do not include enough information for the merchant
to infer anything about the closing state except whether or not it is outdated. That is, we do not
provide a reconciliation mechanism for the merchant to derive the most recent state and prevent
further payments. However, we stress that, in this situation, the customer cannot make payments for
which they have not already transferred the corresponding funds to the merchant.
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Let G be an elliptic curve point of order q, x ∈ Zq be a private key, m be a message, and H be a
hash function.
Merchant. On input x:
Sample k ← Zq.
Define (rx, ry) = k ·G.
Compute rx = rx · x mod q.
Calls 2PC with input (k−1, rx).
Customer. On input m:
Call 2PC with input (m)
2PC. On inputs (m, k−1, rx):
Compute s = k−1 · (H(m) + rx) mod q
Output s.
Figure 5.11: Computing ECDSA under 2PC with precomputation. The Merchant and Customer sections
are computed locally in the clear; 2PC is computed securely.
5.4 Implementation
5.4.1 Instantiation of cryptographic primitives
Our implementation targets the λ = 128 security level. We instantiate the hash function H, used by
ΠCom and ΠRlock, with SHA256 as defined in FIPS PUB 180-4 [Dan15]. We instantiate ΠMAC using
a standard HMAC described in RFC 2104 [KBC97], also using SHA256 for a hash function. We
instantiate ΠSig using ECDSA [Por13], since Bitcoin transactions require ECDSA signatures with
SHA256.
5.4.2 2PC with EMP-toolkit
We instantiate the 2PC protocol required by UpdateState using the EMP-toolkit [WMK16] software
framework. This provides multiple garbled circuit protocol implementations; we use the optimized
implementation of Yao’s semi-honest protocol [Yao86] and a maliciously secure protocol based
on [WRK17a].
Garbled circuit protocols represent functions as a boolean circuit and data as wires in the circuit.
This lends itself to an efficient SHA256 implementation. EMP-toolkit provides a high-level C++
library to express functions and produces two output streams: it can directly execute the Yao
semi-honest protocol, or it can compile the entire computation into a circuit. The circuit file is used
as input to other protocol implementations provided by the framework.
The EMP-toolkit circuit compiler imposes some limitations on the software description of the
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(a) Total wall-clock time for tests.
(b) Total RAM usage for local tests (This did not change
in remote tests).
Figure 5.12: Average (over 100 trials) of runtime and RAM usage for a selection of operations used in
the UpdateState protocol. Note the logarithmic scale: in both settings, the malicious implementation is 1-2
orders of magnitude more expensive than semihonest.
function it compiles, some of which are due to the circuit file format [ST]. For example, all variables
must be declared before any of them can be used.
The circuit format assigns all inputs to exactly one party. Shared public inputs must be provided
by both parties (e.g. as private input) and compared for correctness. Constant values (such as the
ECDSA modulus) must be passed in the same way; we define a constants module to contain such
values. The format does not specify a party for output values, so EMP-toolkit can either provide
output to one party, or provide it to both and does not support different outputs for each party.
Finally, the EMP-toolkit malicious framework takes input as a bit array. Since our input contains
complex types, we implemented a translation layer that converts inputs to their boolean representation
and assigns them to the correct wires in the circuit.
5.4.3 Implementation
We implemented a complete, tested version of zkChannels in Rust and C++.13 The vast majority of
the implementation is in Rust; we use C++ only for the UpdateState functionality in the Pay protocol.
The Rust implementation follows a modular design that comprises an on-network component that
builds Bitcoin transactions (for escrow and closing) and an off-network component that establishes
the channel and interacts with UpdateState. The on-network component relies on Rust generics and
traits to instantiate for Bitcoin or any other UTXO-based blockchain.
13Our code is public at https://github/boltlabs-inc/libzkchannels
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The UpdateState component is implemented in C++ using the EMP-toolkit framework. Some
cryptographic primitives we implement for UpdateState are not tailored to a boolean circuit represen-
tation. To produce data-oblivious, boolean-circuit-friendly representations, we narrowed the scope of
these generic primitives. For example, the SHA256 specification takes an arbitrary length message,
pads it to a multiple of the block length, and hashes each block, using the hash of the previous block
as input (and using a fixed value for the first block). However, the data-independent circuit model
requires a fixed upper bound on the size of a loop. Instead, we define separate functions for each
block size needed and pad messages outside the module.
Standard ECDSA requires elliptic curve point multiplication and inversion, which are expensive in
the boolean circuit model. In our protocol, the customer provides the message m while the merchant
provides the signing key x and randomness k. This lets the merchant precompute the terms in an
ECDSA signature that require curve operations and provide them as input to the secure computation
(Figure 5.11). This significantly reduces the scope of the operations computed under 2PC to only
require modular arithmetic and a hash function.
The UpdateState functionality must construct valid Bitcoin transactions that encode the new
state of the channel and spend from the correct sources. Bitcoin transaction formatting is notoriously
complex. To perform this validation efficiently, we define a fixed format for zkChannels Bitcoin
transactions.
5.4.4 Implementation limitations
We pass some Bitcoin-specific parameters to the UpdateState implementation that are not explicitly
described in Figure 5.5. In order to ensure the close transaction will be accepted onto the blockchain,
it must reserve some money from the channel balances to pay a market-rate fee. Since this may
change over the lifetime of a channel, we pass as public parameters a fee amount that is paid by a
second transaction spending from the first (the “child-pays-for-parent” paradigm [Daf16]). We also
pass minimum balances for each party, which ensure the transaction outputs stay above the dust
limit, and a self-delay value, which forces the customer to wait before spending a close transaction.
Our ECDSA signature optimization in Figure 5.11 has a privacy limitation. ECDSA signatures
are not randomizable [FKP16], so an adversarial merchant can keep a record of k, ε pairs. If a
customer publicizes a signature (e.g. posts it the blockchain to close the channel), the merchant can
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identify the signature by its randomness k and associate that customer with their final transaction.
One mitigation is to allow customers to make a “dummy payment” with ε = 0, which effectively
decouples their channel from any meaningful transactions. Another is to explore use of Schnorr
signatures, which may be easier to compute under 2PC and are likely to be added to Bitcoin [WNR].
5.4.5 Bitcoin instantiation
In the zkChannels implementation on Bitcoin, we address practical matters not surfaced in the
abstract protocol. This ranges from efficiency tweaks to improving deployability features.
1. We include hashPrevouts for both expiry and escrow in the definition of cid , instead of simply
txidesc‖txidexp. These values are computable from their respective transaction instructions, and
we include them to avoid extra rounds of hashing in the 2PC.
2. We explicitly handle transaction fees by setting them as a parameter within the channel state.
3. We use a childs-pays-for-parent (CPFP) construction (similar to Lightning Network anchor
outputs) to allow the participants to independently bump up the fees for their transactions, just
in case the original fee was insufficient for the transaction to be confirmed.
5.5 Benchmarks
We evaluate the performance of our implementation, including end-to-end execution of the Establish
and Pay protocols and the UpdateState function in isolation.
We measured the total time spent on the Establish and Pay stages of the protocol using a
command line interface which executes the full protocol but does not interact with the blockchain.
We ran our tests on an AWS t2.medium instance with 2 virtual CPUs and 4GiB of RAM running
Ubuntu 20.04. We ran both parties locally and used the semi-honest 2PC protocol. We executed
each protocol 100 times.
The vast majority of time spent on these stages is taken up by the 2PC computation. Establish
takes, on average, 380ms to execute, and spends 371ms (97.6%) executing 2PC. Pay takes 379ms to
execute and spends 370ms (97.7%) executing 2PC.
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5.5.1 UpdateState performance
We evaluated the UpdateState function, which clearly is the bottleneck of the zkChannels protocol.
For each measurement, we looked at the full function as well as SHA256 module (with 1- and 5-block
inputs) and our modified ECDSA module.
We report on circuit sizes in Table 5.1. In garbled circuit protocols, AND gates are more expensive
to evaluate than XOR and INV gates.
Next, we measured total time and maximum RAM usage when executing the circuits with the
semihonest and malicious garbled circuit protocols. We deployed the tests on Amazon AWS instances
running Amazon Linux on Intel Xeon processors, with the tests themselves deployed in a Docker
container. In the local test, we executed both parties on the same machine: a “t2.large” instance
with 2 virtual CPUs and 8 GiB of RAM, based in the “us-east-2” region, in Ohio. In the remote test,
we deployed one party on the Ohio-based machine, and the other on a “t2.medium” instance with 2
virtual CPUs and 4 GiB of RAM based in the “us-west-2” region, in Oregon.
For each trial, we execute the circuit 100 times and report the average time and RAM usage.
The results are reported in Figure 5.12. The malicious implementation is 1-2 orders of magnitude
more expensive (in both time and RAM usage) than the semi-honest version. The remote tests
are significantly slower than the local verisons due to network latency, but have nearly identical
RAM usage. We note that the two parties had similar resource usage, despite different roles in the
protocols.
5.5.2 Discussion
Our implementation is comparable to other payment channels such as the Bitcoin Lightning net-
work [PD16], which reports payment times of “milliseconds to seconds”, and TumbleBit [HAB+17],
which averages payments of 1.2 seconds.
We have not optimized the circuits used in our computation; minimizing the circuit specification
would reduce the total computation. For instance, Goldfeder cites a SHA-256 circuit [Gol] with half
as many AND gates as ours for a single round.
Algorithmically, although network communications can pose a significant amount of overhead, we
may be able to modify the protocol to use a streaming model, where the garbler sends early layers of
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the circuit before it finishes garbling later layers. The Obliv-C [ZE15] framework has done something
similar in the semi-honest model. It may also be possible to improve software parallelization in the
protocol implementation. Finally, it is reasonable for a merchant to deploy servers in many regions
to minimize network latency.
5.6 Related work
Anonymity for payment channels is an active area of research which can largely be divided into two
areas: unlinkability for individual payments on a channel and routing privacy in payment channel
networks.
Unlinkability in individual payment channels or hub networks has limited prior work. This
chapter’s introduction compares this work to Bolt [GM17], by Green and Miers, which introduced
the notion of individually unlinkable payment channels. TumbleBit, by Heilman et al. [HAB+17],
operates in the hub model, where each participant opens a channel with a central tumbler, who
facilitates payments between any pair. It operates in an eCash-like model [Cha83] and can only send
fixed denominations. The unlinkability property of TumbleBit and its successors [TMM19] applies to
the tumbler, who cannot link the sender and receiver of a given payment, but not to the payment
parties themselves as in our work.
Routing privacy of PCNs has received more attention; here the privacy of a payment is maintained
by routing a payment through a onion-routing style network [MMK+17, MMS+19]. This approach
faces challenges practical challenges with respect to network topology and linkability concerns from
payment amounts. Several works [MSBL+20, ZLL+18, TMSS20] consider the problem of adding
non-anonymous payment channels to privacy preserving cryptocurrencies.
Recent work has demonstrated that MPC and 2PC are practical for deployment. The Zcash
Foundation [BGM17], Boston Women’s Workforce Council [LJDA+18, BLV17] and Estonian Tax
and Customs Board [BJSV15] have all used MPC techniques to address real-world problems. For an
overview of the current tooling for generic MPC, see [HHNZ19] and the citations therein. There has
also been significant recent research effort on threshold ECDSA [Lin17, DKLs18, LN18, CGG+20],
motivated by the use of ECDSA by cryptocurrencies. These techniques apply in cases where multiple
entities each hold shares of an ECDSA key and must collaborate to produce a signature; this is
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different from the single-keyholder blind ECDSA signature we require in zkChannels.
A related line of work examines ways to approximate fairness in secure two- or multi-party
computation by financially penalizing dishonest parties [BK14, ADMM14, KB14]. These works aim
to compensate honest parties in generic MPC computations in the case of a malicious abort. We use
similar techniques to ensure valid close procedures on Bitcoin (including hash locks and timelocks),
but these works operate in the “single-execution” setting (that is, they guarantee fairness for a
single secure computation) and do not provide the infrastructure needed to maintain privacy and
correctness across multiple 2PC executions in a payment channel.
5.7 Conclusion
In this work, we present zkChannels, the first fully privacy-preserving payment channel protocol
that integrates seamlessly with existing payment networks. Our protocol allows a customer to send
and receive anonymous and unlinkable point-to-point payments, achieves better privacy properties
than prior work, and offers critical features that overcome previous deployment barriers. We provide
both a formal, simulation-based proof of security in the standalone model and an end-to-end, tested,
open-source implementation for Bitcoin. To our knowledge, our work is one of the first implemented,
substantial uses of generic two-party computation techniques. We believe that zkChannels is an
important step towards efficient, usable, and private payment networks.
Our contribution includes several techniques and tools that may be of independent interest. On
the implementation side, our very large circuit may be helpful pushing 2PC/MPC benchmarking
beyond toy examples. On the theory side, we provide an abstraction of the arbiter needed to realize
payment channels; we believe this abstraction is useful in considering the many possible extensions to
these protocols, such as generalizations of state beyond tracking channel balances, and more complex




Cocoon: Production-Quality Secure Computation
Cocoon is a Microsoft software framework for implementing secure computation protocols. The
framework, implemented in C#, provides a robust architecture that allows users to implement
two-party protocols. It abstracts away from many of the burdensome practical complexities of such a
protocol, especially those related to networking, message routing for concurrent protocol executions,
and message serialization.
This chapter describes an implementation of the BaRK private set intersection protocol [KKRT16]
in the Cocoon framework. It also describes an integration of the protocol into Seclūd, a platform
designed to automatically deploy privacy-preserving applications using Microsoft Azure resources.
The goals of this chapter are twofold: first, to describe the software architecture and development
process used to produce production-quality code; second, to give a sense of the computational
resources and infrastructure required to deploy such a secure computation.
To implement a protocol in the Cocoon framework, one defines information and data structures
used by the protocol, including parameters (constants defined for a whole protocol execution) and
internal state (elements that may change or update). The body of the protocol is a series of message
handlers. Each party defines their behavior on receipt of a specific type of message; their actions
may include internal computation and state update, recursively calling another protocol, setting an
output value, and creating and sending a message in response.
Unlike other software frameworks in this dissertation, Cocoon can be used to implement either
general-purpose MPC protocols or optimized, special-purpose protocols. This chapter focuses on






// in Party A’ s p ro t o co l d e s c r i p t i o n
async Task HandleMessageAsync ( YMessage y ) { . . . }
// in Party B ’ s p ro t o co l d e s c r i p t i o n
async Task HandleMessageAsync ( XMessage x ) { . . . }
async Task HandleMessageAsync ( ZMessage z ) { . . . }
Figure 6.1: Cocoon protocols are implemented on a message-by-message basis, matching the traditional
format for theoretical protocol specifications.
of their sets without revealing any other elements. It can be computed using general-purpose MPC
techniques, but a wide body of literature describes efficient, special-purpose functions for computing
PSI.
The Cocoon work includes two main projects: (1) Refactoring an existing BaRK protocol
implementation to better reflect its modular, compositional structure; and (2) Integrating the
implementation into a larger developer platform to enable use by a more diverse set of users.
6.1 BaRK protocol and implementation
This work uses the PSI protocol by Kolesnikov et al. [KKRT16]. They define an oblivious pseudo-
random function (OPRF), a two-party functionality for computing a keyed pseudo-random function.
One party provides an input value and receives the PRF evaluated on that input; the other party
provides no input and receives the key, as described in Figure 6.2. Kolesnikov et al. drop their OPRF
protocol (referred to as BaRK-OPRF) into an existing semi-honest PSI protocol [PSSZ15] to produce
BaRK.
OPRF
x1, . . . , xn
F(k1, x1), . . . ,F(kn, xn) k1, . . . , kn
Figure 6.2: High-level functionality for a batched oblivious pseudo-random function computing a pseudo-
random function F on inputs x = x1, . . . , xn with keys k = k1, . . . , kn.
At the beginning of the project, the Cocoon development team had already defined an abstract
PSI class (a generic wrapper that describes the general PSI functionality) and had implemented the
BaRK protocol as an instantiation of this class. However, the monolithic BaRK implementation did
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not separate the OPRF component from the overall protocol.
The main contribution of this project is an new architecture and implementation of the BaRK
protocol with an explicit separation between the PSI and OPRF components. The OPRF component
now has an explicit API to abstract from the specific implementation and simplify future versions
with different OPRF protocols. The API expands the basic OPRF definition to allow the key holder
to compute the PRF on their own inputs with the keys they receive as output from the protocol.
This restricts its utility primarily for use in PSI protocols, where the goal is to mask multiple input
sets with the same set of keys.
The new implementation includes a robust class for OPRF inputs that enforces the invariants
required by the protocol. For example, the calling protocol passes parameters for a data structure
used by the OPRF; the input class checks that the data structure is large enough to hold all the
input elements.
The updated BaRK PSI protocol is greatly simplified: Party A initializes the OPRF sub-protocol
on her inputs. When it completes, A passes its outputs to B, who finds the intersection of hashes
and adds the corresponding input elements to the output set.
Integration tests. The implementation is augmented with a suite of integration tests for the PSI
protocol. They run on both fixed and random data of many sizes and compare the results of the
two-party protocol to the intersection computed using standard C# set libraries. The tests are
included in the repository’s continuous integration; this means all code merged into the main branch
of the repository must pass these tests. These currently have parameters hard-coded for the BaRK
PSI protocol, but the tests themselves are not BaRK-specific and it would not be difficult to expand
the suite to test other PSI protocol implementations.
6.2 Seclūd integration
Seclūd1 is a Microsoft product that deploys privacy-preserving applications on Microsoft Azure
services. It is designed to make secure applications accessible without a cryptographic background.
The product offers end-to-end deployment of secure applications, such as private prediction on
homomorphically encrypted data. For private set intersection, a typical flow requires each participant
1https://seclud.microsoft.com
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to specify the Azure database containing their input set; Seclūd deploys the computing infrastructure
that will execute the protocol, computes the result, and writes it to the recipient’s database. The
second contribution of this chapter is the design and implementation of an integration of the updated
BaRK protocol into Seclūd.
The use case we imagined has two parties whose data are changing over time. They want to
compute PSI on a regular basis to find new intersection elements. One party deploys a Cocoon server
that handles PSI requests. This server is hosted in a Docker container and sits behind a Kubernetes
load balancer, allowing the server party to handle multiple concurrent requests.
The ideal client infrastructure is a simple web server. On request from the user, the API spins up
a new Docker container that reads the client’s dataset, executes PSI with the server, and writes the
output. This implementation contributes a scaled-down version: a single-execution client that spins
up a one-time-use container and does not persist a web server for multiple executions. There are
two main disadvantages to this approach: first, it doesn’t take advantage of shared pre-processing
data that can be reused across multiple executions of BaRK between two parties. Second, it requires
the client to re-enter all their setup information each time they want to execute PSI (including, for
example, the connection information for their Azure data and connection information for the server).
The deployment uses a wide variety of Azure resources and services, representative of the type of
infrastructure required to deploy MPC in practice. The server infrastructure uses Kubernetes to
maintain a load balancer and containers for each client connection. The client uses Azure Containers
to initiate and execute the computation. Both parties use Cosmos DB to specify and hold their input
sets, and the client also specifies a second table to write the computation output. Seclūd maintains a
storage account with the container images (specified using Docker), which specify the computation
(including reading input data, executing BaRK, and writing the output if appropriate). Each of these
resources requires configuration of appropriate permissions and access keys to deploy correctly.
6.3 Deployment observations
Team motivation. This work is sponsored by the Microsoft Research Cryptography and Privacy
group. This group works in an intersection between academia and industry: they develop and
implement new cryptographic protocols like an academic group, but they maintain their software to
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the relatively high standard of industry. As a group within Microsoft, they have access to product
teams and other potential “customers” within the company, who can identify internal applications
for secure computation products.
Software quality and tests. The team has a significant focus producing high-quality software.
New software for the repository is divided into pull requests, each implementing a specific feature,
improvement, or bug fix. Before merging into the main repository, each pull request goes through
a code review process, where 2-4 developers review and comment on the changes. These reviews
enforce a high level of documentation, correct various instances of code diverging from best practices,
and prevent software bugs. Indirectly, they ensure that multiple people are familiar with each part of
the codebase, which improves maintainability.
The framework features a growing library of tests, including small-scale unit tests and end-to-end
integration tests. Unit tests mainly apply to the supporting software, such as message serializing,
data structures, and other components with clear specifications. Protocols implemented in Cocoon
use end-to-end tests to ensure correct behavior on random inputs. The test suite is included in the
repository’s continuous integration infrastructure. A pull request must pass the full suite of tests on
multiple operating systems before it can be merged to prevent accidental breaking changes.
Security and infrastructure limitations. The Cocoon framework alone requires a fairly high
degree of cryptographic knowledge to use because the user must specify a full set of parameters for
each protocol and sub-protocol used. During this project, the protocols implemented in Cocoon had
neither default settings for their parameters nor internal consistency checks.
For example, the BaRK PSI protocol defines a security parameter which is a function of parameters
of the data structure used in the protocol, but the implementation does not verify that these (separately
defined) parameters agree. The PSI protocol calls sub-protocols with their own security parameters,
but does not verify that the sub-protocol security parameters are at least as large as the PSI security
parameter. The PSI protocol defines the data structure parameters and the size of each party’s input,
but does not verify that the structure is large enough to hold the input.
There are also no “secure defaults”, which could minimize the amount of external mistakes that
can be made, e.g. by automatically setting the data structure to be larger than the input sizes.
In practice, many of these issues can be solved by adding more robust validation in the implemen-
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tation, especially where two protocols come together (e.g. in input classes and protocol initialization
functions). This is not an issue with the framework itself, but with the protocol implementations. In
fact, the framework architecture includes initialization functions for each protocol where the protocol
designer can add such consistency checks. In the current implementation, most of the parameters are
fixed (team members manually validated their consistency in code review). The only user-provided
parameters are the input set sizes which we use to customize the data structure.
Cocoon is not optimized for rounds of communication which might be an issue in low-bandwidth
settings. In most cases, Cocoon only has one or two extra rounds of communication to correctly
handle protocol terminations.
Documentation. Despite being a mainly internal tool, the Cocoon framework has a reasonable
amount of documentation. There is a wiki page that describes the architecture of the framework and
details the purpose of each component.
There is a large body of example code, mostly in the form of “hello world” protocols. These
don’t do any interesting computation but demonstrate the overall setup of a protocol: defining
inputs, outputs, and their recipients; sending messages between parties; initializing state; and calling
sub-protocols.
These examples are documented to various degrees; many include extended software documentation.
The wiki explains each protocol at a high level and includes pages on constructing a new protocol
from scratch, describing the various components.
Happily, new software added to the repository, including the BaRK and BaRK-OPRF protocols,
is held to a higher standard of documentation, including documentation of all public methods and
data structures. The software documentation uses XML comments that integrate with robust code
editors and integrated development environments (IDEs), and can be processed by the C# compiler
to produce a documentation file.
6.4 Conclusion
The Cocoon framework and Seclūd integration demonstrate the type of work required to make a
software tool suitable for a production environment. Development on the Cocoon framework includes
a significant focus on code quality and manual review, documentation, and automated testing. The
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Seclūd integration focuses primarily on automatically provisioning the computing infrastructure
required to execute secure computation, and illustrates the complexity of a robust deployment and





This dissertation aims to illuminate barriers to the practical deployment of secure multi-party
computation. The work in the previous chapters identifies specific issues and presents solutions in
the context of several novel applications. As a technology, MPC continues to move rapidly toward
practicality. This dissertation concludes with several recommendations for future work, encompassing
both high-level research questions and practical engineering improvements.
One major area for improvement is in compiler design and optimization. The end-to-end
frameworks in Chapter 3 often focus on either optimizing the MPC protocol implementation or on
correctness, making guarantees about the equivalence of the described and compiled programs. For
instance, in Chapter 5, EMP-toolkit [WMK16] provides a fast garbled circuit implementation, but
generates SHA-256 circuits that are larger than existing optimized versions. The independent circuit
compilers focus on optimizing intermediate representations, but require additional translation into
circuit formats compatible with the best protocol implementations. Generating better translation
tools or standardized circuit formats could easily improve overall efficiency of MPC executions by
connecting the smallest circuits with the fastest protocols.
In fact, the utility of optimized circuit compilers extends beyond MPC deployments. Other
privacy-preserving techniques such as homomorphic encryption and ZK proof systems also depend
on compact, data-independent representations of general-purpose functions, although they may have
different constraints for optimal performance. A valuable area for future work is to distill the relative
requirements of each technique into a single circuit compiler that can optimize for each of these
systems. Such a compiler would be particularly useful if users could add new primitives or constraints,
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to support the development of hybrid MPC frameworks (as defined in Chapter 3). The compiler and
hardware communities likely have valuable insight to offer the developer of such a constraint solver.
The positive response to Chapter 3 suggests a need for continued maintenance of these resources.
Indeed, at least eight frameworks have been introduced since the study concluded in mid-2018. Some
have been added to the open-source repository by this author or the original framework designers,
but a systematic analysis of recent improvements would be a continued benefit to the community.
As MPC techniques gain popularity in practical settings, companies will expect standardized
protocols and implementations. Few, if any, of the existing frameworks are interoperable: two parties
wishing to execute an MPC computation must use the same software. The eventual convergence on a
standard set of MPC protocols, preprocessing techniques, and optimized communication architectures
will fall on a body like NIST [BDV20]. However, it does not appear that the community has begun to
select for any specific type of protocol. In fact, there is not even a clear selection for basic primitives,
such as replicated secret-sharing, oblivious transfer, or oblivious transfer extension, that underpin
the security of many MPC protocols.
Practical use of MPC frameworks will require high-quality software that is resistant to misuse.
The proof-of-concept frameworks used throughout this dissertation illustrate common pitfalls in
implementations. Future engineering work should focus on minimizing these, and related, issues.
Computation on real numbers remains difficult. Many MPC frameworks implement some real
number operations, typically using a fixed-point representation. However, their functionality remains
limited, and the increased complexity of such operations present additional usability issues. For
example, many techniques require some amount of “extra space” in a fixed-point variable (relative to
the actual numerical value) to correctly evaluate without truncation or overflow. This was an issue
in the network algorithms in Chapter 4. This type of overhead should be explicitly documented or
handled entirely by the MPC engine.
Many potential users of MPC frameworks do not have a strong grounding in the underlying
primitives and techniques. Thus, frameworks designed for a general-purpose audience should aim for
simplicity that make it difficult for a user to accidentally make insecure and inefficient choices. For
example, Chapter 6 introduced a discussion on secure defaults. A production-quality framework that
offers options for multiple protocols should validate that each protocol is instantiated at an equivalent
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security level and notify the user of misaligned parameter settings. Similarly, MPC compilers should
document thoroughly—or avoid entirely—high-level language features that offer similar operations
with different performance characteristics. For example, early versions of SCALE-MAMBA [AKR+19]
feature multiple for-loop constructions, one of which is significantly more efficient (later versions
introduce a new high-level language that removes this option).
Few practical applications exist in isolation or use MPC as a complete solution. MPC software
frameworks must be integrable into existing software systems. Frameworks that design domain-
specific languages should include robust systems for receiving input and writing output data for
the computation. The most straightforward method is writing to and from files; this is typically
adaptable to read and write from standard input. Framework designers must take care to specify
exactly how such I/O systems operate. Little is more frustrating to a user than finding that their
little-endian data was interpreted as big-endian. Indeed, the implementation in Chapter 5 required a
translation layer to break complex types into correctly-oriented bitwise representations and assign
them to the corresponding wires in the circuit. Chapter 3 describes a variety of other pitfalls in I/O
manipulation. Although this topic is not particularly novel in a pure academic sense, it is essential
to an effective deployment.
Although significant work lies ahead, this author remains optimistic about the future of secure
computation. With growing awareness of MPC comes increased corporate investment, higher
quality engineering, and increased interest in standardization. These improvements, along with the
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[GHM12] C. Gouriéroux, J. C. Héam, and A. Monfort. Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency
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